

72-9169

WINSOR, Jr., Curtin, 1939-
THE NATIONAL SECURITY AND ARMAMENT POLICIES OF
ARGENTINA.

The American University, Ph.D., 1971
Political Science, general

University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan

© Copyright by

CURTIN WINSOR, Jr.

1971

THE NATIONAL SECURITY AND ARMAMENT POLICIES
OF ARGENTINA


by

Curtin Winsor, Jr.


Submitted to the
Faculty of the School of International Service
of The American University
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree
of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
International Studies


Signatures of Committee:


Chairman:


Prof. Harold E. Davis


Prof. John Finan


Prof. Brady Tyson


Prof. Larman C. Wilson


Dean of the School

Date: 8/3/71

1971

The American University
Washington, D.C.

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

AUG 20 1971

PLEASE NOTE:

**Some Pages have indistinct
print. Filmed as received.**

UNIVERSITY MICROFILMS

PREFACE

This paper is a study of the national security policies and interests of Argentina. It also includes a chapter which is specifically concerned with that nation's armament policies and interests in arms limitation. The paper is intended to give the reader a view of what constitutes Argentina's perceptions of security and military necessities in a broad perspective; for Argentina's national security is viewed by the predominant factions in the armed forces, and therefore by the government, as being synonymous with national development and industrial-military self-sufficiency.

Argentina measures herself as the hispanic leader-nation of the hemisphere vis a vis Lusiac Brazil, whom Argentina views as its principal rival. This rivalry exists mainly at the level of economic production and political influence within the southern cone of South America; within these general limits it also influences the planning of the Argentine Armed Forces.

Within the framework of this paper, Argentine national security is viewed from the perspective of Argentina's economic development, of political influence within the region (which is also related to economics),

of foreign and domestic threat factors, and, of the resultant and institutional armament requirements of the Argentine Armed Forces. Arms control is viewed in historical perspective and is analyzed in the light of recent political developments affecting levels of conventional arms and nuclear armament in South America.

A significant amount of the information provided in this paper was secured from speeches and papers of prominent Argentines which had not been disseminated in the United States. Considerable attention was also given to the Argentine press in this search and to appropriate Argentine military and civilian magazines and other published sources.

It is also appropriate that the reader should understand at the outset what this paper is not intended to be. It is not particularly concerned with the political role of the Argentine Armed Forces. Neither is this paper meant to be an assessment or evaluation of United States military aid, training or assistance policies, except where the programs extending from such policies have affected Argentina.

Defined in terms of methodology, the objective of this paper is an output study of the policies which guide Argentina's national security planners. Much of the paper contains background information on inputs and the policy processes, but the over-all purpose is

to reveal Argentine policy; supplemented by information on the history, interests and interest groups, and the national characteristics which contribute to its formulation.

The central problem dealt with in this paper is the institutional rivalry between the Peronist labor sector or mass base on the Argentine political scene and the armed forces as self-ordained guardians of the organic state and constitution. As we shall see, the running conflict between these two institutions has poisoned the political, economic and social environment of Argentina and has made the position of the last three (four since the fall of Levingston) governments quite unworkable through the imposition of political bars to Peronists and Peronist agitation and selective violence in reprisal towards the Governments.

The principal objective of this paper is to illustrate the basic issues and underlying factors resulting in Argentina's national security and armaments policies while simultaneously demonstrating the extent to which the problem of Peronism had polarized the country and dominated its official policies pertaining to national security and armaments. The dominant position in the government of the Armed Forces has resulted in these policies being aimed essentially toward the curbing of Peronism since the fall of Juan Perón in 1955.

This situation has resulted in the submergence of the nation's more traditional interests and positions on matters of international as well as domestic importance. The extent to which this distortion has occurred will be revealed in this paper, for the distortion of the nation's more traditional national security and armament policies due to Peronism is an important factor contributing to the pathological condition of Argentina today.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
LIST OF TABLES	xi
LIST OF FIGURES	xii
LIST OF MAPS	xiii
Chapter	
1. GENERAL PERSPECTIVES OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY	1
THE NATIONAL HORIZONS OF ARGENTINA FOREIGN POLICY CONSIDERATIONS	5
International Prestige	5
National Sovereignty and Economic Independence	7
The Organization of American States: (OAS)	9
Multilateral Intervention Within the Hemisphere	10
Territorial Integrity	14
NATIONAL HORIZONS: DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS	23
National Unity and Social Peace	23
The Armed Forces, Nationalism and Economic Development	25
Representative Government	32
THE ORIGINS AND THEMES OF ARGENTINE FOREIGN POLICY	36
Historical Beginnings	36

Chapter	Page
	vii
The Emergence of Modern Argentine Foreign Policy	42
Argentina, the United States and International Diplomacy	45
Argentine Opposition to Pan Americanism	48
The Internationalist Facet of Argentine Foreign Policy	53
World War II, Perón, and the Third Position	56
Anti-Communism as a Tenet of Foreign Policy	66
Future Courses of Argentine Foreign Policy	74
2. THREAT PERCEPTION	78
THREATS PERCEIVED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA	78
External Threats	79
Internal Threats	81
The Dynamics of Dichotomy	105
THREAT PERCEPTION AND INTELLIGENCE	109
The National Security Threat Perception Agencies	111
The Center for National Intelligence	113
The State Intelligence Secretariat (SIDE)	114
The Directorate of Federal Coordination (DCF)	115
Military Intelligence Organizations	115
THE DYNAMICS OF ARGENTINE THREAT PERCEPTION	116

	viii
Chapter	Page
THE EMPHASIS OF ARGENTINE INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE	120
RESPONSES TO PERCEIVED THREATS . . .	122
PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS	124
OTHER SOURCES OF THREAT PERCEPTION .	125
3. MISSIONS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND PARA- MILITARY FORCES AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY	128
THE MISSIONS DEFINED	128
Juridical Missions	129
Operational Missions	133
The Para-Military Institutions . .	143
Deployments as Indicators of Missions	151
THE ARMED FORCES EQUIPMENT PURCHASES AND MISSIONS	154
The Army	154
The Navy	162
The Air Force	170
THE HISTORY AND DYNAMICS OF INTER- SERVICE COOPERATION AND RIVALRY OVER MISSIONS AND EQUIPMENT	184
FOREIGN MILITARY INFLUENCES ON THE ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES	193
Extra-Hemispheric Military Influences	195
United States Military Assistance .	204

	ix
Chapter	Page
4. BALANCE OF POWER AND ARMS LIMITATION	215
ARGENTINE PERCEPTIONS OF THE REGIONAL BALANCE OF POWER	215
Historical Factors	215
The Contemporary Balance	222
Future Trends	231
ARGENTINE ATTITUDES TOWARDS ARMS LIMITATION	234
1902-1938: Universalism and Regional Rivalry	234
Recent Discussions of Arms Limitation Possibilities	240
ARGENTINE ATTITUDES TOWARD NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL	248
Argentina and the NPT	250
Argentina and Latin American Nuclear Free Zone (LANFZ)	253
UNIVERSALISM, REGIONALISM, NATIONALISM AND ARMS CONTROL	255
5. THE NATIONAL CONTEXT	258
INSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS	258
NATIONAL SECURITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT	262
The National Development Council (CONADE)	264
THE ARMED FORCES AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT	266
Background	266
The Industrial Role of the Armed Forces in Recent Years	270

Chapter

Page

THE FUTURE FOR THE ARMED FORCES IN THE ECONOMIC CONTEXT:	
CIVIC ACTION	275
Civic Action	276
THE COST OF THE ARMED FORCES:	
TRENDS IN FORCES AND BUDGETS	283
6. CONCLUSIONS	299
7. BIBLIOGRAPHY	307

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
1. Latin America: Long and Short Term Trends in the Volume of Military Expenditure	291
2. South America: Constant Price Figures . .	293
3. South America: Current Price Figures: Local Currency	294
4. Argentina's Military Expenditures: in Current and Constant Pesos and in U.S. Dollars, for the years 1940-1969	295

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure	Page
1. The Organizational Structure of Argentina National Security Threat Perception Machinery	117
2. Argentina Naval Vessels	170
3. Argentine Air Force and Army Hardware	183
4. Argentine and Brazil: Personnel Trained by the United States: 1959-1969	206
5. Naval Training: Personnel Programmed for Training by U.S. Navy 1959-1969: Argentina, Chile, Peru	207
6. Operational Tank and Warship Inventories	223
7. Operational Combat Aircraft Inventories: Argentina and Brazil: 1954-1968	224
8. Brazilian Force Levels	225
9. Chilean Force Levels	226
10. Military Expenditure in Latin American Countries	292

LIST OF MAPS

Map	Page
1. The Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata--1800	41
2. The Geographic Regions and Population Distribution of Argentina	82
3. Argentina	153

Chapter 1

GENERAL PERSPECTIVES OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

Argentina is the eighth largest nation on earth in area, with a territory of over 1,084,000 square miles. It is the second largest nation in South America in terms of both land area and population. The people of Argentina are largely of Southern European origin and numbered approximately 23,000,000 as of 1970. Most Argentines or their parents arrived during the great immigration waves of the 1880s, 1930s and from 1948-1954. The result racially, is a remarkably homogeneous society for a Latin American country, indeed, a nation of European immigrants.

In addition to the European character of its people, the Republic of Argentina has long held a particularly pronounced preference for the nations of Europe, both as its principal trading partners and as its sources of political and cultural inspiration. This situation arose in large measure from Argentina's relative isolation in the "southern cone" of South America geographically, from its strong cultural identifications with Europe, and from its immigration policies.

In area Argentina is the largest Spanish-speaking nation in the southern hemisphere, and as such, it has historically served as the Hispanic counter-weight to the colossus of the South American continent--Brazil. Perceiving itself as champion of Spain's legacy in America, Argentina measures itself against Brazil as its principal rival on the continent in terms of economic development, international influence and military capability.

In addition to its rivalry with Brazil, Argentina has traditionally opposed some of the political and economic policies of the United States toward Latin America. One basis for the cleavage between the United States and Argentina has always been Argentina's ambition to lead Hispanic America. This ambition resulted in its traditional opposition to a strong regional political system in the Americas which they fear would be economically and politically controlled by the United States. Argentina has, therefore, historically sought to deal on a bilateral rather than multi-lateral basis with all nations, largely in the interests of maintaining her extensive European markets and associations which prior to World War II served as counterweights to the United States. In addition, Argentina's long standing suspicion of the power and influence of the United States has been sustained by the economic competition of the two nations as exporters of cereals and meats, and by

Argentine resentment of the United States' exclusion of Argentine exports.

Thus Argentina may be characterized as isolated by geography, suspicious of the influence of the United States in Latin America, and historically distrustful of the growth of its continental rival--Brazil. It is also strongly interested in a protective, if not acquisitive and ambitious sense toward its Hispanic neighbors. As a result Argentina has evolved national interests or horizons with international dimensions which exceed in scope those of any Latin American nation save possibly for Brazil.

Defined in terms of its need for armaments, Argentina's "national horizons" present an exceedingly complex picture. Argentina has not fought a war since 1870. But her armed forces nevertheless perceive their military missions in terms of: (1) threat of attack from neighboring nations, (in the event that they should become victims of Communism); (2) internal security, to guard against subversion and guerrilla-terrorist attacks, with emphasis on urban areas; and (3) an Argentine strategic role in the event of a general war, a role that would be focused upon the protection of Argentina's commerce against possible raiders and submarines.

Argentina's national goals, particularly as they are viewed by the armed forces, stress a yearning

to achieve greatness. Argentines believe that their nation must eventually lead Hispanic America to the realization of its economic and political potential and they recognize that their own country must realize this goal itself if it is ever to be the leading nation of a continent. A second national goal of Argentina is that of economic and political freedom in the international area. This arises from Argentina's far flung trade interests in the competitive field of grain and meat export. A third national goal or precept, related to the first, calls for the opening up and settling of the national territories to the south and the diversification and development of the impoverished provinces of Tucuman, Salta and Jujuy in the northwest.

Given the over-all national goal of industrial development (modernization) and its relevance to military missions, and given the nationalistic outlook of the armed forces generally in the period between the late 1940s through the present, the overlap between these two areas is widespread. As a result, we have sizeable commitments by the armed forces to the development of heavy industries and of extractive industries, with increased priority being given to the less developed regions of the nation. In conjunction with this development/modernization role is a complimentary civic action variant, which is intended to open up isolated regions and at the same time extend the control of the

national government to the same. Such a development mission is rationalized as a precursor to private sector development and as an "innoculation" against the disease of rural insurgency, or the less likely phenomenon of irredentist behavior in the south on the part of neighboring Chile.

The following pages are intended to present to the reader the basic foreign and domestic policy objectives of Argentina which pertain to national security policy and armaments procurement. As a whole, they are intended to provide the reader with a glimpse of the national horizons of Argentina as they might be perceived by an Argentine planner, together with appropriate perspective, from the point of view of the present Government and its constituency, the Armed Forces.

THE NATIONAL HORIZONS OF ARGENTINA FOREIGN POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

International Prestige

This consideration is of great importance to Argentines, and particularly to the leaders of the armed forces, who have historically envisioned Argentina as the dominant Hispanic power of the southern cone of the continent. This tendency is enhanced by Argentina's geographic isolation from great power interests, and by its important extra-hemispheric trade interests.

Additional matters pertaining to national prestige are the result of Argentina's historic rivalry, both economic and political, with the United States. The prestige factor involved in this relationship is particularly important to Argentina relative to Brazil.

Argentina's desire for international recognition has also been manifested by military hardware acquisitions, by interest in regional peace-making, by activity in international forums, and particularly by recurrent attempts to identify with non-aligned or "third power" groups on the international scene. This tendency was particularly manifested in the past two decades by the governments of Perón and Frondizi.

Argentina's cherished pretensions to leadership within South America's southern cone if not toward the continent as a whole manifests itself in irrendentism or in a traditional and even aggressively paternalistic eagerness to engage in peacekeeping¹ or arbitration endeavors among its neighbors and sister republics which would contribute to the prestige and status of the

¹A peace-making role was played by then Argentine Foreign Minister Saavedra Lamas in the Chaco War settlement of 1933; and more recently in Argentine attempts to reconcile Peru and the U.S. in the IPC dispute. The Chaco War negotiations resulted in a much sought after Nobel Peace Prize being awarded to Saavedra Lamas in 1934. This moment was probably to represent the acme of Argentina's international prestige.

Argentine nation.

National Sovereignty and
Economic Independence

As interpreted by the Argentine Armed Forces, national sovereignty implies "combat capacity," which is defined to include: "the settlement and development of the national territories, economic self-sufficiency, and industrial development." The military view of sovereignty also requires that the armed forces enjoy the capability for "optimum combat efficiency."²

Argentina's civilian leaders (particularly those of the Popular and Intransigent Radical Parties and of the Peronists) define sovereignty largely in terms of the development of an independent foreign policy and of national freedom from the interference and the excessive influences of foreign powers. Both the military and civilian sectors place heavy emphasis upon economic self-sufficiency as an integral part of national sovereignty. However, since the overthrow of Juan Perón in 1955 the civilians (Radicals and Peronists) have tended to be less favorably inclined toward foreign capital investment as an aid to economic development than did the Onganía

²Confirmado, "Las Fuerzas Armadas en Argentina" (unsigned), Buenos Aires, April 1967, pp. 24-26. (Attributed by the U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires to Julio Alsogaray).

government or its successor. The "nationalist" and "liberal" sectors of both the armed forces and the former civilian political parties also disagree as to the extent to which foreign capital might be permitted to participate in the development of the nation without prejudice to its sovereignty. The standard of self-sufficiency on this issue is given differing interpretations by those opposed to foreign capital--known to political observers and economists as "nationalists"--and those who are favorable to it in limited amounts who are called "liberals." In general, both the civilian and military leaders of the nation place a high premium upon economic independence and development as fundamentals of national sovereignty, although, as indicated above, they may have differing views within each group as to the desirability of foreign capital as a development aid.

Argentina has had periodic tendencies towards isolationism and chauvinistic nationalism, which have also been manifestations of her exaggerated (from a U.S. perspective) notions of sovereignty or political and especially economic independence. This phase of Argentine policy has its obverse in periods of internationalism or universalism which we will examine later. The nationalist variation of Argentine foreign policy is currently held in check partly by the armed forces desire to foster industrial development and by their perception of "communist menace." The armed forces

governments have on occasion tempered their nationalism in order to meet the nation's immense capital requirements. However, nationalism has been a major factor with both military and civilian governments.

The Organization of American States: (OAS)

Viewed in the context of history, Argentina's foreign policy suggests an aspiration to political leadership in Hispanic America. But because of the dominant role of the United States among the membership of the region's principal political organization--the OAS--Argentina has generally not found the OAS to be conducive to the achievement of its own hemispheric interests and objectives. The Argentines have thus operated on the assumption that the United States exercised de facto hegemony over the OAS or Pan American Union since its formative meetings in the 19th century.

The anti-Communist stance of Argentina since Frondizi has led it to favor and, in 1967, to propose the institutionalization within the OAS of a more active advisory and coordinating body on hemispheric defense matters. The Argentine proposal would have abolished the independent Inter-American Defense Board in favor of a "Consultative Defense Committee" as a permanent standing committee of the OAS, for the specific purpose of counter-acting international communist subversion.

Argentina proposed this measure unsuccessfully at the Third Inter-American Conference at Punta del Este in 1967.³

Multilateral Intervention Within
the Hemisphere

Argentina has historically been opposed to intervention of any kind, a foreign policy factor which finds its roots in Anglo-French interventions in the Rio de la Plata area in the period between 1828-1845. These interventions were principally at Argentina's expense and resultant sensitivities have led Argentina to usually oppose the right of any nation to intervene in the affairs of any other nation.

This notion was given specific expression by Argentine Foreign Minister Luis M. Drago in 1903 to the effect that "Public debt cannot occasion armed intervention nor even the actual armed occupation of territory of American nations by a European power."⁴ In later years Argentina came to view the interventions of the United States with considerable suspicion. This tendency was manifested by Argentina's opposition to the United

³Remarks of Minister of Defense Van Peborgh at the Foreign Press Association Luncheon, November 26, 1968. Prepared text translation from United States Embassy, Buenos Aires.

⁴Foreign Relations of the United States, 1903, p. 4.

States occupations of Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic and reached a peak when Argentina abstained from the OAS Resolution of March 13, 1954, called the "Declaration of the American States Against the Intervention of International Communism." This resolution provided the basis for the application of the Rio Treaty provisions against foreign invasion or threat, should any American nation succumb to communism.

This spirit of resistance to interference and particularly U.S. interference in the affairs of a Latin American state was next invoked by Arturo Frondizi in attempting to stem OAS condemnation and expulsion of the Castro regime of Cuba from that organization. Although consonant with the nation's traditional opposition to intervention and U.S. interference per se, this position was strongly opposed by the Argentine Armed Forces. The resultant conflict between Frondizi's strict adherence to non-intervention and the armed forces perception of communist threat from Cuba led to a confrontation which seriously weakened Frondizi and contributed to his removal by a coup after Peronist provincial election victories in February and March of 1962.

The ouster of Frondizi in March, 1962, and the advent of the Cuban missile crisis, with the active participation of two Argentine destroyers in the ensuing blockade, marked the articulation of anti-communism as

an Argentine foreign policy factor; one which complemented the rising influence of the armed forces in the Government. This principle was held less dearly by the Popular Radical, President Arturo Illia (1963-1966), who together with the Argentine Congress, delayed permission for Argentine participation in the Dominican Republic intervention of 1965. This earned Illia considerable animosity from factions within the armed forces and contributed to the grounds for the coup which toppled his Government from power in June of 1966. The re-ascendency of the armed forces as the power basis of the Government again favored anti-communism over non-interventionism as a basic tenet of foreign policy. The dynamics of this interaction will be explored more precisely in a later chapter.

It is clear, however, from the course of events and from the recorded history of the nation, that Argentina's civilian governments, and particularly the Radicals, oppose intervention generally as a traditional factor of foreign policy. This is not entirely true of the armed forces, however, whose perception of threat differs and would probably favor Argentine participation in a multilateral hemispheric intervention against a communist regime. In part, this interventionist outlook would be abetted by the reluctance of the Argentine Armed Forces to permit Brazil to again provide the troops and leadership for such a development as in the case

of the Dominican Republic.

The Argentine Government and the armed forces have consistently opposed proposals for a standing Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) for the same reason that they have little confidence in the political independence of the OAS--basic fear of United States influence. Argentines feel that such an organization could readily become a multi-lateral tool of United States foreign policy and therefore oppose it as a permanent entity.

On the other hand, the government originated proposals for the creation of a "Consultative Defense Committee" within the OAS in 1966 and 1968 with the purpose of developing a more responsive continental defense mechanism than presently exists in the semi-autonomous, Inter-American Defense Board. The crucial difference as between the two concepts is that the IAPF would be a standing force or "ready tool" for the purpose of "anti-communist intervention," whereas the Argentines favor a more convenient, consultative arrangement, wherein they still retain the right to national deliberation prior to actual commitment.

The historic Argentine policy in favor of non-intervention in the affairs of other nations is supported as a general principle by the influential "middle" sectors of the Argentine populace which are usually represented by the Radical Parties. In this

context, the non-intervention principle would be universally applicable as against outside intervention in the continent under any circumstances short of a direct threat from another country. On the other hand, it is likely that Argentine participation in a multi-lateral effort against a Communist inspired internal conflict in a neighboring or hemispheric country would stimulate considerable popular dissent. The military would be more likely to favor such a contingency, particularly if Argentina's neighbors were involved; however, the support of the civilian populace or of a popularly elected civilian government in the future would not be so certain.

Territorial Integrity

Argentina's historical tradition of self-proclaimed leadership over hispanic southern South America--sometimes called the "Vice Regal Tradition"--(see page 42) leads to intransigence on matters pertaining to the nation's present borders. It also gives Argentina a strong irredentist proclivity directed towards recovery or at least "guardianship" over the lands which were once included within the old Viceroyalty of the Plata (see Map 1). Argentina's claims to the Malvinas Islands, the three small islands in the Beagle Channel, and her interest in the combined economic development of the southern hispanic states of the

"Cuenca del Plata" (within which she would be the dominant nation) all reflect the "Viceregal" tradition as a factor of national interest.

Argentina's constitution expressly prohibits the alienation of national territory, and the armed forces, by the definition of their missions, are also dedicated to its protection, settlement and economic development. Military and civilian views on the matter of territorial integrity differ little save perhaps on emphasis.

Civilian or Radical Governments usually downplay "confrontations" with Argentina's neighbors over border conflicts, whereas the governments dominated by the armed forces or explicitly dependent upon them for sustenance, are apt to be more willing to raise issues, particularly with Chile, over boundary disputes and territorial questions. In part this attitude on the part of the armed forces reflects their exaggerated sense of nationalism in the vice royal sense, as well as their mission to protect and develop the national territory. The development of the national territory also is cited by nationalists in the armed forces as preventative endeavor as against future irredentism on the part of Chile in the South or Brazil in the north. Development and territorial integrity are thus inter-related to a number of Argentine military planners.

Both civilian and military governments of Argentina consistently pursue the goal of Argentine economic and political influence within the southern cone and the continent as a whole. Argentina has been an active participant in the Cuenca del Plata, within which it is vying with Brazil for regional leadership in a development sense. This project had received the support of the civilian Illia government, and the armed forces supported regimes of Juan Onganía and Roberto Levingston.

The territorial integrity of the nation would be stoutly defended by any Argentine Government. As a nation, Argentina would be adamant in resisting any encroachment on what presently constitutes the territory of the Republic and shades of emphasis as mentioned above would apply only to disputed areas such as Antarctica, the "Malvinas," and the Beagle Channel Islands. Any encroachment on Argentina's present national territory would be considered casus belli by civilian or military governments of Argentina.

Present territorial disputes. Argentina's relations with her neighbors and the world have been remarkably peaceable, her last war having been fought in 1870. Several disputes with Chile have occurred over the years however. Notable among these is the disputed Argentine claim to three islands in the Beagle

Channel. Andean border disputes with Chile have been resolved by arbitrations, including one as recently as 1966. These incidents and the long-standing claim against Britain for the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) are of significance to Argentina on grounds of national pride. The importance of these disputed areas arises from the fact that a blow to national pride from defeat in a skirmish at one of them could seriously diminish popular support for an Argentine government.

"Las Islas Malvinas". The "Malvinas Islands," better known to the world as the Falkland Islands, have been a target for Argentine irredentism for over 125 years. The Islands were claimed for Spain by the Vice Royalty of the Plata, in 1803, but were evacuated by order of the Viceroy in 1811. In 1820, the first post-independence government of Argentina, then called the United Provinces of La Plata, sent a frigate to re-establish the colony on the islands as an assertion of control and as part of its policy for reunifying the various territories once under the Viceroyalty of the Plata.⁵

The Argentine governor of the islands later became embroiled in a serious incident with the United States over fishing rights, which led to his

⁵Harold F. Peterson, Argentina and the United States: 1810-1960 (State University of New York, 1964), p. 103.

arrest and removal by the commanding officer of the U.S. Frigate, Lexington, in 1832. The ensuing dispute was settled in fact when the British re-established their old claim to the Islands and recolonized them in 1833. Argentina has since periodically reasserted her claim to the Islands and Britain has regarded the matter-- according to one of her historians--as "neither important enough to solve nor unimportant enough to forget."⁶ The issue has remained on dead center and is likely to remain so if the U.K. respects the wishes of the Islands' 2000 inhabitants, who are predominantly of British descent.⁷ Argentina has refused to accede to Britain's suggestions of arbitration on this matter by the World Court.

The Malvinas issue has served as a popular manifestation of the Argentine viceregal tradition and, to a small but significant extent, as a justification for building up Argentina's naval power. In addition, various Argentine Governments have used the pretext of the "Malvinas" to direct the attention of the populace away from domestic problems. Thus, the "Malvinas" have served as an externalized and essentially political issue which can be employed for the purpose of rallying nationalist sentiment to the interests of the government.

⁶H. S. Ferns, Britain and Argentina in the Nineteenth Century (London, 1960).

⁷Peterson, op. cit., p. 118.

Patagonia, Tierra del Fuego and the Beagle

Channel. Since the mid-nineteenth century, Argentina and Chile have had disputes over southern Patagonia and the vast and sparsely inhabited island known as Tierra del Fuego, which is located at the extreme southern tip of the continent. Recently, the focus of the dispute has been a group of three miniscule, barren islands in the Beagle Channel. These islands are claimed by Argentina on the grounds that the original division by Britain's arbitration of Tierra del Fuego and Patagonia in 1881 was based on a faulty survey. At various times since the turn of the century, Argentina and Chile have been on the verge of submitting this matter to further arbitration. However, these efforts have all perished in procedural and preliminary difficulties. In December, 1967, the Foreign Minister of Chile unilaterally requested British mediation of this dispute. Argentine claims against Britain and the unilateral character of the Chilean request led to Argentina's refusal to accept British arbitration and the question has remained unsettled.⁸

The Islands are named Picton, Nueva and Lennox. They extend into the Beagle Channel, running from north to south in it, bordering respectively on the interior

⁸ Alfredo Rizzo Romano, "Aspectos legales del arbitraje solicitado por Chile en la cuestion del Beagle," Estrategia, No. 3 (September-October, 1969), pp. 66-72.

of the Beagle Channel, and on the edge of the Drake Passage. By gaining possession of them, Chileans believe that Argentina's planners envision an "open border" created by possession of these islands, which would face the Antarctic Continent which lies 640 miles directly across the Drake Passage, and thereby enhance Argentina's claims there. Argentina and Chile have long had conflicting claims in Antarctica, which are temporarily held in abeyance by the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, in which all interested nations suspended their claims to the area for 30 years.⁹

It is significant that Argentina's naval planners feel that the Beagle Channel ports have potential strategic value as bases for air and sea anti-submarine warfare operations, in the event that a major war in the future might remove the Panama Canal from operation. Argentina wants at least a share in the control of the Drake Passage, and the Port of Ushuaia could serve this function well, but less securely, they say, with the channel islands in the hands of a "leftist" or marxist Chile, as they are and have been since 1881.

Another aspect of the situation in Patagonia and Tierra del Fuego is the estimated potential of the region's resources and the growing number of Chilean

⁹Thomas McGann, Argentina: The Divided Land (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1966), p. 12.

citizens inhabiting the territory of Tierra del Fuego. These are said to include over 40.5 percent of the territory's 10,200 inhabitants, most of whom are employed as contract laborers and herdsmen. The principal source of Argentine official presence in Tierra del Fuego is a 200 man naval and air station at Ushuaia (population: 4000), which lies close to the Chilean border.

Tierra del Fuego and Patagonia thus are of immediate concern to Argentina's armed forces because they are thought to have both immense and untapped mineral and energy resources, and a growing population of workers and residents whose primary allegiance is to Chile. They believe that such an alien population would constitute a threat to Argentine sovereignty at a time when Argentina and Chile have conflicting border claims in the region and when Chile is dominated by radical "left-wing" civilian political trends.

At the heart of the on-going Argentine-Chilean dispute is the factor of their fundamentally different attitudes toward regional economic development and foreign policy. As a relatively wealthy and self-sufficient nation, Argentina has consistently advocated regional economic development and integration, but as a concomitant or result of national development. Chile, on the other hand, has viewed regional integration as a vital element to her own national development, which is perilously dependent on the fluctuations of world

copper prices. In spite of increased national trade and ostensibly friendly relations between the two nations, this theme has been an irritant which has interfered with serious discussions of diplomatic significance between the two neighbors, including their territorial disputes, and has contributed to the non-resolution of the Beagle Channel and Andean Border questions.¹⁰

The 200 mile territorial sea and seabed. Argentina claims sovereignty over national territorial waters which extend 200 miles from her shoreline and over: "the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to its territory to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the supra-adjacent waters permit the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas."¹¹

The rationales for the Argentine position on the 200 mile limit include economic and security considerations, the latter posed by: foreign "spying" (.e.g, Soviet trawlers), and the spectre of unauthorized military use of the adjacent seabed by another state.

¹⁰New York Times, May 8, 1968, p. 8.
Juan E. Guglielmelli, "Nuestro tema central: La Patagonia," Estrategia, No. 3 (September-October, 1969), pp. 5-8.

¹¹Law 17,094 of December 29, 1966.

The economic and developmental aspects of the seabed are also a factor, given Argentina's economic interpretation of national security, and the fear of some planners that if Argentina does not develop or at least assert possession of such resources, others will. The fact that several oil companies are presently drilling for off-shore oil deposits in these waters further enhances the position from an economic point of view; and the 200 mile territorial sea is also perceived by the Argentines to improve their claim to the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) which lie 400 miles off shore from Patagonia and Tierra del Fuego.

Up to the present time the only forceful assertion of Argentine sovereignty over these waters has been the arrest of a Russian factory ship for fishing in them without a license. Argentine destroyers fired on that ship which was subsequently captured, and a second one which escaped with damage into "safe-haven" in Uruguayan waters.

NATIONAL HORIZONS: DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS

National Unity and Social Peace

This consideration is given high priority by both the military and civilian sectors in Argentina. The crucial obstacle to its realization has been Peronism, the substantial labor-oriented sector of the population which has been politically isolated and

alienated since the dictator's overthrow in 1955. Most Argentine political upheavals and military political interventions since 1955 have been provoked by the armed forces' unwillingness to permit the Peronists to gain a position of power within the Argentine government. Since they amount to over one third of the civilian voting population in Argentina, the Peronists represent the single largest and most cohesive unit within the civilian political spectrum.

The armed forces themselves are divided as to how the Peronist problem should be handled politically. They have generally been inclined to view any strong political showing by the Peronists as a threat to their position as "guardians of the constitution." Hence, for reasons which they perceive to be in their institutional interests, the armed forces have strongly opposed organized direct Peronist participation as or through a political party in Argentine politics and government.

Basically, the armed forces have responded to the Peronists with repressive measures, whereas the civilian sectors have sought integration and/or cooperation with them. The Peronists themselves represent the coherent interests of the large majority of the trade union movement of Argentina, with scattered support from the other sectors. They had become increasingly divided as between cooperation with the Onganía government and active, if not armed resistance to it, with

some splinter groups opting for the adoption of terrorist and disruptive tactics. The general ban by the government against all political parties includes the Peronists, whose activities are thereby confined to the area of government-labor relations. To date, these activities have been conducted under an uneasy truce in the face of sporadic protests, some of which have been initiated by the university students.

The Armed Forces, Nationalism
and Economic Development

The belief of the armed forces in their development mission has the purpose, as we saw above, of preserving the nation's territorial integrity. More important, however, is the internal facet of this mission which includes the armed forces comprehensive view of defense and the state. The following quote from a recent Minister of Defense illustrates this perspective.

In the convulsed world in which we are living, . . . the welfare of man will be attained through complete development, this being the reason why development is of prime importance (to the national security of Argentina).

The military factor as a means of defense is of complementary value and it must contribute with its action to obtain the special situation or protection in order that complete development may be achieved without interferences.

Ing. Emilio Van Peborgh, Argentine
Minister of Defense. Speech given to
the Foreign Press Association Luncheon,
November 26, 1968 (U.S. Embassy Trans-
lation from the prepared text.)

Since the early 1930s, the Argentine Armed Forces have interpreted their role to be that of preparing the nation to enable it to withstand assault from without or within. They think of this role as strongly linked to the goal of industrial development by which a nation must "build cohesion within the national community."¹² The armed forces have carefully distinguished this role from that of maintaining law and order, however, which is relegated to the police or para-military security forces. National development from the point of view of the armed forces is meant to prevent internal security problems. It calls for the deterrence of violence through military preparedness, the nourishment of its economic roots through modernization, and the development of the national economy (including the ability to produce weaponry) with resultant increases in employment and commitment to the concept of a cohesive and peaceful national community.¹³

The armed forces believe that they are called upon to promote constructive change as well as to identify and neutralize the enemies of such change. Their missions, as they view them, are particularly geared to the economic problems and needs of the national community. Should they fail in their role in the national development, the armed forces leaders

¹²Confirmado, "Las Fuerzas . . .," p. 24.

¹³Ibid.

fear that national economic stagnation would ensue generating social and political consequences that would reduce the cohesiveness of the nation, and ultimately of the armed forces themselves, leaving Argentina vulnerable to Communist subversion.

The armed forces perception of their development role has been influenced by their goal of Argentine self-sufficiency in the field of weapons manufacture. Argentine officers remember that they were cut off from their sources of weapons in the two world wars of this century. Even today they believe that the United States has deliberately denied them what they perceive to be needed modern equipment commensurate with their national requirements. In 1945, this perception led the Argentine Armed Forces to develop a network of armaments factories that today can produce light weapons, trucks, aircraft and all kinds of ammunition, and which now can turn out AMX-13 tanks, naval frigates, and other forms of combat equipment. The Argentine Armed Forces doctrine of national self-sufficiency lies at the heart of the matter. Toward that goal over the past several decades the armed forces have taken on an increasingly active and broad responsibility for the promotion and planning of national industrial development, particularly in the field of the metallurgical industries. This sense of responsibility has coincided with the armed forces'

objective of national greatness through industrial expansion, an expansion that they believe will eventually lead to independence from the political and economic influence of foreign powers. The armed forces view of the need for national development is effectively summarized in the following quotations given by armed forces leaders at different times and which reflect remarkable consistency of vision.

At no moment in history has there been a case of a weak military nation developing into an industrial power; and neither has there been found a nation with military capability which lacked an industrial base.¹⁴

Confirmado, April 1967
(Attributed to General
Alsogaray)

Modern warfare requires a sound economy and strong industry. An efficient army and navy are not enough to keep a nation free and sovereign, because they would be like a coat of mail on a body unable to carry it. We must develop an athlete in armor to insure our country's freedom: in other words, the country must be strong economically.

Col. Marino Abarca
Director General of
Industries, 1942¹⁵

The armed forces may thus rationalize their leadership role in Argentina's national development in terms of logistical independence leading to national

¹⁴Ibid., p. 25.

¹⁵Ysabel F. Rennie, The Argentine Republic. (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1945), p. 376. See also: El Cronista Comercial (Buenos Aires), June 1, 1944.

military strength. Likewise, Argentine civilian elements tend to regard national development in terms of industrialization and of Argentine international independence and prestige. Both of these national sectors thus favor industrialization, although groups within each favor the achievement of this objective through the use of varying degrees of state control as opposed to private investment and use of foreign capital.

The armed forces generally take a more nationalistic view of development than do the civilian elements, although substantial minorities within each sector modify such a generalization. Argentines all favor the development of an independent industrial capability and attainment of a more favorable balance of trade on the world markets as a potential exporter of industrial products. This dream rationalizes the recent Argentine arrangements for the purchase of armaments in Europe--arrangements which have specified that the weapons (and ships) must be assembled and at least be partly manufactured and assembled in Argentina. (See p. 266)

Civilian attitudes toward national development generally tend to be less statist in character than do those of the armed forces. Development and industrialization per se is less important to the civilians as a matter of priority than to the armed forces. The

military's involvement in industry is becoming more oriented toward forms of mixed corporations which feature combined capital investment by both the armed forces and private sector. Both armed forces and civilian planners thus find common ground, though with differing emphases, on the principle that the armed forces acting alone should exploit only those areas of the economy which the private sector is unable to efficiently handle.¹⁶

In the context of this subject it is impossible to ignore the political role of the armed forces and its effects on national security policy. As we have pointed out above, the armed forces backstop the country as advocates and where other sources fail, as mechanisms of economic development. They view the political scene in the same manner, and have attempted to justify their interventions into Governments since their ouster of Irygoyen in 1930 on grounds of saving the nation from political breakdown. In this sense they have approached their role in a deliberative manner, and have thrown out governments deemed by them to pose a threat to the well-being of the nation.

¹⁶ Confirmado, "Las Fuerzas . . .," p. 24.
Gen. Osiris G. Villegas, "La Seguridad y su implicancia en las sectoriales," Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra, XLV (September-October, 1967), pp. 15-16.

This rationale has worn thin in recent decades on the fact that the threat to the nation is interpreted by the armed forces leadership to arise from the challenge to them of Peronism, the largest civilian political/labor movement in the country. The leaders of the armed forces view Peronism as a threat to their own perogatives and the position of the armed forces as the nation's dominant and all-purpose institution.

The political role of the armed forces has traditionally become awkward when they have attempted to sustain a government for protracted periods of time. Internal problems built up following Perón's ouster in 1955, and now appear to be affecting the Government of the Armed Forces headed by General Alejandro Lanusse. The pressures of being in direct political control are seen by the armed forces leadership as being corrosive of the unity of the services and fostering ideological factions within the ranks. The result will probably be elections with some sort of safeguard against an outright Peronist victory.

The deliberative function of the armed forces thus carries into the economic and political spheres of the nation. The country's strong attachment to representative government plus the tendency for actual control of the Government to weaken and divide the armed forces create a traditional counter to

temptation for the armed forces to hold direct power through a given government for longer than interim periods.

Representative Government

When General Julio Alsogaray overthrew the popularly elected Illia government in 1966, the armed forces acted in order to achieve a viable economic base for the nation which would in turn, "lead to a more stable political atmosphere amenable to the eventual and successful return to the democratic process." Their position was that the chaotic, splintered, personalist, and irresponsible civilian political party system had been unable to cope with either the Peronist problem or the pressing economic needs of the country since 1955. This situation created what the military leaders of 1966 perceived to be a national crisis against which they had to react decisively for the national welfare. The Onganía Government had promised elections, but in the indefinite future, with the caveat that such political normalcy would follow on the heels of solutions to the nation's economic problems and of social stability conducive to a stable, development-oriented and unified nation. (The events of June 9, 1970 indicated that this was too broad a departure from representative government for the armed forces and concentrated too much power in the

Presidency.)

Civilian opinion on the matter of representative government is divided. The economic policies of the Onganía Government initially received some support because they demonstrably reduced the nation's inflationary spiral. However, the civilian politicians of Argentina have almost always been self-seeking and pragmatic, and they would think of any overall estimate of civilian views as generally favorable towards a prompt return to representative government. Opposition to the non-representative Onganía and Levingston Governments had been growing among student elements and among the clergy (and even the church's hierarchy) who favored a more accelerated approach to the solution of social problems in the face of the Government's bias towards matters of economic development. This trend was accelerated when Rosario and Córdoba experienced severe disturbances in 1969. Dissatisfaction has also been widespread in the impoverished areas of Tucuman and Salta, where the Government's economically motivated shut-down of a large percentage of the sugar industry created a serious unemployment problem.

The durability of the Levingston Government, as with that of Onganía, remained dependent upon the extent to which it represented the institutional interests of the armed forces. The Junta terminated Juan C. Onganía's lease on the Casa Rosada abruptly on June 9, 1970, when

its members felt he had acquired too much power for the presidency. The question of eventual return to representative government was the ostensible reason for this action, for Onganía had earlier stated that the armed forces would remain in power for "at least a decade," and the "Liberal" elements of the armed forces found this to be unpalatable. The tendency of the Onganía regime to attempt to enlist Peronist support also offended the armed forces.

The departure of Onganía did not change the actual institutions or basic policies of the Government. The Levingston Government faced its problem of representative government with no easy solution in sight. While Perón lives, the armed forces will not permit his followers to participate in a representative governmental process as such. Perón's various followers constitute over one third of the electorate. The other political parties rarely if ever poll over one quarter of the vote. It follows therefore that any return to representative government in Argentina must include a solution to the Peronist problem. The question of truly representative government thus constitutes a most basic factor to the national horizons of Argentina; and as a question, it remains unanswerable until the problem of Peronism and the armed forces is resolved in an equitable manner.

The Levingston Government initiated a plan for

return to political "normalcy" in five years in September of 1970. This plan, called La Salida, featured the disappearance of the traditional political parties and direct participation by the people in an elected Government, which would be permitted first at the local level and finally on a national scale.¹⁷ In preparing for these events, President Levingston was in communication with all ex-presidents residing in Argentina, excluding the Peronists.¹⁸ There are indications that the turn of events in Chile have re-enforced the armed forces perceptions of need for La Salida, or a return to an elected and non-communist government and sooner than the five year span proposed by Levingston. These pressures may have also served to improve the possibility of an arrangement with the Peronists.

The "Liberal" faction in the armed forces have been more favorable to the holding of elections within the next two years. This issue and the question of economic nationalism created great pressure between the Presidency of Arturo Levingston and Army CINC Lanusse, ultimately resulting in the removal of the former in April of 1971.

¹⁷La Prensa (Buenos Aires), September 30, 1970, pp. 1, 2.

¹⁸William Montalbano, "The Game of Politics Returns to Argentina," The Miami Herald, September 24, 1970, p. 12.

THE ORIGINS AND THEMES OF ARGENTINE
FOREIGN POLICY

Historical Beginnings

Argentina's remoteness from the Spanish Colonial System and the energy of its armies, bound together under the brilliant command of General José de San Martín, in large part accounted for the achievement of southern South America's independence from Spain. In 1810, Spain's grip on Argentina's forerunner, the Rio de la Plata Viceroyalty, was a weak one. This weakness grew out of its geographical remoteness from the principal areas of Spanish colonial activity, and its lack of easily extractable resources and exports (beyond hides and salted beef), all of which contributed to give Argentina a relatively low priority for attention from the repressive forces of the Spanish King.

On May 25th, 1810, following the conquest of Spain by Napoleonic France, dissident Argentines threw out an unpopular and weak Viceroy and founded the Junta provisional gubernativa de la provincia del Rio de la Plata. This government was headed by dissident criollos (native born persons of Spanish descent) acting on behalf of the exiled Spanish king. The criollo leaders soon recognized that their decisive step in 1810 committed them to independence and that independence could only be secured when the Spanish Royalist presence and threat

in Chile had been eliminated. Accordingly, under the brilliant leadership of José de San Martín, the Argentines prepared an expeditionary force for this purpose. While these preparations were under way, criollo representatives from the provinces of the former Viceroyalty of La Plata met in Tucuman in 1816 and declared complete independence from Spain as the United Confederation of La Plata-- becoming the first nation of Latin America to do so. In 1817, San Martín struck at the Spanish forces in Chile by making a dramatic march across the Andes which culminated in his victories at Chacabuco and Maipú. This maneuver surprised and defeated the Spanish forces in Chile and paved the way for victory in Peru. The Peruvian campaign began with San Martín's amphibious landing on the south coast of that country in early 1820 and culminated with his capture of Lima in July of 1821.¹⁹

By this time San Martín was both the leader of the Armies of the South and Ruler of Peru and was presumably in a position to secure immense power for himself. However he was also a man of solid principles and broad vision. When he met with his northern counterpart, Simón Bolívar, in Guayaquil on July 26-27, 1822, he recognized that the gulf between his own belief in monarchism and the Pan American republicanism of Bolívar

¹⁹Ricardo Levene, A History of Argentina (Trans. and ed. by W. S. Robertson) (Chapel Hill, N. C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1937), p. 263.

could not be bridged. Accordingly he gave up his command over the Armies of the South and his Rulership of Peru in favor of Bolívar, thereby leaving Bolívar in nominal command of all South American revolutionary forces, and retired from public life and politics permanently.²⁰

This selfless action facilitated the liberation of the continent and permitted San Martín a place in the history of the continent unrivalled for purity of purpose.

San Martín's motto was: "Seras lo que debes ser, y si no, no seras nada." (Be what you ought to be or else you will be nothing.)²¹ San Martín, resigned because he recognized that he could not pursue his ideal of a multi-nation continent ruled by monarchies without ruinous conflict. He thereby averted what would have almost certainly been a clash between Bolívar's northern forces and his own armies of the south.

The idealism of San Martín left an abiding impression upon Argentines and particularly the officers of the armed forces who have interpreted his beliefs to suit their purposes on several occasions. However, San Martín's opposition to military intervention in politics has always been respected, though lamentably not notably adhered to, by his successors. A philosophically inclined person might well view what has

²⁰George Pendle, Argentina (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 30-31.

²¹Levene, op. cit., p. 270.

transpired in Argentina as a negation of the motto of San Martín. For the Argentine nation has hung between the poles of exaggerated national pride or chauvinism, and listlessness and disunity in confronting national problems. This persisting condition has undoubtedly been due as much to Argentina's historic regionalism (as between the city of Buenos Aires and the interior provinces with their caudillos and gaucho soldiers in the 19th Century) as it was to the make or break attitude of San Martín. Nevertheless, in the late 1800s Argentina anticipated a destiny for itself in the south comparable to that of the United States in the north--in terms of her economic potential, international interests and national prestige as the basis for hemispheric influence.²²

The contradictions inherent in the later policies and makeup of this nation can be contrasted with the example of San Martín and his posthumous attributes, for he is credited by many Argentine thinkers, and particularly the armed forces, as being a fundamental influence upon Argentina's concept of itself as a nation. The mystique of San Martín, the first professional soldier of South America, haunts Argentina's history. An authoritarian with high ideals and a passion for law and order, San Martín is credited with having bequeathed

²²Alejandro Magnet, Nuestros Vecinos Justicialistas (Santiago de Chile: Editorial de Pacífico, 1953), p. 30.


to the 20th Century Argentine military their self-appointed mission as "Guardians of the Constitution." He refused to accept power when he could see it would have to be ~~adulterated~~ by compromise and so, perhaps more astute than Bolívar, he departed the South American scene unscathed by failure or the corruption of his ideals. Briefly stated, San Martín is symbolic of the paradox of a nation with vast potential that has failed to find adequate political or economic solutions to its national problems due to the rigid outlook of its dominant institution, the Armed Forces.

The memory of San Martín and the geographic extent of the Spanish Viceroyalty are among the most basic parameters of Argentine national perception and, ultimately, of Argentina's national horizons and security concepts.

The early military efforts of Argentina on behalf of independence for Chile and Peru had the secondary objective of consolidating within Argentina parts of Bolivia, and all of Paraguay and Uruguay, which were included within the Spanish Viceroyalty of the Plata. However, in various ways these regions successfully resisted early Argentine efforts toward their reincorporation and survived to become the separate nations of Paraguay, Bolivia and Uruguay.²³

²³McCann, op. cit., p. 77.

Map 1
 THE VICEROYALTY OF THE RIO DE LA PLATA--1800
 COMMUNICATION AND TRADE ROUTES*



*from Scobie, Op cit., p.52

The Emergence of Modern
Argentine Foreign Policy

Argentina's perspective of foreign policy and national security has manifested itself in two primary modes, one of which may be called the Viceregal Tradition or the desire to dominate the territory included in the original Viceroyalty of the Plata. This mode or variation has often been obscured by the second principal Leitmotif, that of internationalism. The Viceregal Tradition has principally manifested itself in Argentina's self-acknowledged arrogance, a national trait arising from a vaguely defined but never forgotten sense of leadership in Hispanic South America, particularly as against the 'racially and culturally inferior colossus to the North', Brazil. The original Viceroyalty of the Plata had been designed by the Spanish King in part to buffer Brazilian ambitions, and in part to guard against British incursions. These objectives Argentina has not forgotten. Argentina's attitude towards the rest of Latin America in the years preceding the Second World War was that of a superior power. Nevertheless, this accusation has always been denied by Argentines who insist that they have never abused their strength, and that they have a long record of non-aggressive, co-existence with their neighbors. They claim that Juan Manuel de Rosas' campaigns against Montevideo were defensive in

character, designed to prevent the La Plata River estuary from falling into Brazilian or British hands. They are quick to point out that the Paraguayan War of 1865-1870 (The War of the Triple Alliance) was not initiated by the Argentines but declared on Argentina by Paraguay. They add that Argentina's foreign minister subsequently demonstrated that nation's magnanimity when he stated that "Victory gives no rights" in the conferences over the territories of defeated Paraguay.²⁴ Argentines will point out that in 1902, their most serious frontier dispute with Chile over the Andean demarcation line was settled by arbitration and not on the battlefield.²⁵ Finally, in most recent times, Argentine President and Dictator Juan Perón's pacts of 'economic union' (based on the Pact of Santiago of 1952) with his weaker neighbors (Bolivia and Paraguay) are defended as reciprocal benefit arrangements with no political implications. This last item was contentiously argued by other parties to the treaties, particularly the Uruguayans who never did join the "Union."

²⁴Levene, op. cit., p. 480.

²⁵This statement was uttered during the post-war settlement negotiations with expansion-minded Brazil and Uruguay, Argentina's allies in the War. The meaning of this phrase was considered to be less of a self-denying injunction than a warning to Brazil. It must be noted that Argentina took from Paraguay the Misiones region and much of the Gran Chaco in this settlement.

The conciliatory variation of the Viceregal Tradition has been revealed in Argentina's interest in arbitrating or settling border disputes and problems arising between its neighbor states. The Argentines have gone to considerable lengths to arbitrate or settle such matters, particularly in the case of the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay (1933-1936).

The solicitous attitude manifested by Argentina towards the problems among its neighbors does not carry over into cases in which its own borders are open to question. For the Argentines are fiercely determined to keep that real estate which they presently possess. Thus the Viceregal Tradition should be viewed as a manifestation of Argentine interest in accumulating international prestige, and in influencing the affairs of the other Hispanic states that once were wholly or partially included in the Viceroyalty of the Plata. The Argentines cling with tenacity to their claims upon territories whose worth may be negligible but which lie with the outer territorial limits of the original Viceregal boundaries. Argentina's obdurate claims to several border areas of little value along the Andes and to three barren islands in the Beagle Channel are cases in point, as is their claim to the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) and a large portion of Antarctica.²⁶

²⁶McGann, op. cit., p. 77.

Argentina, the United States and
International Diplomacy

Argentina . . . raised the flag for another kind of Panamericanism. It was for the (unique) development of each nation; for economic progress based fundamentally on foreign commerce. . . . It was for the development of strong and sustained foreign trade.²⁷

--Nicanor Costa Mendez (1965)

Isolationism, nationalism, and a strong consciousness of the example of San Martín ("Be what you ought to be . . .") have traditionally restricted Argentina's willingness to become involved in regional or multilateral organizations or pacts. Ever since Simón Bolívar's unsuccessful attempt to create a Confederation of Hispanic American States in 1826, Argentina has been reluctant to support a multilateral organization for Latin America as a region;²⁸ preferring instead to deal with the region through bilateral pacts.

Argentines tend to view themselves as the eventual leaders of Hispanic America, if not of the continent as a whole. They are inclined to view with

²⁷ Nicanor Costa Mendez, "Política internacional de Argentina (1880-1930)." (Lecture given at the Centro de Altos Estudios) May 5, 1965. Unpublished mimeograph in Spanish, translated by C. Winsor).

²⁸ Robert N. Burr, "The Balance of Power in Nineteenth Century South America," Hispanic Americans Historical Review (February, 1955), pp. 40-42. See also: H. E. Peterson, Argentina and the United States: 1810-1960, op. cit., pp. 276-276.

suspicion any international or regional organization wherein the United States may supplant Argentina's influence by means of its preponderant political and economic power. Argentina's aversion to regional or hemispheric cooperation in an organizational sense dates back to Mariano Moreno, the secretary of Argentina's first governing junta following the expulsion of the viceroy in 1819. Moreno was credited with articulating Argentina's resistance to federation among the Spanish colonies--largely due to an aversion to Colombian, Mexican, or Bolivarian leadership. Moreno later became an advocate of limited continental cooperation, when he appealed for U.S. assistance against Spain for the South American revolutionary campaigns in 1813. Moreno's early dictum opposing multilateralism has stuck in Argentina, however, even if the reasoning behind the original idea was warped somewhat in the process--from opposition to Bolívar to opposition and suspicion of the United States.²⁹

The failure of the Panama Congress of 1826 to achieve a "Pan American Union" was abetted by Argentina's refusal to attend or discuss continental solidarity, particularly under the leadership of Colombia and Simón Bolívar.³⁰ (This attitude in part reflected the

²⁹Levene, op. cit., pp. 260-261.
Peterson, op. cit., pp. 275-276.

³⁰Ibid., p. 277.

fact that the country was then at war with Brazil, suffering from chaotic internal divisions.)

Sixty-three years later in 1889, when the Washington Conference of American States was called by the United States, an Argentine delegation attended but articulated their country's opposition to regional multilateralism and any constraints upon the extra-continental economic and political relationships of Argentina. This conference had an elaborate agenda which included such visionary and far-reaching proposals as a Pan American customs union, a common American coinage, an American arbitration treaty and strengthened inter-American communications and cultural ties.³¹ However, the Conference foundered (except perhaps in its creation of the Pan American Union) on the skillful opposition to these proposals by the two Argentine delegates, Roque Saenz-Pena and Manuel Quintana, who seized every initiative in order to out maneuver United States efforts to create tighter hemispheric bonds.³²

The definitive Argentine position at the conference was clearly stated for posterity by Roque

³¹Thomas F. McGann, Argentina, the United States and the Inter-American System, 1880-1914 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 75-76, 145-148.

³²Ibid., pp. 146-148. Peterson, op. cit., pp. 281-283.

Saenz-Pena: "Argentina was open to the trade, people, and capital of the world: she would form no part of any bloc which might restrict her happy relations with Europe." In response to the U.S. sentiment: "America for the Americans," the Argentines replied: "Let America be for Humanity." It was at this meeting that Argentina set the pattern of resistance and opposition to the United States' leadership within the region and ensuing regional organizations which it has followed consistently to the present time.³³

Argentine Opposition to
Pan Americanism

Argentine policy towards any proposed Pan American system was based upon the following formula:

It resisted entry into any system of rigid structure which impeded Argentine trade with the world and particularly with Europe.

Argentina was not disposed to enter into any system in the Americas which was under the hegemony or protection of the United States.

Argentina sought to bring about a Pan American political consensus which emphasized dialogue among the South American nations and which would be limited to commerce among these nations.

Argentina refused to accept a Pan American system . . . which in any way detracted from the sovereignty to which Argentina aspired.³⁴

--Nicanor Costa Mendez, (1965)

³³McGann, op. cit., pp. 154-155. Peterson, op. cit., p. 283.

³⁴Costa Mendez, lecture.

The rationale for Argentina's historic aversion to hemispheric multilateral commitments is in part provided by an exaggerated sense of sovereignty. This view has been supported by Argentina's geographic isolation, bolstered by the historical isolationism of Manuel Moreno, sustained by an export-based economy and a sense of proprietary leadership over southern Hispanic America, and finally, it was reinforced by a sense of rivalry toward the United States of America.

The preponderant economic and political vitality of the United States in the late 19th century and early 20th century was a factor against which Argentine nationalism was shaped in the area of international affairs. The vice-regal legacy and a vision of continental grandeur caused Argentina to consistently oppose the leadership of the United States in the southern hemisphere, toward the development of the political capabilities of the Pan American Union since 1889, and it also became evident in the early years of the League of Nations.

In the conferences at Versailles, Argentina maintained that the League's acceptance of the Monroe Doctrine as a regional arrangement in its Charter would be tantamount to acknowledgement of U.S. hegemony in the hemisphere, which was unacceptable. Argentina also opposed the acquiescence of the United States to the seating and exclusion of nations by their power-status

at the Versailles Treaty negotiations; a position which violated one of Argentina's more cherished tenets of foreign policy--the equality of all sovereign states. In this context, the post World War I atmosphere in Latin America was charged with Latin American nationalism which was most effectively expressed as anti-Americanism. This phenomenon was particularly acute in Argentina. United States interventions in Nicaragua in 1928 and the Dominican Republic in 1933 fanned these flames. But U.S. insistence that the Monroe Doctrine was beyond the jurisdiction of the League struck Argentine as a particularly flagrant denial of the equality of states within the American hemisphere.³⁵

On December 2, 1920, Argentina, then under the Presidency of Marcelo de Alvear, requested that the distinction between the victorious and conquered states at Versailles be removed. When this request was rejected, on top of the insertion of a reference to the Monroe Doctrine as a regional understanding, or in the Argentine view, an American system recognized by the League, Argentina withdrew her delegation.³⁶ An appeal by Hipólito Yrigoyen in 1921 for universality of League

³⁵Dexter Perkins, Hands Off: A History of the Monroe Doctrine (Boston, Mass.), pp. 279-299.

³⁶Peterson, op. cit., pp. 367-368.

membership was also denied and this marked the end of Argentina's participation in that body until it rejoined the League in 1933 with specific and stipulated objections to the Charter's Article 21. These objections denied that the Monroe Doctrine was the basis for an American regional system.

Argentina's objections were cited in the following piece of legislation:

In communicating Argentine acceptance to the Secretariat of the League of Nations, the Executive Branch of the Argentine Government will make it evident that Argentina considers the Monroe Doctrine as cited in Article 21 of the Pact to be a unilateral declaration . . . which does not constitute a regional agreement as the mentioned article expresses it.

--Article 5 of Law 11,752 (1933)³⁷

It may well be questioned as to whether the reference to the Monroe Doctrine in Article 21 of the League's Charter was in fact a true expression of that Doctrine. However, for our purposes Argentina's objection to that provision of the League Charter serve to reveal her attitude towards U.S. interests in the hemisphere. (Paz and Ferrari indicate that Argentina also used the objection to the Doctrine as a ploy to avoid paying back dues. It provided an ostensible reason

³⁷ Alberto A. Paz and Gustavo E. Ferrari, Argentina's Foreign Policy: 1930-1962 (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1962), pp. 26-27. See also: Arthur P. Whitaker, The United States and Argentina (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954), pp. 101-102.

for Argentine absence due to lack of Congressional approval and therefore justified past non-payment of obligations to the League.)³⁸

The Argentines have traditionally held that American regional organizations are susceptible to the predominant power and influence of the United States. Reacting against this fact Argentina has generally maintained her traditional aloofness from hemispheric multilateral commitments on grounds that Latin American regional pacts which include the United States thus constitute a potential threat to national sovereignty. This attitude has been the rationale behind Argentine arguments against multilateral (Inter-American Peace Force) intervention in the affairs of individual states. Only in the cases of Cuba (1962), the Dominican Republic (1965), and Bolivia (1967), where the Argentine Armed Forces' fear of communism has been preponderant, has an Argentine government even considered any form of armed intervention by one state or a group of states into the affairs of another; and in these instances, Argentine intervention was unpopular and/or opposed by the civilian congress. It was too delayed to be effective in the instance of the Dominican Republic where Brazil seized the initiative.

³⁸ Paz and Ferrari, op. cit., pp. 26-27.

A sense of frustrated nationalism has cast 20th century Argentine foreign policy into a fundamentally negative role as counter-weight to the initiatives of the United States towards the strengthening of regional multilateralism. As of 1970 only the perception of a communist threat by the Argentine Armed Forces had temporarily spanned the gulf which divides the national interests of the U.S. and Argentina, at least as that relationship is perceived by many nationalistic Argentines.

The Internationalist Facet of Argentine Foreign Policy

The positive obverse of Argentina's resistance to American hemispheric regionalism or Pan Americanism has been a broadly internationalist position founded upon the following assumptions: that all states should be equal, and that zones of political and/or economic influence are inherently wrong when they tend to subject the weaker states of Latin America to the interests of the stronger United States.

The internationalist or universalist facet of Argentine foreign policy reflects a concept of national security which has manifested itself in neutralism in the two world wars and a view of extra-continental events which is influenced to a large degree by commercial interests and geographic isolation. President Hipólito Yrigoyen (1916-1922, 1928-1930) typified this attitude

by keeping Argentina neutral even though his people were largely pro-Ally in the First World War. He also led Argentine's withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1921, when he failed in his endeavors to obtain seating for Argentina among the victors at the Versailles Conference and to amend the League's Pact by permitting the conquered nations to be admitted to membership. Withdrawal from the League in 1921 was one manifestation of a foreign policy which attempted to embrace the entire international scene on the basis of universalism and equality. Failing that, the Argentines chose an essentially isolationist position from 1921 until the War.

During the period between the wars, the friction between the United States and Argentina became more frequent and intense. It reached its high points between 1933 and 1945, when Argentina consistently opposed United States efforts to achieve a collective security arrangement for the hemisphere. Under the leadership of Foreign Minister Carlos Saavedra Lamas, Argentine delegations in 1933 and 1936 insisted on universalist or internationalist approaches to the problem of security and rejected the suggestions of hemispheric coordination proposed by the United States.

At the Conference of Montevideo in 1933, Argentina put forward an Anti-War Pact, which substituted vague prohibitions against aggressive war for any form

of collective security. In 1936 at the Buenos Aires Conference, the Argentines stifled several United States proposals for collective security on the grounds that such pacts were not compatible with the character of the then moribund League of Nations. During this period, the Argentines consistently substituted universalist sentiments for hemispheric pacts or arms limitations or collective defense agreements. The probable Argentine objective was to keep their own ties with Europe free from encumbering regional arrangements, and in this enterprise they were relatively successful. The spirit of Argentina's foreign policy during this period was well stated by Saavedra Lamas, who declared during the 1936 Buenos Aires Conference: "Let us turn toward all horizons . . . and let us extend great human ideals-- ideals having no limits or continental restrictions."³⁹

True to this philosophy, Argentina had ratified only two of fifty-one Pan American Treaties or conventions by the outbreak of the war in 1941.⁴⁰ Argentina would do

³⁹ Ibid., p. 37. See also: Argentine Republic, Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, Sessions Report (Stenographic record in Spanish) Buenos Aires, 1937, pp. 39-71. Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: Macmillan Co., 1948), Volume I, pp. 497-500.

⁴⁰ McGann, Argentina: The Divided Land, p. 88.

no more than agree to proposals for continental neutrality after the outbreak of the war in Europe in 1939. In 1940, Argentina agreed in principle to the Declaration of Reciprocal Assistance and Cooperation for the American Nations, formulated at Lima in 1938, which established a system for continental consultation in the event of war against any nation of the hemisphere.

World War II, Perón, and the Third Position

Following the entry of the United States into the war in December of 1941, a most serious cleavage between Argentina and the inter-American system occurred. Argentina steadfastly refused to break off relations with the Axis Powers in spite of the recommendation of its foreign minister at Rio de Janeiro in 1942. This situation intensified with the advent of Ramón Castillo as President in 1942, and in 1944, the Argentina Government, then under the military regimes led by Generals Pedro Ramirez and Edelmiro Farrell respectively, assumed a position which was almost blatantly pro-Axis. This led to a severance of relations between the United States and Argentina. A number of other Latin American countries also broke off relations and Argentina was excluded from the newly created United Nations due at least in part to Russian opposition.

The rise to power of Juan Domingo Perón in 1945 led to a reluctant Argentine declaration of war against

the Japanese and, indirectly, the Germans. This action brought Argentina back into the Inter-American system and qualified the country for membership in the UN. In ten years, the foreign policy of "internationalism" had taken Argentina from a zenith of international prestige gained under Saavedra Lamas, following his role in mediating the Chaco War; to a nadir, following Argentina's sympathy for the defeated Axis powers, in defiance of the entire American hemisphere.

The foreign policy of Juan Perón, as President from 1946-1955, was aimed to regain for Argentina her lost prestige and to achieve continental status as a "superior power." Perón vigorously pursued these objectives within the hemisphere through several policies. The first policy promoted a series of bilateral treaties which were intended to establish the economy hegemony of Argentina over the continent. This beginning would lead to the consolidation of an Economic Union, to be created on the basis of Argentina's system of bilateral agreements with her neighbors and other nations of the continent.

In pursuing this course, Perón sought to capitalize on the unusually intensified intracontinental trade brought on by the war. In February, 1953, he proposed to Chile, Bolivia, Paraguay and the other nations of Latin America his grand economic plan--the Pact of Santiago, which would abolish tariff barriers, increase

trade and provide funds for loans and investments. If consummated, this scheme would have led to relatively industrialized Argentina's hegemony over a South American economic bloc. Chile's Congress rejected the idea due to distrust of Perón,⁴¹ but Nicaragua, Ecuador, Bolivia and Paraguay accepted the pact. Uruguay, bolstered by the assistance of the United States and Brazil, was able to hold out against acceptance but not before considerable economic pressures had been brought to bear by Argentina. Poor Argentine harvests due to drought, fuel shortages, and U.S.-Brazilian resistance to Perón's penetration tactics, destroyed the plan for Argentine economic hegemony over South America.⁴²

Perón's other foreign policy initiative within the hemisphere was political in character and sought to exploit the potential appeal of his labor based political party. Hoping to infect the labor sectors of the continent with his doctrines, Perón sent out a series of "special" labor attaches for the purposes of penetrating the international and regional labor confederations of the hemisphere. Considerable influence was achieved in Peru, Mexico and Costa Rica by these men, but the

⁴¹Magnet, loc. cit. Hipólito Paz, "La política Argentino-chilena durante la presidencia de Peron," Estrategia, No. 3 (September-October, 1969), pp. 103-110.

⁴²Olive Holmes, "Perón's Greater Argentina and the United States," Foreign Policy Reports, XXIV (December 1, 1948), pp. 164-165.

stout resistance of the existing continental labor confederations forced the Peronists to establish a third-Peronist-labor confederation on a continental basis. Called the Agrupación de Trabajadores Latinoamericanos Sindicalistas (ATLAS), this movement began after Perón was faced by domestic problems.⁴³ It received some support but survived Perón's fall only in Nicaragua.

Perón's foreign policy toward the American Hemisphere System was a reaction to the international ostracism into which the nation had fallen after its fascist interlude during the war. To regain the prestige which Argentina had lost after backing the Axis in World War II, Perón set out to restore Argentine presence in the hemisphere through the development of an ideological "Third Position." This move was complementary to Argentina's then flaring nationalism and permitted him to play both sides of the Cold War while spreading Argentina's influence through the schemes cited above. His plan was defeated by his inability to offset the economic power of the U.S. through dealings in Europe, the near collapse of the Argentine economy, and his own

⁴³Ernesto Galarza, "Argentine Labor Under Perón," Inter-American Reports, No. 2 (March, 1948), pp. 13-14. Peterson, op. cit., pp. 472-473. Robert J. Alexander, "Peronism and Argentina's Quest for Leadership in Latin America," Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 1, 1955, p. 54.

political weakness following the death of his wife, Evita, in 1952.

The Perón foreign policies and Argentina hemispheric diplomacy represented a strong effort through bilateral means to reassert Argentine aspirations to continental leadership. Perón's "Third Position" was actually little more than a cold war cover for his continental ambitions, and from the perspective of the international scene it was little more than a somewhat pretentious and ideological application of Argentine intercontinental neutralism. It can be argued that in fact, Perón was no more interested in altering Argentina's traditional policies of neutralism, absolute sovereignty (for Argentina), non-intervention (only vis a vis Argentina), and leadership in Latin America, than were his predecessors or successors. However, national shame due to Argentina's Post-World War II plight, the complex forces of the Cold War and the lack of alternative international financial backing to that of the U.S. obliged him to adopt new tactics.

Following the "Revolución Libertadora" which ousted Perón in 1955, the provisional government of General Pedro Aramburu set about shoring up foreign policy positions which had deteriorated during ten years under Perón. In this process, the Government recalled the special labor attaches sent out by Perón abandoned

the coercive economic measures set against Uruguay, and ratified the Bogota Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1956. During this interlude, Argentina's military-oriented government bound itself more closely to the U.S. and the outside world by signing technical assistance agreements and by joining the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.⁴⁴

Following the election of Arturo Frondizi of the Intransigent Radical Party (PRI) to the Presidency in 1958, Argentina again turned to an erratic internationalist foreign policy. Frondizi found himself beset by tremendous domestic pressures, due in part to: the nation's dire economic condition, the wishes of a strong and ever present military, and a highly nationalistic people. The result was economic and political instability which contributed to contradictory foreign policies. Frondizi at first attempted to remain close to the United States. However, he simultaneously cultivated Latin American regionalism (as opposed to Pan Americanism) by making Argentina a charter member of the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA). This organization was intended to achieve the eventual elimination of tariffs and the integration of trade policies among the member states. Implicit in its

⁴⁴McGann, Argentina: The Divided Land, pp. 90-91.

development were: encouragement of intra-continental trade; the possibility of presenting a strong economic front against the European Common Market, Free Trade Association and their African associates; and finally, hopes for some sort of political "customs union" within which Argentina could play an important, if not dominant role.⁴⁵

On the extra-continental side, Frondizi attempted to associate Argentina with the so-called neutralist bloc of Asian and African nations, posing as an exponent of third world development. In concert with the Quadros Government of Brazil, he expressed what was pretentiously referred to as a foreign policy in the service of development.⁴⁶ One of his themes was "Cuba or Argentina: Two alternatives for a common problem--underdevelopment." By this phrase, Frondizi meant that the U.S. had to choose between Argentine development and Cuban communist revolution, and must therefore not fail to support Argentina on Argentina's terms.⁴⁷ Here was Argentine nationalism

⁴⁵ Ibid., pp. 90-92.

⁴⁶ Paz and Ferrari, op. cit., p. 195.
 Arturo Frondizi, La Política Exterior de Argentina (Buenos Aires, 1962), pp. 40-46.

⁴⁷ Paz and Ferrari, op. cit., p. 195.
 See also: Rogelio Frigerio, Nacionalismo, potencias industriales y subdesarrollo (Buenos Aires: Editorial Concordia, 1961).

with a new twist.

These developments transpired against a background of mounting crisis as relations between the U.S. and Cuba deteriorated in 1960-1961. The erratic and radical Janio Quadros, President of Brazil and his successor, João Goulart, took pains to protect Cuba against U.S. efforts to oust that regime from the OAS. To Quadros and Frondizi, the issue of Cuba became an issue of sovereignty with a "developing" nation opposed to U.S. intervention.⁴⁸ Frondizi then found himself bound into a series of contradictions which focused on the Cuban problem and ultimately contributed to his ouster by the armed forces.

Posing as a champion of third world development and sovereign equality or freedom from intervention, Frondizi found himself seeking aid from the U.S., while simultaneously attempting to placate the strong nationalism of his people, and being closely identified with the pro-Cuban position of the Brazilian Government. This balance fell apart on the Cuban issue, when he attempted to oppose the U.S. move to unseat the Cubans from the OAS at the

⁴⁸Paz and Ferrari, op. cit., pp. 204-206. Carlos A. Florit, Politica Exterior Nacional (Buenos Aires: Avayu, 1960), pp. 43-44. See: Janios Quadros, "Brazil's New Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 40 (October, 1961), pp. 19-28.

January meeting of the American Foreign Ministers at Punta del Este, Uruguay, in 1962.⁴⁹ In effect, Frondizi found himself in the questionable position of siding with Argentina's traditional rival Brazil in supporting a communist power and advocating a pact to ratify this position--the Pact of Uruguayana. Frondizi further weakened his difficult position by clandestinely meeting with Argentine born, Che Guevara, who was then Minister for Industry of Cuba on August 18, 1961. This meeting was known to the chiefs of the armed forces and further weakened Frondizi's position.

The outcome of this confusion was pressure from the armed forces on Frondizi, forcing him to break relations with Cuba on February 7, 1962. Frondizi was thrown out by the armed forces two months later, after he perhaps knowingly permitted Peronists to vote in and largely capture a number of provincial and congressional elections.⁵⁰

Frondizi's refusal to view the world as it was--divided into power blocs--and his insistence on a vague universalist view of absolute non-intervention and the self-determination of peoples, was in some ways reminiscent of Hipólito Yrigoyen in the 1920's. But this position

⁴⁹ Paz and Ferrari, op. cit., pp. 218-219.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 221.

over-stepped the bounds of the traditional universalism in Argentine foreign policy. His adherence to Brazilian foreign policy initiatives in defense of Cuba belied Argentina's own peculiar brand of nationalism beyond the toleration of the armed forces, and inevitably contributed to his removal by them. Frondizi's overthrow, on March 30, 1962, was caused in part by his erratic and pro-Cuban foreign policy and in part by his ill-advised experiment of permitting the Peronists to vote in provincial elections.

Frondizi was inclined to apply Argentina's internationalist mode of foreign policy in a manner which the armed forces believed was against the national interest. This variation of Argentine policy has been characteristic of civilian Radical Party governments of the 20th century, at least more so than of military ones. The tenets of this policy are basically the following: neutrality in times of international war or stress; insistence upon the categorical equality of all nations; opposition to Pan-American arrangements of a political or economic character; preference for bilateral arrangements or for an uninhibited world system; and opposition to all forms of foreign intervention (broadly interpreted) in the affairs of other nations, particularly to "intervention" by the United States through diplomacy, trade, and "AID" as well as by straight military action.

Anti-Communism as a Tenet of
Foreign Policy

The overthrow of Perón and the assumption of power by the armed forces in 1955 introduced a new element into the fabric of Argentine foreign policy. This was the theme of anti-Communism, a principle which originated among the career officers of the Argentine Armed Forces. This theme was to become a predominant one within the armed forces after the rise of Castro in Cuba, and for the Government after Frondizi.

The rise of Communism in Cuba was watched with suspicion by the Argentine Armed Forces. Frondizi's position on the issue of Cuban representation's at the OAS attracted military criticism, and Argentine diplomatic identification with the pro-Cuban Brazilian Governments of Janio Quadros and João Goulart compounded this concern. The anti-Communist feelings of the armed forces were particularly aroused when Frondizi signed the pact with Brazil at Uruguayana in 1961, subscribing to a position which pledged support for continued relations with Cuba. This was compounded by Frondizi's ill-advised and clandestine visit and interview on August 18, 1961, with "Che" Guevara. Guevara was then acting as Fidel Castro's Minister for Industry, and an Argentine by birth.⁵¹

⁵¹Ibid., pp. 206-207.

The increasingly pro-Communist attitude of the Goulart regime in Brazil and Frondizi's avowed intention of diplomatic solidarity expressed at Uruguayana further alarmed the Argentine Armed Forces, particularly after Frondizi's unsuccessful attempts to ban hemispheric collective security measures by the OAS against Cuba at the Foreign Ministers meeting at Punta del Este late 1961 and January, 1962. An Argentine Air Force General Order on January 31, 1962 illustrated the armed forces' attitude towards Communism at the time.

The Argentine Air Force operating on the basis that the fight against communism is in accordance with a principle of defense more than of pure politics, and that international communism constitutes at present the greatest danger for liberty and democracy, reaffirms (to the units) its pro-Western position and its solidarity with all those countries that have taken up the defense of the free world, and it will not tolerate any threat that endangers our way of life.⁵²

--General Order 29, 31 Jan. 1962

In this instance Frondizi backed down and broke diplomatic relations with Cuba on February 8, 1962, but the opposition of the armed forces toward his Government had been so thoroughly aroused that Frondizi fell from this and other causes on March 30th, 1962.

The brief successor government to Frondizi was headed by the President of the Senate, Jose M. Guido.

⁵² Ibid., p. 219.

He was succeeded by an elected President, Arturo Illia of the Popular Radical Party on July 7th, 1963. Neither Government made significant changes in Argentina's foreign policy. The Illia Government offended the armed forces when it failed to obtain from the Congress authorization for Argentine Armed Forces to participate in the multilateral and allegedly anti-Communist OAS occupation of the Dominican Republic in 1965. The prospect of Argentine participation had been met by considerable popular opposition, much of which had manifested itself in the Congress, which opposed the venture. But domestic matters such as the armed forces fear of Peronist political success in the congressional and provincial elections scheduled for 1967 together with the deterioration of the nation's economy due to runaway inflation, were largely responsible for the armed forces' coup against Arturo Illia on June 27th, 1966.

The emergence of the armed forces into a dominant role in the fields of politics, national security policy, and the foreign policy formulation of Argentina, began with the overthrow of President Yrigoyen in 1930. It is interesting to note that since 1930, 10 out of 13 Argentine presidents arrived at the Casa Rosada as military officers, by force and by election. Argentine civilian presidents who were overthrown for not meeting

military "standards of constitutional government" included: Ramón Castillo's Conservatives in 1943; Arturo Frondizi's Intransigent Radicals in 1962; and Arturo Illia's Popular Radicals in 1966. This progression has led to today's dominant military presence in Argentina wherein the armed forces have been acting in their self appointed role as juridical defenders of the Constitution, of the Hispanic culture, of the Roman Catholic Church, and ultimately, of the nation's security, broadly interpreted to include its industrial development and the exclusion of Peronists and Communists from positions of political power.

Argentine Governments whose power base lay with the armed forces have tended to follow the nation's historic foreign policy precepts with but one recent and fundamental addition. The military, as self-proclaimed guardians of Argentine nationalism and national security, together with their traditional supporters among the land-owning elites and the traditionalist elements in the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church, have fastened onto the bogeyman of "International Communism" as the chief threat to the well-being of the nation. This theme became a matter of public concern to the armed forces prior to their seizure of power from President Frondizi in 1962. The armed forces even departed from traditional Argentine policies by seeking

military and economic assistance from the United States to counter the "communist threat."

The armed forces have focused on communism as the chief threat to the nation because it is more convenient politically than would be a like assault on Peronism. This perception of a communist threat dates from the Cuban revolutionary experience--the aftermath of which was the summary execution of a number of Cuban regular military officers. It was an example that their Argentine counterparts took to heart. Beyond the Cuban executions, the Argentine Armed Forces see in Communism a convenient domestic and foreign enemy which could be used as justification for new equipment and for their own role as guardians of the nation. Communism is thus the threat which can be invoked for the purpose of the development of the armed forces internal security missions and for their actions against perceptions of external threat. Where admission of anti-Peronist~~s~~ suspicions would be poor politics by the armed forces and would involve unacceptable levels of domestic turmoil, the communists have served them as a convenient and cooperative scapegoat. The example of Che Guevara in Bolivia served this purpose in an external sense; (What if such a revolution were to succeed in Chile or Brazil?) and several small scale guerrilla attempts in the Argentine northwest (Jujuy and Salta) served this purpose in a domestic context

in 1968 and 1969.

Argentina's cooperation with the U.S. will last as long as the armed forces' continuation of fear and use of communism remains credible as a threat, or as long as the armed forces keep the more isolationist and nationalistic Radical and Peronist civilian politicians out of power.

One result of the anti-Communist tenet of the Argentine Armed Forces was the initiation of a U.S. Military Assistance Program with Argentina in 1964. The agreement for this program led to the loan and purchase of armaments and the adoption of U.S. military organization techniques.⁵³

The armed forces change of attitude toward the United States is all the more notable in light of the fact that Argentina had not shared equally in the post-World War II military assistance and sales provided to her neighbors by the United States through "Lend-Lease." This discrimination is a fact of which Argentine military leaders had been painfully aware since 1942. It had created what they interpreted as a changed balance of power in South America which favored Brazil. Historically the Argentine Armed Forces have favored the maintenance

⁵³ Fredrick P. Munson, et al., Area Handbook for Argentina (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office--Department of the Army, Pamphlet #550-73, 1969), p. 355.

of an "armaments" balance as between themselves, Brazil and Chile, according to their perceptions of possible Brazilian or Chilean threats. Since 1945, leaders of the Argentine Armed Forces have professed their fears that radical events in a strong neighboring country could lead to disastrous hostilities with relatively "under-armed" Argentina.⁵⁴

The armed forces rapprochement with the United States was in part instituted by U.S. gifts of military assistance and hardware to her regional rival Brazil, and to a lesser extent by U.S. military assistance rendered to Chile and Peru. It also resulted from the Argentine Armed Forces fear of the threat from subversive Communist or Peronist advocates of revolutionary warfare. The sworn opposition of the Argentine Armed Forces to Communism as an internal and external threat aligned their institutional interests with those of the U.S. and also became fundamental to their view of national security and foreign policy.⁵⁵

⁵⁴Paz and Ferrari, op. cit., p. 99.

⁵⁵In economic matters, however, Argentina has maintained her traditional "neutral facade" and has availed herself of bi-lateral trade opportunities with "Communist Bloc" nations, including the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland and the People's Republic of China (CPR).

The reassertion of certain tenets of traditional Argentine nationalism have tended to restrain the friendliness of Argentina's relations with the U.S. The two countries have been rivals for export markets for grain and have had a trade balance which has been unfavorable to Argentina. This matter has tended to counter-balance the recent ideological coincidence of Argentine-U.S. interests, in spite of the fact that much U.S. capital has been invested in or loaned to Argentina since World War I.⁵⁶

Argentine-U.S. relations have also been computed by the sporadic reluctance of the U.S. to sell sophisticated armaments to the Argentine Armed Forces. This has resulted in Argentina's purchasing many major equipment items from European arms suppliers at greater expense, but free from the political restrictions which the U.S. has placed on its military assistance, grant and/or loan equipment. Since 1962, the basic Argentine plan for the purchase of European

⁵⁶ A major problem has been the consistent refusal by the U.S. to import many Argentina beef products, due to protectionism on behalf of U.S. cattlemen and due to allegations that Aftosa (hoof and mouth disease) is endemic in parts of Argentina. This situation has offended the Argentines for fifty years and remains a fundamental obstacle to the development of closer relations between the two countries.

armaments (Plan Europa) has coincided with Argentina's lines of historical, political and economic ties to that continent.⁵⁷ These developments are rationalized by a slogan which dates back to the times of Rosas: "We buy from those who buy from us."

Future Courses of Argentine Foreign Policy

The future directions which may be followed by Argentina will reflect the nation's geographical isolation from the Americas, but to a lesser extent than has been the case in the last two centuries. Argentina has long nurtured ambitions for becoming the predominant hispanic nation of South America, and in recent years this objective has been pursued through regional economic diplomacy, specifically in the case of the Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA) and the Cuenca del Plata. In these endeavors, Argentina will be confronted with the growing economic and political potential of Brazil, and it is likely that the two nations will be economic competitors and political rivals within the Latin American area and particularly in the south in spite of LAFTA and the Cuenca del Plata. In the context of this rivalry, military considerations are not likely to be important factors so long as a very general balance of forces is

⁵⁷ McGann, op. cit., pp. 81-82.

maintained, as is presently the case.

Argentina will be inclined to continue to avoid multilateral hemispheric arrangements of a political or economic character which include the United States. Beyond a broad commitment to the OAS and the Rio Pact, Argentina views any comprehensive hemispheric multi-lateral arrangement as being tainted by the predominant power of the United States, a prospect which has traditionally been anathema to all Argentine Governments. Multi-lateral commitments or pacts within Latin America may be viewed favorably by the Argentines so long as they do not jeopardize the nation's broader international interests,⁵⁸ particularly those related to the European markets.

Under the leadership of the Levingston Government and given the powerful political voice of the armed forces, Argentina will continue to be sensitive to an international communist threat and/or conspiracy. This perception of threat in the field of foreign policy is likely to encourage Argentina to be politically close to the United States on the issue of Communism. This factor will also make the Argentine Government interested in U.S. Military Assistance policies, particularly from the point of view of training programs. The first hand

⁵⁸ Boletín Oficial, "Comando en jefe del ejército," March 27, 1968, p. 1, col. 1.

experience of the United States in the field of anti-revolutionary warfare or counter-insurgency is particularly appealing to Argentine military personnel.

It is not expected that armaments per se will be items of great importance to the armed forces, due to the large number of supplier nations. (Continental homogeneity of armaments is not rated a particularly high priority by Argentine military personnel, unlike their counterparts in the United States.) It must be acknowledged however, that U.S. Military Assistance has provided a number of armaments to the Argentine Armed Forces to date and that such assistance and sales would continue to be most welcome so long as they were not bound by political restrictions. The logistical base of the armed forces, their command structures, and operational doctrines today are similar to United States models and reflect the influence of U.S. Military Assistance.

It is most likely that the foreign policy of Argentina will continue to complement the crucial national security objectives of self sufficiency through balanced industrial development (including the capability for domestic manufacture of armaments), anti-communism and leadership on the continent. The Government's hard-line anti-communist attitude could lead to potentially explosive scenarios in the event that communists came to power in a neighboring country.

However, on the issue of communism, and largely on the basis of that issue alone, Argentina may be counted among the friends of the U.S. in Latin America at the present time. However, beyond this issue and the general parameters of the OAS and Rio Pact, Argentina is a solitary nation, isolated by its geographical location, broad international interests and a history of frustrated leadership ambition within the South American continent. Its interests in armament and arms control are likewise delimited by this position, for its powerful armed forces call for modern arms to reflect the pretensions of the nation and to define their own professional status on a continental scale, Brazil being the principal counterweight to these pretensions.

Chapter 2

THREAT PERCEPTION

THREATS PERCEIVED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA

The Government of Argentina perceives threats to its national security from four areas to which it has given attention in defining its foreign and domestic policies, including its equipment purchases and mission directives to the armed forces. These areas may be defined as follows: (1) the government and the armed forces fear the possibility of a communist inspired coup or accession to power in Chile or Brazil; (2) the Argentine Government and armed forces perceive possible threats from dissident Peronist groups, university students, and to a lesser extent, from the Revolutionary Communists which might wish to sabotage or subvert Argentine institutions for revolutionary purposes; (3) they perceive a possible low level threat to the national pride from defeat in a border skirmish with one of their neighbors, particularly Chile, due to disputes over ill-defined border areas and small pieces of territory; (4) the fear of possible ~~ble~~ of Communist Bloc maritime attack by submarine or raiders as the result of a global war between East

and West is viewed by the Argentines as a remote contingency, but one for which they can justify naval equipment and training as a matter of sovereign principle and institutional pride. Included in this contingency also would be possible Argentine participation in multilateral military operations within the Hemisphere.

External Threats

The threat of a Communist takeover in a neighboring country with resultant hostilities against Argentina is the contingency which is most feared by the Government of Argentina. This possibility is often cited as a principal justification for the replacement of Argentina's obsolete military equipment. Argentines appear to feel confident that they would not succumb to internal communism. However, they freely assume that should one of its neighbors go communist and export "revolution", remedial action might be the necessary response by Argentina, and that at the very least an aggressive definition of national defense might be necessary in such a contingency. The appearance of Che Guevara in Bolivia gave considerable concern to the Argentines, who had been openly willing to intervene at the request of the Bolivian Government.¹

¹Argentine troops and gendarmaria had been moved into proximity to the Bolivian border, and it is possible that only the Bolivian victory over the guerrillas prevented an Argentine expeditionary force from undertaking the extermination job itself.

It should be noted that the Argentine assistance to Bolivia and readiness to join the fray was carefully cleared with Brazil in advance to allay any fears of political adventurism detrimental to Brazilian interests.²

The Bolivian experience served to demonstrate the Argentine's sensitivity to this variation of the "Communist threat." Fear of future developments of this variety appears to be motivating the Argentines to carefully watch political developments in Uruguay and in Chile. The victory of Salvador Allende's leftist United Front in the 1970 Chilean elections could precipitate a grave crisis for the Argentines, which some have intimated could lead to a "preventive conflict." The possibility of an Argentine attack on Chile is remote, but not altogether non-existent. In Argentina's view today, a Communist military build-up in Chile is viewed as the most serious regional threat to the national security short of the same thing taking place in Brazil.

The threat of regional or international hostilities in the southern cone of South America may seem unlikely to the U.S. observer today, but it offers a logical rationale for the acquisition of military equipment by Argentine military planners, who have been beset with obsolescent equipment and concomitant declines in

²New York Times, August 8, 1967, p. 4.

the morale of their armed forces. It should also be remembered that the War of the Pacific, the Chaco War, and the bloody War of the Triple Alliance are still matters of record.



Internal Threats

The internal threats to Argentine National Security anticipated by the armed forces are those arising from subversions, although as we shall see, other possibilities have been accounted for. This is indicated by the fact that most Argentine military doctrine, training and equipment purchases emphasize anticipation of revolutionary warfare. At this point, it should be noted that with the exception of such isolated areas as Tucuman in the north, or possibly Jujuy and Salta in the northwest, the flat, open and sparsely settled land does not favor rural revolutionary warfare. The overwhelmingly important area of the country is Buenos Aires Province and the adjacent Federal District containing the City of Buenos Aires. This region and the cities of the littoral--Cordoba, Rosario, Mendoza and Santa Fe lie amid uniquely flat, and open grasslands. Known as the Pampa, this terrain extends as a nearly unbroken plain for 500 miles south to the Colorado River, 400 miles west to the provincial capital city of Cordoba, and 450 miles north to the city of Santa Fe. In it are found over 85 percent of the wealth and population of the country.³

³Preston E. James, Latin America. 3rd ed.

Map 2

THE GEOGRAPHIC REGIONS AND POPULATION DISTRIBUTION OF ARGENTINA



Munson, et al, Op.cit.
p.12

The open character of the land offers little cover for guerrillas and makes serious domestic threat most probable from within the cities. The traditional posting of strong, visible, cavalry and paratroop units of the armed forces conveniently close to the nation's four largest cities--Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Rosario and Mendoza⁴--can be seen as a reflection of the armed forces perception of threat from elements within the urban areas which might perpetrate insurrection against the government. More specifically, these urban elements are: the Peronists or urban proletariat, the university and high school students, and the Communist Party.

The Peronists. The Peronist labor movement of Argentina is the nation's most powerful civilian interest group. It is the political legacy of Juan Domingo Perón, who was President of Argentina from 1946-1955. Peron came to power through his skillful development and use of the General Confederation of Labor (CGT), making it inclusive of all Argentine labor unions. Using both the armed forces and labor as his power base, Perón simultaneously encouraged a form of popular nationalism which

(New York: The Odessey Press), pp. 293-299. Pendle, Argentina, p. 1. F. P. Munson, et al., Area Handbook for Argentina, pp. 17-19.

⁴ Ibid., p. 404.

has persisted in several variations as manifestations of working class interests in Argentina up to the present time. As President, Perón failed in his efforts to industrialize Argentina because he seriously depleted its agricultural base and promoted inefficient state industrial enterprises and rural marketing systems which the Argentine economy sustained only at considerable cost. Perón's economic defeats prevented him from fulfilling the political expectations he had aroused while in power.

After 1952, and for economic reasons, Perón ceased to identify with the direct aspirations of his labor support. He held down wages, began to encourage foreign capital investment, sought the friendship of the United States, and obtained "credits" (loans by any other name) from it. He also antagonized the church over a series of unpopular issues including divorce. In short, Perón both alienated and divided his once monolithic support base in organized labor. Though these sectors had no other champion, Perón's eccentricity was such as to divide his followers and thereby enable a faction within the armed forces to remove him.⁵

⁵Samuel L. Bailey, Labor, Nationalism and Politics in Argentina (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1967), p. 171.

Following Perón's fall from power in 1955, an anti-Peronist, military regime came to power under General Pedro Aramburu. This movement attempted to eliminate Peronism as a political force in the country. Under Aramburu's Government of the Armed Forces, numerous Peronist leaders were jailed, the General Confederation of Labor (CGT) was intervened and all forms of Peronist political activity were prohibited.

In effect, Aramburu attempted to destroy the political interests of over thirty percent of the Argentine electorate or 2,500,000 people. He failed to displace Peronism largely because he offered the disenchanted followers of Perón no substitute whereby they might be able to reidentify their interests politically. The resultant vacuum had the effect of reviving the once demolished myth of Perón as the champion of organized labor.⁶

Aramburu further antagonized organized labor by actively taking over the unions themselves. By his actions, he built up a vast reservoir of bitterness between the armed forces and organized labor which led to his assassination by "hard line" Peronists in 1970, and which is likely to persist beyond the death of Perón and at least until the retirement of a large number of

⁶ Ibid., p. 183.

general officers in the Argentine Armed Forces.

Perón's successors--the late August Vandor, Francisco Prado, and Andres Framini--did not effectively hold the movement together. The intervention of the Aramburu government led to extensive splits within the surviving Peronists. These men were and are individually ambitious and have created basic divisions within the movement. As a group, however, the Peronists still represent the interests of organized labor in Argentina. In the open elections of 1962 and 1966 they made formidable showings and, in both instances, their success led to the fall of the governments then in power to coups by the aroused and still vindictive anti-Peronist leaders of the armed forces. The strong Peronist showing in the congressional and gubernatorial elections of 1962 and 1965 sensitized the armed forces to the threat posed to their interests by the Peronists and accentuated their fear of a Peronist comeback and retribution.⁷ The Peronists also had other problems. The prolonged absence of Perón from the country partly resulted in the growth of rivalries within the leadership of the CGT which has split into two factions. The predominant faction of the CGT, which has claimed authentic support from Perón,

⁷M. Goldwert, "Dichotomies of Militarism in Argentina," Orbis, Vol. IX, No. 3 (Fall, 1966), pp. 936-937.

was led by the late August Vandor and was in favor of "Liberal" Government policies including constitutional government, relatively free trade and development of the national potential in a manner not inconsistent with the welfare of the workers. The minority or anti-government hardline faction, of the CGT was led by Raimundo Ongaro and adopted a strong anti-Government xenophobic nationalist position. It called for extensive national control over the economy and opposed free trade and foreign capital. This hardline group favored a structuralist-socialist view of economies and politics.

These two factions within the CGT split openly in 1967. The rebel faction under Ongaro--the CGT de "Paseo Colon"--(Paseo Colon is the address of the rival CGT secretariat) went into opposition against the Onganía Government by advocating non cooperation with wage policies and participation in student protests, including strikes. Vandor, who then led the majority faction, attempted to keep the CGT in communication and dialogue with the Onganía Government, hoping to influence its policies.

In May and July of 1969, when student riots in Córdoba, Corrientes, and Rosario were severely repressed by the Onganía Government, the CGT's two factions united to oppose the policies of the Government and cooperated

in the initiation of two general strikes of short duration in Córdoba. However, the leadership of the CGT ("autentica") still kept the door open for eventual cooperation with the Government. The resultant dispute between the two blocs of Peronists again splintered "Peronismo" until the assassination of August Vandor on June 30, 1969, renewed the possibility of CGT unity.⁸

Until the developments of May-July 1969, led to both a cooling between the Government and the "authentic" CGT, and the assassination of Vandor, the CGT as a split entity was in serious danger of further or complete breaking up and a commensurate reduction in its national political power. The intercession of Perón from Spain reversed this trend dramatically and resulted in a leader of the "Paseo Colon" faction being elected chairman of the CGT in 1970.

The participacionistas or "autentica" Peronists have lost ground following the events of May and June, 1969--and the assassination of their skilled leader, August Vandor. Leadership in the CGT then passed to the hard-liners. The defection of over 200,000 textile workers in February of 1970 underscored this trend and portended trouble for the Onganía Government. Earlier, the hard line elements succeeded in electing one of their number, Jorge Paladino, to be Secretary General of the

⁸New York Times, July 1, 1969, p. 2.

National Labor Confederation, the CGT. In spite of these developments, a reduced majority of Peronists could be counted within the participacionista sector as of Spring 1970. However, the Onganía Government took scant comfort from the increased defections to the "hardline" position and intervened in the CGT to "prevent violence" on July 29, 1969.⁹ The possibility of a united Peronist opposition still poses a most serious threat to the Levingston Government and the dominant position of the Argentine Armed Forces, particularly gives recent Peronist declarations of solidarity with the government of Salvador Allende in Chile.

The Peronists and their sympathizers were reliably estimated by the U.S. Embassy and other sources to number in excess of 2,500,000 persons in 1955.¹⁰ They are largely located in Argentina's key industrial and urban areas and are therefore in a potent position to disrupt the Argentine economy with strikes, terrorism or sabotage within the cities. A unification of the Peronists against the Government, should it be manifested in rebellion or urban terrorism as occurred in Cordoba in 1969 and 1971 constitute a most serious threat and direct challenge to the institutional power of the

⁹Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Vol. VI, July 30, 1969, p. B 1 (Paris: AFP in Spanish 2217 GMT, 29 July, 1969).

¹⁰Bailey, op. cit., p. 162.

leadership of the armed forces.

While Juan Perón lives, even as a symbol and in Spain, no solution to the dilemma of the polarization between all factions of the armed forces and the Peronists is in sight. However, mortality and retirement can effect change, and the timely death of Perón together with new faces at the troop command level of the armed forces may facilitate compromise. Even so, however, this area is fraught with risk, for a possible recipe for civil war in Argentina would be a premature alliance between a small faction of the armed forces and the majority of the Peronist groups.

The death of Perón could either facilitate the rise of a more coherent leadership in the CGT or could signal the atomization of the movement. Either eventually could lead to normalization of the nation's political scene over an appropriate period of time. The present scene is a most difficult one for both the Peronists and the armed forces, because the existence of Perón still precludes compromise. The splits in the Peronist movement and their political disenfranchisement have led to widespread frustration and on the part of a few, urban terrorist activity, which hit a raw nerve among the armed forces leadership when an extremist group of Peronists calling themselves the "Juan José Valle

Command"¹¹ kidnapped and murdered former President Aramburu in late May, 1970. This incident, plus Onganía's efforts to both consolidate power to the Presidency and accommodate with the autentico Peronists, contributed to his ouster from the Presidency on June 9, 1970.

The basic problem and potential threat to national security in Argentina today as it is perceived by the leadership of the armed forces is Peronism. The leadership of the armed forces, and particularly General Alejandro Lanusse, were subject to Peronist harassment and in the case of Lanusse, three years of imprisonment in Tierra del Fuego. They fear that a resurgence of Peronism to direct political control of the Government of Argentina would seriously diminish the power of the armed forces, and more specifically, the deliberative role of the armed forces leadership. As they see it a militant, and potentially armed, labor union-political party in power would at least neutralize their own monopoly over the use of force in the nation.

The armed forces fear of the Peronists is founded upon the vulnerability of Argentina's fragile economy

¹¹General Juan José Valle was an army general who attempted an aborted counter-revolution on behalf of the Peronists in 1956. He was unable to elicit much support and he and eleven of his officers were summarily executed by the Aramburu Government.

to sabotage, and the vast potential for urban political disruption which is open to the Peronists as a method for provoking a national crisis and discrediting governments in power. The fall of Onganía in June of 1970 and of Levingston in April of 1971 are illustrations to this point.

Well aware of their vulnerability to Peronist sabotage and political pressure, the armed forces are now in the process of trying to gracefully get out of the direct business of governing. The CINCs are only too aware of the pressures which the Peronists can bring to bear, and the tentative commitment by President Lanusse to have elections within two years (more likely one year) reflects the armed forces perception of discomfort and political vulnerability. Their difficulties in governing have injured their prestige as a national institution and raised the spectre of internal political cleavages which they can easily do without.

The Communist Party of Argentina (PCA). The Communist Party of Argentina was founded in 1918 following a split in the Socialist Party. As of 1919, it had 33 branches, claimed a total membership of 1400 persons. In 1920, the PCA succeeded in gaining 3,114 votes in a Buenos Aires provincial election. However, following the coup of 1930, which ousted the Government of Hipólito Yrigoyen, the PCA was declared illegal and many of its

leaders, who had been active in the Labor movement, were jailed. In 1945, the PCA was once again permitted to function as a legal political party, a gesture which preceded Peron's diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union. During Perón's administration, the PCA covertly supported him, by attempting to work with (and into) the Peronist labor movement. Officially, however, the Party was in opposition to the dictator.¹²

The fall of Perón in 1955 and the resumption of the control of the armed forces over the government resulted in immediate suppression of PCA political activities. In 1958 its activities were banned altogether, and in 1963, the PCA itself was declared illegal as a subversive organization and went underground. The Party benefited from the political relaxation of the Illia administration, from 1963-1966, but was once again declared illegal along with all other Argentine political parties with the advent of the Onganía administration in 1966. The anti-communism of the armed forces and the Onganía administration soon led to a decree-law fixing penalties for subversion and excluding communists from holding public office. The State Intelligence Secretariat (SIDE) was assigned the task of determining which individuals or legal entities were to be considered

¹²Munson, et al., op. cit., p. 205.

communist for the purposes of this law. Such determination could result in persons being expelled from occupations related to public service. The teaching and writing professions were particularly singled out for this kind of attention by the SIDE.¹³

The present size of the PCA is estimated to be somewhat in excess of 60,000 card-carrying members of which fewer than 15,000 are active party workers. The PCA has followed the orthodox Communist line as promulgated by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, since its inception in 1918.¹⁴

The PCA's most recent activities have been directed toward drawing membership away from the "autentico" faction of the Peronists through their own Movement for Union Unification and Coordination (MUCS). This organization is a Communist labor confederation and has advocated opposition to the labor policies of the Onganía administration. The current publication of the PCA is the newspaper Nuestra Palabra, which had consistently opposed the positions of both of the Peronist factions as of 1968. The PCA has also officially rejected the activities and positions taken by the followers of the late Che Guevara and those who advocate immediate, violent, Castroist revolutionary

¹³Ibid., p. 206.

¹⁴Ibid.

tactics.

The PCA has had a difficult time with the issue of revolutionary activism. Its opposition to violence and terrorist tactics has resulted in defections and reduced influence among Argentine youth, particularly the university students. A number of the dissident activists have adopted the name "Revolutionary Communist Party," and together with other Marxist-Activist elements, resorted to a campaign of urban terrorism. Its earlier predecessor was an unsuccessful guerrilla operation in the northern province of Tucumán. This group was discovered and captured by the National Gendarmería on September 19th, 1968. Thirty-five persons were captured along with more than forty modern light weapons, which spokesmen for the Gendarmería noted were more modern than their own. The band was made up of Revolutionary Communists, and included several hardline Peronists, which caused concern among elements of the armed forces. In addition to their domestic ties, the guerrillas had been in touch with their Bolivian counterparts under the late "Inti" peredo, sole Bolivian survivor of Guevara's defeat. The Tucumán group was captured in one of its initial training phases, and apparently had been intending to conduct guerrilla warfare toward the first part of 1969.¹⁵

¹⁵New York Times, September 30, 1968, p. 3.

One result of the guerrilla incidents of 1968 was the arrival in Argentina of a thirty-man U.S. Special Forces Mobile Training Team as part of the U.S. Military Assistance Program. The Team was to work with selected elements of the Gendarmería and army in the Province of Salta, in order to build them into elite cadres for future anti-guerrilla operations.¹⁶

On February 12, 1969, a third guerrilla-type incident occurred wherein six suspected guerrilla's were seized in a remote area of the Province of Jujuy in the northwest of the country. These men were poorly armed and scantily clad and generally in poor shape. They admitted to being part of the same group which had been broken up in Tucuman in the previous year. The ideological character of the band was Castroist although several of the members were apparently Peronists operating under the auspices of the communists. This particular band was thought to be an advance group for a "mother cell" or "school group" in an expanded operation which was to follow.¹⁷

The present line of the PCA emphasizes: opposition to U.S. imperialism, support for the Allende Government in Chile, solidarity with the Viet Cong, and the use of the

¹⁶ New York Times, October 8, 1968, p. 7.

¹⁷ FBIS, VI, 14 February 1969, p. B 1.
(INTERPRESS, Santiago, Chile in Spanish 2246 GMT,
13 Feb. 1969.)

PCA as the focal point for organized labor's resistance to the Government. It calls for a "democratic coalition of popular movements to establish a provisional government and convene a constituent assembly by which the people could establish a genuine, socialist minded, democratic regime." The PCA supported the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia after some internal tremors of opposition.¹⁸

The PCA and its more violent Castroist cousins are not now considered to be an imminent threat to the Government of Argentina. Their principal threat to the government is in the area of urban insurgency, insurrection or sabotage; and even this threat could be effective only with the cooperation of similarly inclined Peronists. The PCA's difficulties, as cited above, were simplified by the death of its long-time Secretary General Victorio Cordovilla in 1969, who had been long out of touch with its younger membership. The PCA's other problems include the following: a relatively static membership; loss of a number of its youthful adherents to the Castroite terrorist groups; and the oppression of the Ongania and Levingston Governments, which though the application of "Plan Conintes" can make preventative arrests of persons "suspected" of subversion. The situation in Chile has accentuated this situation notably.

In actuality, it would appear that the Communist Party of Argentina poses but a minimal threat to the

¹⁸El Siglo, Santiago, Chile, August 27, 1968, p. 3. (Translated by FBIS, VI, Sept. 5, 1968, p. A 1.)

present Government of Argentina. However, the Government, and its present armed forces constituency, perceive a grave threat from any alignment between the PCA, the Marxists in Chile and the Peronists in Argentina. Recent pro-Castro and pro-Allende pronouncements by Perón in Spain have heightened this fear. In combatting the growing social unrest and political ferment in the country since 1962, the armed forces have seen fit to mount a series of anti-communist campaigns, either clandestinely (as propaganda) or through the legal process of the Government which they have for the most part controlled.

The tactic of persecuting the weak PCA serves several functions. It justified the maintenance of an elaborate intelligence network, ostensibly for the control of the PCA, but in reality it is for use in infiltrating and keeping track of Peronist activities. In addition, the development of anti-Communist propaganda campaigns can be rationalized as off-setting PCA-Peronist identification or at least making it difficult for Peronists to justify to the civilian population. Finally, the "communist threat" justifies the Government and armed forces in maintaining internal security forces and training programs of a scope and intensity which could only serve potential anti-Peronist purposes.

The PCA thus serves the armed forces and present Government of Argentina as a "surrogate threat" which justifies preparations for possible conflict with the far

more powerful and dangerous Peronist groups. Whereas it would be a recipe for civil war should the armed forces mount a direct "attack" on the Peronists, and justify their armaments and training for the purpose of suppressing Peronist strength, the weak PCA serves the same purpose at a minimal risk and in a politically expedient manner from both a domestic and international point of view.

The university students. The university students of Argentina, particularly those of Córdoba, have had a history of political activism which has had far reaching effects on the nation's politics. In 1918, student pressure brought about the Reforms of Córdoba through the University Reform Movement which initially opened up the universities to middle class students, as a preserve for the youthful elite classes. Beyond this, the Córdoba Manifesto of 1918 marked the entry of students into politics on an institutional scale.¹⁹

The political role of the university students in 20th century Argentina has been that of a catalyst for change. They have opposed the status quo and have particularly attacked inadequate social institutions of the nation. On the whole, the students usually have championed valid causes--initially, but they have also

¹⁹Hartley F. Dame, et al., The Political Influence of University Students in Latin America (Washington, D.C.: Special Operations Research Office, American University, 1965), p. 10.

been vulnerable to irresponsible radical appeals and miscalculated actions. The Argentine University students have generally favored Marxist and Socialist political views and have opposed the dictatorships of the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China. In the university milieu, politically activist students have viewed the autonomous university as a suitable institution for the initiation of political change.²⁰

The university students of Argentina have been one of the most constant and occasionally critical irritants to confront the Governments of Juan Onganía and Roberto Levingston. Their allegedly communistic tendencies and constant abuse of governmental authority was a factor which led to the overthrow of the Illia administration in 1966 and to the Onganía Administration's abolition of the autonomy of the university through the University Reform Law in 1967.²¹ This move provoked nationwide student protests. However, the concomitant to the government action was the presence of police on the campuses which damped down the student political activities until May 15th, 1969.

On that date, a student protest rally over a 16¢ rise in university cafeteria prices in the town of Corrientes resulted in the slaying of a student--Juan

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Goldwert, op. cit., p. 397.

José Cabral--by a member of the local police force. This action galvanized a nationwide student protest, and street demonstrations catalyzed major riots in the cities of Córdoba, Rosario and La Plata on May 21-22, leaving 16 dead, hundreds wounded and hundreds more under arrest. In these cities, the rioting students were joined by Peronists of the "Paseo Colon" faction and the forceful tactics used by the local police, Gendarmeria and federal policy catalyzed even the split Peronists into a unified anti-Government position. The result was a nationwide general strike in Córdoba for 28 hours on May 30th, supported by the whole Peronist labor movement and its sympathizers.²²

The Onganía government barely survived this crisis but significant cabinet changes ensued, the government was clearly shaken, and the potential power of the students in politics was dramatically underscored.

The University of Córdoba was in the vanguard of anti-Onganía student sentiment. During the crisis of May and June, 1969, somewhat optimistic sources indicated that as many as 9,000 students had assembled to demonstrate. For sheer radicalism, however, the University of Tucumán is given kudos by Cuban newspaper writers. The Universities of Corrientes, Santa Fé, Rosario and

²²New York Times, June 1, p. 2.

Resistencia were also cited in the Cuban press for their students "high level of mass action and struggle efficiency." The University of Buenos Aires apparently has been relatively docile in spite of its impressive past record for "combativeness and political consciousness."²³

The Argentine university student movement has developed along two principal lines: that of Marxist organizations loosely affiliated in the traditional University Federation of Argentina (FUA), and the nationalist groups which include hardline or "Paseo Colon" Peronists, Social Christians, leftist Catholics and independents. The nationalist elements are affiliated in the National Students' Union (UNE). A third and less numerous group are called the Liberals, which include the youth movement of the Popular Radical Civic Union, progressive anarchists and assorted others.²⁴

The largest of the student organizations is the FUA which is said to be controlled politically by the "Revolutionist Communist Party," a splinter group from the PCA. The FUA leadership propounds generally anti-American issues. It includes representation within its directorate by one member from each of the following organizations: the PCA, the Revolutionary Party of the

²³Julio Morandi, "The Student Organizations in Argentina," Prensa Latina, Havana, July 24, 1969.

²⁴Ibid.

Workers (Trotskyite), and the Labor Policy Group (Trotskyite). Its general membership includes various other less representative marxist and trotskyite groups.²⁵

The second largest national student organization, the National Student Union (UNE), is strongest at the University of Córdoba. It includes the Intergrationalist Movement, a leftist Catholic group. It is not ideologically marxist.²⁶

The principal difference between the two national student organizations is their fundamental disagreement over the "Paseo Colon" faction of the Peronists. The Nationalists favor Ongaro and the Marxists oppose him as an opportunist, whose political inconsistency makes him an enemy of the revolutionary left.²⁷

The student organizations meet on common ground in their opposition to the United States "Imperialism," their revolutionary opposition to the **Lanusse** Government, their opposition to the armed forces, and finally, in their conviction that the university in Argentina is a training ground for revolutionary cadres and a center for conspiracies against the Government.²⁸

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Dame, op. cit., pp. 50-51.

It must be borne in mind that the students who are actively participating in these organizations seldom exceed ten percent of the student body of a given university, although this ratio will often vary, depending upon the issues involved. Student protest against infringements of their perogatives or interests generate huge responses as was the case in Córdoba and Rosario in 1969 and 1971. "Anti-Imperialism" generally is the main concern of a small hard core seldom exceeding five percent of the students.

The student organizations have opposed the government on three grounds. They object to its abolition of the university's autonomous status; they oppose its developmentist economic strategies, which they claim create social hardships for the lower classes; and they also oppose its ban on all political activities and parties.

Despite their political activities, the University students of Argentina under normal conditions have relatively little direct political power and alone could not threaten the Government. However, when their grievances and demonstrations strike sympathetic cords with the Peronists or even the "Paseo Colon" faction thereof, they constitute a significant threat to the national security as catalytic agents of mass disorder.

The Dynamics of Dichotomy

The problem which haunts Argentina today embraces in differing ways the three groups discussed above. The political power in Argentina is polarized between the Peronists, whose leadership is divided still, and the armed forces under the informal leadership of the Army's CINC, Alejandro Lanusse. Until these two elements, the one with electoral power and other with the force of arms and organization, can come to terms with each other, government in Argentina will be inherently unstable.

The University students figure on the political scene as potential revolutionary catalysts to the Peronists. Antagonistic towards the government, they are always a possible threat in the cities of the littoral particularly Córdoba, where at the critical moments, they may generate sufficient Peronist support to strike a possible mortal blow at any Argentine government.

The Communists have featured as scapegoats for the problems of the regime, particularly since the events of May, 1969. They lack mass support and have attracted attention in 1969 and 1970 chiefly by the actions of their disaffected revolutionary splinter groups, whose terrorist activities in the cities and rural areas has attracted considerable attention. However beyond their role as a diversion, the communists are no real threat to the Government unless they can find common

cause with the Peronists.

In 1970, the Onganía Government found itself in the position of being opposed by the Peronists for holding the line on wages and housing. It had been under continuous pressure from the "Liberals" in the armed forces, led by Army CINC Lanusse, who want a "return to representative democracy." However, the gulf between the Peronists and armed forces remains as of December, 1970, and there exists no civilian politician with sufficient following to attract notable support from other sources. Hence the "democratic" pretensions of the Azules seem illusory.

On June 9, 1970, the regime of Onganía was overthrown by the armed forces, who were suspicious of his attempts to deal with the autentico Peronists and who claimed to advocate an earlier return to representative government. The Azules in the armed forces are liberals in name only. They now confront through President Levingston, the fundamental dilemma--of reconciling a return to representative government with their own refusal to recognize the fact of Peronist political power.

Until the gulf between the Peronists and the armed forces or even a major faction thereof can be reconciled, Argentina will continue to suffer from a continued political dichotomy and constant instability. Reconciliation between the armed forces and Peronists

may in fact only occur when Perón as a symbol of possible Peronist unity passes from the scene and the Peronists either become more splintered and less powerful or are able to deal directly with elements in the armed forces and thereby achieve a balance of power in the nation.

In terms of threat, the Peronists constitute the largest extent rival to the institutional supremacy of the armed forces in their perceived roles as protectors of the constitution, the national values and the Church in Argentina. The armed forces officers fear that Peronists will perpetrate reprisals upon many general officers in response to fifteen years of suppression, should they obtain political power again, and the recent fate of ex-President/General Aramburu has reenforced this fear. This dilemma, in addition to the economic difficulties of the nation, and the aggrandizement of power by the Presidency under Onganía, resulted in the Junta of Armed Forces, CINCs leading a coup against President Juan Onganía, who like his past four predecessors, had confronted the dilemma of dealing with the Peronists as he attempted to stabilize the nation's economy while depending upon armed forces support to remain in power.

In meeting the Peronist "threat," the armed forces have used another existing threat of a lesser magnitude, which served their purpose, in part, as a political surrogate for the Peronists. This is the

Argentine Communist Party, and the "International Communist Conspiracy," a theme which has been abetted by Allende's success in Chile. Where it would be impolitic to avowedly prepare for confrontation with the populous Peronists, the same end is being achieved. For while the armed forces arm and train themselves to meet alleged communist threats, the fact remains that Peronists would be their most probable adversaries.

As pointed out above, the Argentine countryside is, for the most part, unsuited to guerrilla warfare because of its flat, open character in the strategic area of the Pampa. Only the states of Salta, Jujuy, and Tucumán in the Northwest and North, and some of the isolated areas in the western extreme of the country have the geographical conditions and poverty to support Castro-style guerrillas; these areas, however are too sparsely populated and too remote from the nation's strategic areas to serve a national political purpose. In addition to these factors, the good diet and ties to the land of most rural Argentines would not be conducive to a guerrilla mentality, save for in the impoverished Northwest. Guerrillas in all but the areas mentioned above would have to be self-sustaining or draw on the cities for supplies and recruits. The unhappy experiences and apparent isolation of the rural guerrillas encountered in Salta, Tucuman and Jujuy in 1968-1969 seem to attest to the region's unsuitability for insurgency.

Urban insurrection is therefore a more vital domestic concern to the government in the area of national security, and this field is initially the responsibility of the Federal Police.²⁹ Massive violence is most feared in Buenos Aires and Córdoba. However in the cities too, the relatively high living standards, a large middle class, and the fact that Argentines are generally more disposed to violent language than to actual insurrection or rebellion tend to reduce danger from protracted urban insurgency, and lead to the use of hit and run urban terrorist tactics by communist and hard-line Peronist splinter groups. In 1970, their activities included robbery, kidnapping and, in the case of Aramburu, political assassination. The murder of Aramburu by the so-called Peronist terror group--The Juan José Valle Command--thoroughly stirred the armed forces, reminding them that some Peronists had not forgotten fifteen years of repression and frustration.

THREAT PERCEPTION AND INTELLIGENCE

The national security policies of Argentina evolve from processes and inputs from powerful individuals in the Government and from the perceptions of need developed by the organizations of the Government concerned with the identification and application of national policy

²⁹F. Munson, et al., Area Handbook for Argentina, pp. 383-384.

where instances of threat are discerned. These organizations are important in that to a large extent the accuracy with which the government can respond to problems and crises depends upon their work in intelligence gathering and, in several instances, their abilities to react or respond as directed.

The profusion of these organizations and their combined deficiencies in both professional personnel and coordination suggests that the Government of Argentina lacks an effective institutional capability for sizing up threats to the national security and for responding to such threats in a low level police/intelligence manner. In order to understand the problems and capabilities available to the Government from this area, we shall examine nine of the organizations which contribute to the Government's intelligence and threat perception capability.

It should be noted that the majority (five) of the intelligence collection organizations are under the armed forces and are likely to take a parochial view of problems which affect the particular service involved. Since these (five) armed service related intelligence organizations report to their respective Commanders-in-Chief it can be expected that on many internal political matters they may be reluctant to give us potential domestic political advantages by fully sharing their

"take" within the Government.³⁰

The civilian (nominally) State Intelligence Secretariat, better known as the SIDE ("Seeday"), shares its information selectively, depending upon the amount of direct influence the armed forces may have over the Government at any given time.³¹ However, in spite of basic problems pertaining to matters of parochial domestic political interest, it must be said that these groups generally function together in the event of serious external or internal threats to the national security, and their "take" is placed at the disposal of Argentina's overall national security planning body, the National Security Council (CONASE). Intelligence related to armed forces military interests and obtained by armed forces organizations may be relayed directly to the President by the Junta of the Armed Forces.³²

The National Security Threat
Perception Agencies

The National Security Council (CONASE) is normally the highest body for the consideration of national security affairs in Argentina and thereby serves

³⁰ Primera Plana, July 19, 1966, pp. 44-49; Confirmado, 9/15/66, p. 17; and Confirmado, 8/3/67, p. 17. See also: Carlos A. Florit, Las Fuerzas Armadas y la Guerra Psicologica (Buenos Aires: Arayu, 1963), pp. 110, 135.

³¹Ibid.

³²Ibid.

as the official threat perception apparatus and information user of the government. It was established by decree on February 3, 1967, and is composed of the five cabinet rank ministers and the three Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The CONASE serves as a deliberative group on matters of crisis proportions and pertaining to long range planning for national security policy. In this role, it makes recommendations as to the role and activities of the armed forces in all matters pertaining to such policy.³³

Only the President of the Nation can convene meetings of the CONASE, and only he is able to give the decisions or recommendations of the CONASE the effect of law. The CONASE is staffed by a permanent Secretariat headed in 1970 by an active duty Army general. The functions of the Secretariat include preparations for the CONASE meetings, and workups of the results of these meetings. The Secretariat has under it a directorate General for Security Policy, consisting of three departments related to threat perception: Information (intelligence formulation and research), Special Affairs (subversion and labor disputes), and Security Control.³⁴

³³"Diose a conocer el Texto de la Ley de Defensa," La Prensa, October 8, 1966, pp. 1, 8.

³⁴Ibid.

The Council of Commanders-in-Chief, is in early 1971 the most powerful national security-oriented institution in the nation. Beyond its obvious political power, it has the specific authority to advise the President, its chairman, on matters related to military policies and strategy, including the preparation of plans for the future development of the armed forces, the assignment of logistic and operative responsibilities to the armed forces according to their joint plan, the approval of recommendations emanating from the Inter-American Defense Board, and the election of senior Argentine military personnel and civilians for positions of higher responsibility pertaining to national defense.³⁵

The Council of CINCS is a permanent entity and does not require a presidential summons in order to meet. Its President (Lanusse) or any permanent Council member is authorized to call a meeting. However, unanimity is required for the Council's decisions; when unanimity is lacking the final decision is referred to the President of the Nation.³⁶

The Center for National Intelligence

CNI was designed to be roughly analogous to the U.S. Intelligence Board. It was intended to serve as a point for the coordination, planning, centralization, evaluation and transmission of intelligence and for the

³⁶Ibid.

formulation of overall intelligence doctrines for the CONASE. The CNI is headed by the Director of the civilian intelligence arm, the State Secretariat for Intelligence (SIDE), who serves as the permanent intelligence advisor to the CONASE. The CNI also includes representatives from the various military and police intelligence services.³⁷

The State Intelligence
Secretariat (SIDE)

This organization serves as the nation-wide civilian coordinating agency for internal security related intelligence. Under the leadership of a retired military officer, (an army general), the SIDE is the originating agency for control over subversive activities, and illegal political activity or opposition plotting against the government. It is also the liaison service for intelligence links with foreign nations. The SIDE is responsible for the censorship of foreign and domestic mails, and contains a division responsible for naming "Communists" or subversives for dismissal from government employment as per the "Anti-Communist Law" decreed by President Onganía in 1967.³⁸ The SIDE reports to the CONASE through the CNI.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Munson, op. cit., p. 209.

The Directorate of Federal
Coordination (DCF)

The DCF serves as the intelligence arm of the Federal Police and is under the Ministry of the Interior. The DCF has 32 delegaciones or field offices, located in 18 provincial capitals and other major cities throughout the nation. It investigates suspected subversive activities nationally, and when convenient, it coordinates its activities with the other intelligence services. The DCF usually coordinates its activities and information gathering with the juridical and security police in all provinces. It is limited in its jurisdiction to matters of direct federal concern.³⁹ Its present areas of interest include the activities of radical students, the Peronists and the activities of the Communist Party and its revolutionary "off-spring."

Military Intelligence Organizations

The Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Dept. II, Intelligence (OACSI) has the responsibility for the army's counter-espionage and security mission, and draws upon both domestic and international sources for intelligence and information pertaining to the army's institutional interests.

The Naval Intelligence Service (SIN) is responsible for counter-espionage and security affairs for the navy.

³⁹Ibid., pp. 384-386.

As with the OACSI, it draws upon domestic and foreign intelligence and information pertaining to the navy's institutional interests.

The Air Force Intelligence and Security Service (SISA) is responsible for counter-espionage and security affairs for the air force in the same manner as does the OACSI and SIN for the army and navy.

The Security Service of the Army (SSE) directs covert operations against Communists and Peronists. It is also said to be responsible for the investigation of reports of army plotting against the government.

The Gendarmeria Intelligence Service (SIG) is responsible for intelligence and threat perception arising from or relevant to problems of the borders and the zones adjacent thereto, including guerrilla operations from neighboring states, smuggling, and illegal immigration. The SIG reports to the Director of the Gendarmeria, who is responsible to the Army CINC.⁴⁰


THE DYNAMICS OF ARGENTINE THREAT PERCEPTION

Argentina's official intelligence and information gathering and evaluating organizations are adversely affected by profuse, often personalistic, interservice rivalries which tend to restrict the exchange and

⁴⁰ Florit, op. cit., pp. 110-116.

Figure 1

THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF ARGENTINA
NATIONAL SECURITY THREAT PERCEPTION
MACHINERY



KEY:

Authority _____
Information coordination - - - - -

coordination of routine information between the intelligence services and their sponsoring armed forces or agencies. The apparent failure of CNI as an effective catalyst to provide an evaluated and combined intelligence product for the CONASE as a routine procedure is indicative of this condition.

The Argentine intelligence services are either directly responsible to the armed forces or are led by armed forces personnel. This is true even to a considerable extent of the nominally civilian SIDE, whose Director is a retired military officer.

Although the designated officials of all the intelligence services are supposed to meet once a week to exchange information on their respective fields of interest, these interservice relations appear to be sporadic. The armed forces intelligence services distrust the nominally civilian SIDE even though SIDE is led by and largely staffed with retired army personnel. As a result of this rivalry, the various intelligence services often end up duplicating each other's work and paying for information from the same agents, without preliminary coordination with the other organizations involved. Some effort may have been made to eliminate this problem, but the overall lack of trust and communication among the services as bureaucratic rivals makes this a difficult malady to cure.

The intelligence community as a whole gives

considerable threat perception emphasis to the classification of individuals perceived to be possible threats to national security. Through the SIDE's Advisory Committee for Ideological Classification (CACIE), individuals are classified according to their perceived threat potential as: "Communist," or "probably Communist, but with insufficient evidence to prosecute in court." The former category is used against government employees who can be dismissed summarily from their jobs if so classified. This finding is seldom applied. More frequently the latter category is used and although it provides no legal cause for removal from a government job, it generally is sufficient to insure a person's removal through "administrative routes."⁴¹

The quality of the intelligence services, particularly that of SIDE, is impaired by low pay, poor or non-existent training, and low civilian public esteem. Given the problem of low pay, SIDE office hours generally end at noon and its employees hold other jobs in similar or different fields. The SIDE does not have a training facility and its agents are required to get on-the-job training to develop capabilities for surveillance procedures, wiretapping, spotting, recruitment and surreptitious entry of target organizations. On the whole the military security service are said to be more

⁴¹ Munson, op. cit., p. 205. Primera Plana, op. cit.

effective than the SIDE, in terms of training and overall quality of personnel.

THE EMPHASIS OF ARGENTINE INTELLIGENCE
COVERAGE

Argentine intelligence gathering places greatest emphasis upon domestic subversion, the area in which they believe the probability of actual threat to be greatest. In the context of the present situation in Argentina, much of the attention of the SIDE and the DCF, as well as the limited intelligence capabilities of the various provincial police forces, is directed toward the potential threats posed by the Peronists and students. The outbreaks of violence and strikes in Corrientes, Córdoba, Rosario, and La Plata on May 15-22, and again in Córdoba on May 29-30, were severe enough to overwhelm local police and to require direct intervention by the genarmeria and then the army. Future outbreaks of such magnitude could undermine confidence in the government, and considerable effort has been directed towards heading off such coalitions before they ignite in the future.

Other activities given careful attention by the SIDE and DCF may include surveillance of the socially conscious and dissenting Catholic clergy, of whom at least 123 have been calling for social reforms from the government and some of whom have begun to condone the use of violence to achieve social reforms. These priests have

come increasingly into opposition with the national church hierarchy. They have also been catalytic to student and worker unrest, particularly in the Tucuman region.⁴²

Lesser emphasis in intelligence work is placed upon external ideological ferment and upon communist revolutionary activity within Argentina's continental neighbors. This category is, however, now deemed to be of concern in terms of potential danger and external threat to the country by the present government, largely due to events in Chile. Actual extra-continental invasion or harassment receive very little attention from the Argentine threat perception apparatus. Juridically, and in rationalizing the purchase of sophisticated military equipment, the armed forces do indeed take this area into account. However, as a measure of the probability or lack of threat with which this contingency is viewed, very little attention seems to be paid to it by the threat perception organizations of Argentina. Primarily, their external interests are directed against the infiltration into Argentina of terrorists and Cuban trained guerrillas.

42

The Church hierarchy itself reprimanded the Government on its lack of social concern and preoccupation with national economic development in late 1969.

The possibilities of military action against an extra-continental power are viewed as highly improbable and contingency planning for this area, if it exists at all, seems to anticipate an outbreak of general warfare between the Communist Bloc nations and the United States and its allies, among which the Argentines could probably be counted. Such perceptions are translated into the anti-submarine warfare missions of the navy and air force in anticipation of the strategic value of the passages around or through Tierra del Fuego, in the event that the Panama Canal might be put "out of order."⁴³

The foreign intelligence capability of the Argentine Armed Forces, principally carried on through their military attache system, is relatively proficient by Latin American standards, and serves to keep the armed forces informed as to the balance of capabilities among the important military states in the region: Brazil, Chile, and herself; some passing attention given to Peru. Bolivia, Uruguay, and Paraguay are also watched, though more for weakness or susceptibility to communist takeover than for actual or positive military capability fed by national aspirations.

RESPONSES TO PERCEIVED THREATS

The Government has had several legal options to

⁴³Munson, op. cit., pp. 205-206.

pursue in responding to or preventing terrorism and subversion in Argentina. The most venerable of these is called Plan CONINTES, or the State Internal Commotion Plan. This was initiated by the Frondizi Government in 1960 to respond to pressure from the gorilla faction of the armed forces, whose purpose was to resist Peronist activities of a potentially terrorist nature. Plan CONINTES enabled the President of the Republic to suspend habeas corpus and combine the police and armed forces under a unified command at the disposal of the Army Commander in Chief. This plan was imposed for brief periods of time until 1964, when President Illia suspended it. The events in Córdoba and Rosario of May and June 1969 led Onganía to place the "Plan" in effect again and for a longer period of time. On the basis of Plan CONINTES, the security forces have been seizing revolutionary Communists and Peronists suspected of either guerrilla or terrorist intentions or activities.

The Anti-Communist Law, decreed by the Onganía Government in September of 1967, further enabled the security forces to forestall violence or opposition. Under this law persons can be seized who are suspected of Communist or subversive sympathies. It had been applied by the Onganía administration in order to oust Marxist professors from their jobs in the university system following the University Reform Act of 1967.

The implementation of the security laws is the first line duty of the local, provincial and federal police forces. In the event that problems should exceed their capabilities, the national gendarmeria would be called upon. In the final resort, should violence exceed the combined resources of these security forces, the army is prepared to confront the threat directly, through the use of its nearest troops, or with paratroops, whichever may be most effective.

The underlying cause of the army's reluctance to become directly involved in internal commotions is the belief that such a mission is demeaning to the image of the armed forces as defenders of the nation. The hope that the routine settlement of local conflicts or outbreaks of violence can be taken care of while the armed forces are able to remain aloof from the consequences of domestic turmoil and thereby safeguard their institutional roles, and as planners and developers of the nation, as guardians of the Constitution, the church, and the national territory.

PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS

Public opinion in Argentina appears to be at least indifferent, if not hostile toward the government's intelligence and threat perception apparatus. The misuse of these organizations by the Perón Government and

its military successors, including the present government, have created an image of privation, interference and informers which has never really been dissipated. To the general civilian population, the Argentine internal security mechanisms are synonymous with "an accumulation of sad experiences." A possible exception to this dictum is the gendarmeria, which has been involved in civic action responsibilities and which has been favorably received by civilian populations in their border-related areas of responsibility.⁴⁴

OTHER SOURCES OF THREAT PERCEPTION

Until June, 1970 a less direct aspect of the national threat perception apparatus was the Junta of the Armed Forces, which is formulated along the organizational lines of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff except that it reports directly to the President. Intended to be an advisory group on military strategy to support CONASE, the Junta had the authority to designate theatres of operations and the commanders of the operational theatres. It also developed the over-all policies for the armed forces as well as their doctrines and training procedures. Its members vote on all matters pertaining to policy in its particular area of jurisdiction. In the event of dissent among the armed forces on matters of policy,

⁴⁴Florit, op. cit., pp. 110-116.

the President of the Republic may have the final determining authority.⁴⁵

Argentina also has informal threat perception sources, by its relatively effective communications system. The major Buenos Aires daily newspapers, with a combined readership in excess of 2,500,000, have considerable influence over popular opinion and to an undetermined extent, over the government's determinations of threat. Several of these papers, including La Nacion and La Prensa, are responsible and report news factually; however, some of the tabloids with wide circulation, including the pro-Fronidizi Clarín and pro-Peronist Cronica are sensationalist and may distort events to evoke the partisan interest and chauvinistic emotions of their leadership. These papers have exacerbated national perceptions of "threat" over border squabbles and domestic problems, and to some extent have created pressures on the Government. On the whole, however, the Onganía Government did not have too much difficulty with the press, excepting for its ban on the national news magazine Primera Plana for allegedly "unpatriotic behavior" in printing a series of articles focusing on political differences between Onganía and Army CINC, Julio Alsogaray in September, 1969. The Levingston Government has since lifted this ban, but

⁴⁵ La Razon, op. cit.

the press is highly sensitive to the possibility of censorship, both because of their experiences during the Peron era, and the more recent example of Primera Plana. The Onganía Government also regulated and controlled the dissemination of news for use by radio and T.V. through its use of a state of seige since the disturbances of May and June, 1969, thereby reducing the likelihood of possible international and political problems from this area.⁴⁶ This policy has been followed by the Levingston government and that of Alejandro Lanusse.

⁴⁶ Varela, "May Day Speech," op. cit.

Chapter 3

MISSIONS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND PARA-MILITARY FORCES AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

THE MISSIONS DEFINED

Our position is to have . . . armed forces of maximum flexibility, homogeneity and efficiency compatible with the national potential; an efficient joint effort by the armed forces; and to develop a supporting industry with excellent potential capacity, assuring rational utilization of resources. In sum, our aim is not to hinder development with an excessive military apparatus, but rather to achieve capacity and effectiveness sufficient to guarantee our security.

Minister of Defense, Van Peborgh,
"Remarks at Foreign Press Association,"
November 26, 1968

The quotation cited above pulls together the principal assumptions which underlie the missions of the Argentine Armed Forces. Briefly restated, these include: the maintenance of national stability as a prerequisite to national economic growth, including efficiency and cooperation among the armed forces in pursuing this objective; and finally and equally important, the participation of the armed forces in the development of the national industrial base with the objective of national industrial base with the objective of national industrial

self-sufficiency. The latter objective would receive emphasis from the armed forces in terms of their own logistical self-sufficiency, which is regarded as an important concomitant of their perspective of the national security.

These broad objectives are implemented by the missions of the armed forces, which cover a broad range of contingencies in spite of a general and vague juridical basis in the National Constitution of 1853 and its implementing legislation. For the purposes of this paper, we shall give particular emphasis to those missions of the armed forces which are related to their armaments purchases and requirements. In this context, we shall also examine the influence of foreign military assistance and sales missions on the Argentine Armed Forces.

Juridical Missions

The juridical missions of the armed forces and para-military forces as defined in the Constitution of 1853 and the pertinent implementing laws and organic acts may be summarized as follows: the mission of the armed forces is the preservation of the national integrity. This entails the traditional military response of maintaining a state of readiness to defend the national security and to implement the nation's military policies. The armed forces are called upon to preserve the internal security of the nation when disorders overwhelm the

capabilities of the police and security forces. To a lesser extent, the armed forces juridical missions also include their support of the nation's foreign policy and international or regional commitments; and assistance in the process of national economic development.

The Argentine Army (Ejército de la Republica Argentina) is specifically directed to defend the nation's territorial integrity and contribute to the maintenance of internal security. Beyond this, it is also charged with supporting the nation's international commitments and assisting as needed with the development of the nation.¹

The Argentine Navy (Armada de la Republica Argentina) is specifically directed by its organic legislation to defend the nation from aggression by sea and to provide protection for Argentine shipping in coastal and international waters. It has the additional and more recent responsibilities of assisting the army in maintaining internal security and of assisting in the maintenance of anti-submarine defense for the hemisphere.²

¹Munson, et al., Area Handbook for Argentina, pp. 403-404. Eulogia D. Carrizo, "Las Fuerzas Armadas y la Revolución Mundial," Boletín del Circulo Militar (Buenos Aires), Vol.s CCXVI/CCXVII/CCXVIII, No. 666, 1962, p. 15.

²Admiral Ignacio Varela, "Navy Day Speech," May 17, 1968, at Comodoro Rivadavia. (Translated by the U.S. Defense Attaches Office, Buenos Aires). Munson, et al., op. cit., p. 404.

The Argentine Air Force (Fuerza Aerea de la Republica Argentina) is charged with the air defense of the country. It is legally charged with the role of defending the national air space, providing strategic support in times of war and with providing tactical support for the army and ground forces in combat.³

The most recently established of the armed forces; the air force originated as the Military Aviation Service of the Army in 1912 and became an autonomous service through its Organic Act of December, 1944.⁴

The Gendarmeria (Gendarmeria Nacional de la Republica Argentina) is a para-military federal constabulary and security force which is maintained on an all volunteer basis. It was created on July 28, 1938, for the purpose of guaranteeing the security and interests of Argentine citizens living adjacent to the national borders. However its most actively fulfilled missions have been those regarding its role in maintaining the internal integrity of the nation through law and order. The Decree Laws and Organic Acts affecting the Gendarmeria are complex due to the many roles and missions given this ubiquitous organization. Among the more pertinent of its enabling

³Ibid., p. 406.

⁴William Green, Air Forces of the World (London: MacDonal and Company, 1958), pp. 13-14.

acts and legislation are: Decree Law #3491/58 and Law 14.467 of April 1958, modified by Law 15.901. Its jurisdiction in federal cases is amplified by Decree 10.113/64 which gives the Gendarmeria authority to move against illegal strikers and labor agitators when they become a threat to public or internal security.⁵

The Gendarmeria is similar to counterparts in Europe such as the French National Gendarmeria and the Spanish Guardia Civil. In the event of serious internal disorder, its command passes directly to the Army CINC, to whom it has been organizationally responsible since 1966. The authority of the Gendarmeria is legally tied to a jurisdictional area which varies according to whether there is a state of peace or war. In the later event it is incorporated directly into the armed forces, and in the former it operates semi-independently to fulfill its missions as security police and customs police, serving at the nation borders to guard against illegal activities.⁶ As we have seen above, the juridical complexity of the Gendarmeria's mission is considerable, for the organization has several basic missions (border security and security policy) and a number of delegations of authority from other organizations (health, etc.).

⁵Munson, op. cit., p. 405.

⁶Ibid., p. 404.

The National Maritime Prefecture was initially established in 1814. It is today the oldest Argentine organization in continuous existence. Its basic organizational law was promulgated in 1896. The Prefecture's legal basis was supplemented by: Decree 25727 of 1950, which outlined its specific jurisdiction and functions over the northeastern border areas, the ports, islands, sea coasts and rivers of Argentina; Decree 6150 of 1955, which placed it under the navy; and Law 14459 of 1958, which further defined its duties under the navy. This latter law gives to the Prefecture the security and judicial police functions in Argentina's ports, as well as the role of maintaining general navigation safety in Argentine national waters and of enforcing Argentina's maritime laws. Arising from these juridical responsibilities, the Prefecture retains security police powers which give it the right to use force to protect public order and the security of the state within its zones of jurisdiction.⁷

Operational Missions

The Argentine Army is the most powerful, the best equipped and numerically the largest of the country's armed forces. It is controlled by the Army Commander-in-Chief (CINC) from Headquarters in Buenos Aires. The Army CINC commands all Argentine field forces including those of the National Gendarmeria. He is assisted by a General

⁷Ibid., p. 405.

Staff consisting of a chief of staff and five assistant chiefs, the latter being charged respectively with: I, Personnel; II, Intelligence; III, Operations and Training; IV, Logistics; and V, Policy, Research and Planning.⁸

In addition the Army CINC is in command of a number of agencies which were under the Secretary of War prior to 1966. In addition to the National Gendarmeria, these include the army training institutes, the Military Geographic Institute, the Director General of Military Statistics and the Legal Adviser to the army. Also reporting directly to the Army CINC are the commanders of the four army corps.

The Argentine Army is divided geographically into four army corps areas, each of which is assigned to a given corps. The I Corps Area is headquartered in the Capitol City of Buenos Aires and comprises the Federal City, the Province of Buenos Aires and the Province of La Pampa. It is the largest troop concentration in the country and includes two brigades⁹ and a number of special regiments, directly responsible to the Corps Commander. I Corps

⁸ La Nacion (Buenos Aires), December 11, 1967, p. 7. Munson, et al., op. cit., p. 403.

⁹ The Argentine Brigade is numerically and structurally equivalent to three U.S. combat battalions. An Argentine regiment is analogous to one U.S. combat battalion.

also includes the garrisons at Palermo Barracks in downtown Buenos Aires and the large military school complex at the Campo de Mayo, on the city's outskirts.

The II Corps Area is headquartered at Rosario and includes the northeast adjacent to the Paraguay-Brazil-Uruguay border. It is composed of three brigades, of which one is horse cavalry, stationed in the open country of Entre Rios. The III Corps Area also contains three brigades and is based at Córdoba. Two of the III Corps brigades, along with several units of mountain troops, are located in the vicinity of the Bolivian-Chilean border in the northwest, and a third air mobile brigade is generally held at Córdoba, the largest industrial city of the interior of Argentina. The IV Corps is headquartered at Bahia Blanca and commands two brigades, one of which guards the oil fields at Neuquen Province, while the other is situated at the port city of Comodoro Rivadavia.¹⁰

The army has an air arm, the Army Aviation Command, which is directly subordinate to the CINC, and which has the mission of providing the ground troops with limited airlift, observation, reconnaissance and administrative support capabilities. The Aviation Command consists of an aviation battalion, an aircraft maintenance

¹⁰ Munson, et al., op. cit., p. 403.

company and a depot aviation section. As of 1968, the army had 34 aircraft and 77 pilots, nearly half of whom were in non-flying administrative assignments. The aircraft are all small and basically configured for purposes of executive travel and observation. They include: several Aerocommanders, 1 DC-3, several Piper "Aztecs" (twin engine) and several helicopters, which are used for executive transportation; and a number of Cessna 185s for field use.¹¹

The army at peak strength includes 85,000 men, of whom 65,000 are conscripts, 15,000 are NCOs and specialist volunteers, and 5000 are officers. Due to the one year training cycle, conscript strength has in the past varied spectacularly, dropping to as low as 20,000 in the months of November, December, and January. Approximately 2/3rds of the army officers are regular line officers (cuerpo de comando), the remainder includes: doctors, pharmacists, musicians and other non-combatants. A new conscription system introduced in 1969 has largely eliminated the huge seasonal fluctuations in the conscript strength of the army by inducting the men on a quarterly basis instead of an annual one.¹²

¹¹Confirmado (Buenos Aires), "La Fuerzas . . ." January 26, 1967, p. 28. Munson, et al., op. cit., pp. 403-404.

¹²Ibid., pp. 391, 398, 401.

The organization and deployment of the army suggests a national security mission which is oriented principally against the threat of urban insurrection or insurgency. The heavy concentration of troop strength in Buenos Aires and the littoral cities of Córdoba and Rosario are indicative of this. Provision is also made for the defense of the borders and of vital locations and concentrations of natural resources (e.g., the oil fields and the port of Comodoro Rivadavia).

The Argentine Navy ranks closely with the Navy of Brazil as the largest in Latin America. Its total strength in mid-1968 was approximately 34,000 men, 25,000 of whom were conscripts with one year tours of duty. These statistics included 6,750 in naval infantry and 2,900 in naval aviation. It includes 21 vessels with combat capabilities and 75 assorted other types.

Most combat units of the navy are in the Sea Fleet Command which is located at Puerto Belgrano and a small number of auxiliary naval vessels are at Puerto Belgrano, which is the navy's principal base. The navy's amphibious vessels and the majority of its larger auxiliaries are assigned to the Naval Transport Command at the Port of Buenos Aires.

The Naval Infantry Corps (Argentine's equivalent to the U.S. Marines) has its headquarters in Buenos Aires and is composed of approximately 6000

men and NCOs led by 290 officers, most of whom are graduates of the Argentine Naval Academy. These units provide security for the naval bases and arsenals extending from the Zarate Navy Yard in northern Buenos Aires province to the naval base at Ushuaia in Tierra del Fuego. A brigade of the naval infantry is stationed at the Puerto Belgrano naval base. The naval infantry also has a mission as a strike force with amphibious and commando type capabilities.¹³

The Naval Aviation Command is intended to support naval operations and its missions include coastal and off-shore patrolling, reconnaissance, and antisubmarine warfare (ASW). The Command's 3000 men are principally engaged in maintenance and support operations. It includes approximately 200 commissioned pilots, approximately 20 operating jets and over 180 aircraft. These units are organized into three forces; the first of which is stationed at Punta Indio near Veronica and includes the Naval Air School and one squadron; the second is at the Comandante Espora Air Base near Bahia Blanca and is composed of six squadrons one of which is an attack squadron. The third force is stationed at the Ezeiza International Airport which is near Buenos Aires and consists of two transport squadrons. The majority of the operational naval aircraft and personnel are located

¹³Ibid., pp. 391, 404, 405. Horacio Sueldo, "Las Fuerzas Armadas," from Argentina: 1930-1960 (Buenos Aires: Editorial del Sur, 1961), p. 175.

at the Comandante Espora Air Base, which is the locale for almost all of the operational flying of the Naval Air Force.¹⁴

The light aircraft carrier of the Sea Fleet is constituted as an independent command. Naval air elements (particularly those with ASW missions) are frequently assigned to carrier operations. The navy recently purchased a Dutch carrier which has been renamed the 25° de Mayo--a sister ship to the navy's Independencia with a more modern communications system and steam catapult. The 25° de Mayo replaced the Independencia as flagship of the Sea Fleet in October, 1969. The navy also has a riverine command which is operated from Rio Santiago with headquarters at La Plata, to control smuggling and subversive activities and engage in mine sweeping when required to do so. The navy is responsible for the Maritime Prefecture, a para-military organization akin to the U.S. Coast Guard, which includes 8000 men and performs maritime police functions. The Maritime Prefecture is charged with the supervision of shipping activities and with enforcement of merchant marine safety regulations.¹⁵

The Naval Hydrographic Group is located under

¹⁴Green, op. cit., p. 13. Munson, op. cit., pp. 404-405.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 405. Sueldo, op. cit., p. 178.

the Naval Shore Areas Command and includes the navy's icebreaker, and several amphibious and service craft. The naval shore areas generally use their amphibious and service vessels in rescue, salvage and patrol activities.¹⁶

The basic operational and national security related mission of the navy (in terms of deployment) is the defense of the nation against possible threats from external sources with particular emphasis on anti-submarine warfare (ASW). The conscious preparation for ASW operations seem to indicate Argentine interest in a developed ASW capability in the event of a general war which Argentines believe would increase the strategic value of Cape Horn and the Magellan Straits. The navy's modernization has been limited to seeking jets for the aircraft carrier and seacat anti-aircraft missile armament for the light cruiser General Belgrano. It presently lacks an effective attack capability, at least until it receives 16 U.S. A-4B jets for off carrier operation which have been promised to Argentina by the U.S. for delivery in late 1970 or early 1971.

The Argentine Air Force is the second largest (after Brazil) in Latin America. It is organized into five operational commands reporting directly to the Air

¹⁶ Munson, et al., op. cit., p. 405.

Force CINC. These commands consist of: the Personnel Command, Air Operations Command, Material Command, Research and Development Command, and the Directorate of Civil Aviation.¹⁷

The Personnel Command is charged with normal personnel functions and all training activities and the operation of the Air Force Schools. The Operations Command used to be the tactical element of the air force. It presently is made up of two fighter-bomber brigades, a bomber brigade, a transport brigade and an aerial reconnaissance brigade.

The personnel strength of the air force includes over 16,000 men in 1968, of whom 7000 were conscripts, 8700 were NCOs and 500 were officer pilots. Most of the officers are graduates of the School of Military Aviation. The equipment inventory included over 350 aircraft of which 175 are jets. There are deployed among the five brigades, several small detachments, the Antarctic Group and the School of Military Aviation.¹⁸

The air force's principal support air fields and air bases are six in number,¹⁹ and include the following:

¹⁷Ibid., p. 406.

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 405-406. Green, op. cit., p. 11.

¹⁹Argentina has over 90 airfields which are usable for most of its military aircraft in emergencies.

El Plumerillo, Moron, General Urquiza, Coronel Pringles, El Palomar, and the Military Aviation School. These fields have hard surface runways, and either surface or underground storage for a 30 day supply of aviation gasoline. However, as of 1968, only El Plumerillo and Moron stored jet fuel. These fields have navigational aids and services which are adequate for normal operations. The air force maintains an operational training program throughout the year on a limited basis, due to the disrepair and age of many of its aircraft.²⁰

The air force is responsible for a number of essentially civilian oriented enterprises. These include: the National Weather Service, Aerolinas Argentinas, and the other state airline systems including Lineas Aereas del Estado (LADE), which serves Patagonia and Tierra del Fuego. The air force is also charged with the responsibility for Argentina's interests in space and includes the National Commission of Space Research.²¹

The national security related mission of the air force is that of providing mobility and support for the nation's ground forces. In this sense, it is also called upon to open up and keep open the territories of

²⁰Munson, et al., op. cit., p. 406.

²¹Inter-American Defense Board Staff Paper, "Work of the Armed Forces in the Economic and Social Development of the Countries," Washington, D. C.: IADS, mimeograph #T-255, June 8, 1965, pp. 17, 63.

the south and the interior, thereby assuring national control over the less settled regions of the nation.

The Para-Military Institutions

The nation's two principal para-military institutions, the Gendarmeria and the Marine Prefecture, play a significant role in the context of Argentine national security affairs and policy. It has been the policy of the armed forces to use these institutions and particularly the Gendarmeria to serve as the national instruments in controlling internal disturbances and outbreaks of lawlessness which exceed the capabilities of the local and federal police.

For the purposes of this paper, we are giving particular attention to these institutions as principal tools of the government in the process of carrying out national security policy in the face of forceful or illegal opposition on the part of internal dissidents, such as Peronists and university students.

The National Gendarmeria is a combination federal constabulary and security force manned on an all-volunteer basis. Although distinct from the army, it is considered to be a para-military or constabulary organization, for it has a military structure, is governed by Army Regulations and is commanded by a regular army general officer, who is directly responsible to the Army CINC. In 1968, the Gendarmeria had approximately

11,000 men, including over 1000 officers, and 6300 non-commissioned officers.²² The Gendarmeria has traditionally been staffed by its own officers below the level of the Director and his Deputy; however, recently the Director has filled a number of staff positions with army personnel. Most of the officers in the Gendarmeria are from that organization and are graduates of a three year course at the General Martín Guemes National Gendarmeria School. The enlisted men recruited by the Gendarmeria are usually obtained after they have completed their required military training in the armed services; however, this is not a rigid custom and one year of service in the Gendarmeria satisfies the national military training obligation.²³

The Gendarmeria's operational missions include the following functions: federal security and judicial police; auxiliary customs police; auxiliary immigration police; public health service; forest service police; navigation police in the Southern Lake District; border patrol; the prevention and repression of subversive activities and safeguarding internal security and public safety; and within the border zone, it acts as judge for minor offenses.

²²Sueldo, op. cit., p. 176. Munson, et al., op. cit., pp. 391-404.

²³Ibid., p. 400.

The Gendarmeria patrols the borders and polices a security zone 150 kilometers (90 miles) deep within Argentina's land frontiers, excepting only Tierra del Fuego, and the borders of the Provinces of Entre Rios and Corrientes which are the responsibility of the National Maritime Prefecture. Outside of the frontier security zone, the Gendarmeria has served as a riot control force which can be utilized to back up the Federal Police and to track down insurgent groups which pose too small threat to require the actual intervention of the armed forces.²⁴

Historically, the Gendarmeria has functioned with marked success in the field of counter-insurgency. In 1964, they eliminated a group of pro-Castro guerrillas, who were initiating a campaign in Salta, several of whom had been trained in Cuba and who had far superior weapons than did the Gendarmeria. During the ensuing campaign the Gendarmeria killed two of the guerrillas, six starved trying to escape, and the guerrillas killed two of their own number. Only one Gendarme was lost in this operation. In 1965, an illegal strike at the FIAT Concord factory in Córdoba spread beyond the control capabilities of the Provincial Police and the Governor requested the assistance of the Gendarmeria. The Gendarmeria occupied

²⁴ Sueldo, op. cit., pp. 176-177.

the area, dispersed the strikers, restored the peace and protected the property while also persuading the strikers themselves to return to their jobs. The recent (May-June, 1969) urban disturbances in Rosario, Córdoba and La Plata also saw yeoman service by the Gendarmeria, although the magnitude of the disturbances finally required the direct intervention of the Argentine Army.

It can be seen from the instances cited above that the Gendarmeria is responsible for a complexity of basic activities plus several that are delegated to it by other organizations. Its volunteer personnel makeup and its esprit du corps (at least at the officer and NCO levels) are outstanding. The organization enjoys relative respect from the people with whom they are in contact in the border areas, and at least one reporter compared them to the Texas Rangers in the 19th century, of whom it was said "One riot one ranger," perhaps hyperbole, but indicative. The extensive civic action involvement of the Gendarmeria is at least in part responsible for this situation. The Gendarmeria have been involved in civic action work since their inception in 1938. Gendarmeria units construct schools and work as teachers for elementary and high school subjects, as well as manual skills training. Gendarmeria personnel also teach: automobile repair, typing, carpentry, leather work, driver training and first aid. For example, the Destacamento Vialidad Detachment of the Gendarmeria in Formosa Province has

constructed 725 kilometers of access roads. Gendarmeria medical teams are the only available medical treatment to the residents of many isolated border areas and are provided at no expense, as are inoculations and even dental care in some instances. Other Gendarmeria civic action activities include mail delivery, bridge building, and the construction and maintenance of roads.²⁵

The forces of the Gendarmeria are organized as three regional commands--the Southern Region, headquartered at Bahia Blanca; the Western Region, at Córdoba; and the Northern Region at Rosario. The Gendarmeria also has three regular detachments and one reserve detachment which are semi-mobile groups established to re-enforce regular units if needed and to assist Federal and/or Provincial Police in any area of the nation where they may be needed.²⁶

The patrol is the basic operational unit of the Gendarmeria and the backbone of its organization. The patrol is generally composed of three or four men on horse back under the command of an NCO (chief/jefe).²⁷

The Gendarmeria is said to be handicapped in performance of its missions by a lack of manpower, communications equipment, modern weapons, and transportation.

²⁵Ibid., p. 176. IADB Staff, op. cit., pp. 29-30, 63 and 81.

²⁶Sueldo, op. cit., pp. 172-177.

²⁷Ibid., p. 176.

Nevertheless it is considered to be one of the continent's outstanding paramilitary organizations along with the carabineros of Chile, in the field of internal security and border control and protection.

From the standpoint of national security policy, the Gendarmeria plays a more consistent and involved role than any other military or para-military institution in the nation. Since most real threats to the "national security as perceived by the armed forces" are internal and usually of the level of annoyance rather than danger, the armed forces are institutionally reluctant to become actively involved in the suppression of minor internal disturbances which would tend to discredit their leadership with the populace. As a result, they have found it most opportune to use the Gendarmeria as an all purpose backup for internal problems short of general uprisings. In their role as mobile shock troops and guardians of the national frontier (a romantic and popular image among Argentines) the Gendarmeria have sustained a relatively apolitical image as the nation's principal deterrent to direct internal or external threats to the national security.

The National Maritime Prefecture is a well disciplined para-military organization responsible to the Commander in Chief of the Argentine Navy. The Commander of the Prefecture is the National Maritime Prefect, who is usually a naval officer. The Prefecture

is principally concerned with border patrolling, internal security in border and port areas, immigration/emigration, and navigation safety. It was founded in 1814, and enjoys the tradition of being the oldest surviving and continuous organization in Argentina. As of December, 1968, the Prefecture had a total of approximately 9000 men, including around 8000 enlisted men and 1000 officers. Most of the Prefecture's enlisted men are volunteers, as is the case with the Gendarmeria, and obligatory service with the Prefecture is counted as time spent in compliance with the national military service requirements.²⁸

The jurisdiction of the Prefecture extends to all territorial seas, rivers, lakes, channels, and other navigable waters serving inter-jurisdictional traffic and trade in ports which are under Argentine national jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction includes the "Argentine Antarctic," "Islas Malvinas" and other South Atlantic Islands; maritime coasts and beaches within 50 meters from the high tide mark, and river, lake and channel banks within 35 meters of the normal flood line for matters pertaining to navigation safety. The Prefecture is also responsible for matters occurring on board Argentine ships on the high seas, or on board ships at foreign ports in matters concerning safety and navigation which do not fall under the jurisdiction of the host country. It is primarily

²⁸Ibid., p. 177. Munson, et al., op. cit., p. 405.

concerned with the security and patrolling of the river and maritime border safety areas, which extend to a depth of 150 kilometers along the 2,250 kilometers of riverine borders of Entre Rios, Corrientes and Misiones Provinces.²⁹

The National Maritime Prefecture conducts a multitude of operations in carrying out the many responsibilities with which it is charged. From a police and internal security point of view, the Prefecture is not configured to perform missions beyond policing and detection of illicit activities and should not be regarded as a force capable to engaging dissident forces of greater than "gang" levels of force. In an internal conflict situation its value to the nation would be its limited capacity to deny insurgents material assistance from the Rio de la Plata neighbors of Argentina.

The national security role of the Prefecture is circumscribed to anti-smuggling activity and the protection of the national harbors and waterfronts. Within its jurisdiction, which is a limited one in the national security context, the Prefecture functions like the Gendarmeria as the armed forces preferred reactive mechanism to problems of a controllable magnitude. Its size and the areas for which it is responsible tend to indicate that the prefecture would play but a minimal

²⁹Ibid., p. 405.

role in the event of widespread or large scale disturbances.

Deployments as Indicators of Missions

The deployment of the armed forces illustrates an interesting division in their missions and national security role. The army appears to be deployed largely in anticipation of urban problems, with a majority of its forces stationed in proximity to the principal cities of the Pampa and its littoral: Buenos Aires, Córdoba and Rosario in particular. Other units are dispersed to provide for protection against border incursions and inter-state threats. At the present time approximately 15,000 troops are stationed in the vicinity of the Brazilian border, and most of these are armed and trained in counter-insurgency warfare. Troop concentrations are relatively few along the Chilean border and are most evident in the proximity of the passes through the Andean barrier. Some troop elements are also stationed near important concentrations of natural resources, and others show the flag and assist in civic action projects and industrial undertakings in the southern territories.


The navy, on the other hand is largely deployed for inter-state possibilities, with emphasis on defense and ASW capabilities. Its equipment is suited for patrol duty and is stationed towards the center of the nation's eastern coast-line so as to be able to meet threats from

either Brazil to the north or Chile around the "Horn." The Sea Fleet is based at Puerto Belgrano near Bahia Blanca at the southeastern extreme of the humid pampa, while most of its auxiliary units are stationed at Buenos Aires, and the submarines are at Mar del Plata. The navy maintains a base at Ushuia in the Beagle Channel, and is responsible for the administration of Tierra del Fuego. In terms of deployment it thus guards the strategic waters of the Horn and safeguards Argentina's claims to the region.

The air force is deployed in a broad belt across the country which extends from the Comandante Espora base at Bahia Blanca across to the El Plumerillo base near Mendoza and across the Pass from Santiago. Bases are also maintained in the northwest at Salta, and in the north at New Resistencia (see map). The concentration of Argentina's air strength is around the city of Buenos Aires which boasts four military airfields: El Palomar, Moron, Ezeiza (also the International Airport), and Aeroparque. The fighter-bomber units of the air force are largely deployed to defend the nation's densely populated areas and to a lesser extent, to confront possible threats from Brazil and Chile. A considerable portion of the air force's transport aviation effort is utilized in the airline LADE, which serves the southern territories and is a key component in the armed forces development effort in

Map 3

MAJOR NAVAL AND AIR BASES OF ARGENTINA



the region. Fighter support aircraft (F-86s and a few "Meteors") are also deployed along with transport aircraft and helicopters for the purpose of troop support against rural insurrectionists and to facilitate troop transportation into the provinces of Salta, Tucuman and Jujuy which have been affected by such disturbances in the last three years.

THE ARMED FORCES EQUIPMENT PURCHASES AND MISSIONS

The Army

The Argentine Army has traditionally been equipped for interstate and regional military possibilities. This concept of mission has found equipment expression in emphasis upon mobility and firepower through cavalry or armor, and more specifically--tanks. The tank has been regarded by the Argentine Army as a ubiquitous weapon, in that it is formidable in appearance for the purpose of impressing the urban populace; it is mobile and therefore useful given the predominantly flat character of Argentina's settled areas; and it is also useful as a protected weapon against urban revolutionaries.

It is not surprising therefore that the Perón Government ordered 300 US M-4 (medium) tanks for the army in 1946, at a cost of approximately \$10,000,000. These tanks were purchased as surplus war material through commercial channels. Also purchased at that time were a number of war surplus English armored personnel carriers

(APCs) and US Anti-Aircraft M-5 half-tracks.³⁰

These purchases were intended to equalize the Argentine Army with that of Brazil and also served to provide symbolism appropriate to the intense nationalism of the armed forces during the period 1946-1948. Another motivation behind the acquisition of this equipment may have been Perón's desire to impress his smaller neighbors with the capacity of Argentina to assume regional leadership, a goal which Perón later pursued on the level of diplomacy and economic coercion with mixed results. The purchases of 1946-1948 constituted the army's principal hardware acquisitions until 1964, when a Military Assistance Program was arranged with the United States in order to provide much needed modernization.

The US Military Assistance Program, which was arranged for Argentina on a grant/aid basis, was to have replaced the obsolescent M-4 (Sherman) tanks with enough modern, refitted, M-41 "Walker Bulldog" Tanks to equip one battalion (60 tanks) at a proposed cost of \$US 3.9 million. Of the proposed battalion of tanks, only five were actually sent in that they were intended to produce

³⁰ James Rowe, "Argentina's Restless Military," from Latin American Politics 24 Studies of the Current Scene. R. D. Tomasek, ed. (New York: Doubleday, 1966), p. 246.

an initial "impact."³¹ This shipment was delivered prior to the coup of 1966 and the ensuing suspension of the MAP program. The remaining 55 tanks were not released by the U.S., presumably as a gesture of disapprobation toward the coup.

The U.S. MAP program had also proposed the sale of M-113 Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs) and prior to the coup 83 of the M-113s had been provided to the Argentine Army. An additional 55 M-113s were scheduled for delivery in 1968 but were temporarily frozen by the cessation of the program. The MAP program also provided the army with support and transport mobility through the sale of several hundred trucks and trailers and it provided mobile firepower in the form of 40 Jeep mountable recoilless rifles.³² The coup of 1966 and the U.S. Government's interpretation of the Conte-Long Amendment reduced the major hardware provisions of the U.S. Military Assistance Program to Argentina at a crucial period when the army was in the midst of a major rearmament program. Priorities and funds had already been allocated for the modernization of the army and the political upshot of the reduction of the United States' MAP program was a determined Argentine

³¹New York Times, October 4, 1967, p, 3.

³²Interview with Geoffrey Kemp and Priscilla Clapp (correspondents to the Institute of Strategic Studies), October, 1968.

Army move to the arms merchant of Europe, which was named Plan Europa.

The cancelled U.S. tank deal was replaced with an order for 60 new AMX-13 light tanks from France. The AMX-13s were capable of speeds up to 60 mph and were armed with Italian 105mm cannon, resulting in their being configured technically as tank destroyers. An initial shipment of 30 such tanks was made in 1969, and the various component parts of the remainder were to be manufactured and assembled at the industrial facilities near Cordoba.³³ The initial delivery of these tanks went to the 8th Tank Regiment of the First Cavalry Brigade in Magdalena. An additional 28 tanks are scheduled to be produced entirely in Argentina over a period of 30 months by a consortium of local companies and the industrial facilities of the army.³⁴

The army has also ordered twenty-four 155mm self-propelled howitzers from the SOFMA Corp. of France. These are to be assembled in Argentina in the same manner as the AMX 13s, and are scheduled for delivery to the 141st and the 101st Artillery Battalions of the army.³⁵

³³New York Times, February 23, 1969, p. 6.
Comunidad (Buenos Aires) "Una decision de soberania."
May, 1968, p. 8; Christian Science Monitor, Oct. 7, 1968,
p. 7.

³⁴La Prensa (Buenos Aires), July 16, 1968, p. 3.

³⁵La Nacion (Buenos Aires), October 22, 1968,
p. 2.

The army has ordered sixty 105mm air transportable, towable, mountain howitzers from the Otto Malera Corp. of Italy; 100 wire-guided German anti-tank missiles built by the Bulkow Corp. with four launching platforms and two practice units;³⁶ and has contracted to purchase 60 Swiss "MOWAG" armored reconnaissance cars.³⁷ This picture is completed by a less glamorous and remarkably heterogenous assortment of material sold through the U.S. MAP program in 1964-1966, which provided radio equipment, vehicle maintenance equipment, and spare parts for the general use of the army, thus extending considerably the army's capability for maintaining its equipment and of supplying it in the field.

The army's national security-related missions as reflected by its equipment interests and procurement policies are basically five-fold. They require an army capable of responding to either a threat from Brazil or, more probably to an insurgency in a generally open and flat country, which places great emphasis upon the desirability of a highly mobile armed force. This would explain the need for the swift, heavily armed (105mm) light tanks, faster Swiss "MOWAG" reconnaissance vehicles (which may be used by the Gendarmeria).

³⁶Comunidad, op. cit.; New York Times, February 23, 1969, p. 6.

³⁷Reuters (Buenos Aires), February 24, 1969. La Nacion (B.A.), February 24, 1969, p. 4.

APCs and the large number of trucks. Secondly, the army perceives a more serious threat from urban insurrection, due in part to the nature of the people and of the terrain in most rural areas which is prohibitive to insurgents, and in part due to the character of the opposition it expects from the urban based Peronist and communist elements. The army's normal equipment response to an urban threat is the tank and to a lesser extent the armored car and APC. The army's interest in tanks, artillery (mountain) and self-propelled howitzers can also be viewed as a response to possible conventional threats from Chile or Brazil. This type of weaponry gives the army a sense of institutional pride, and, in a traditional sense, a "modern" military image or appearance.

The Argentine Army's cavalry even today has horse mounted components which are only useful for patrolling, and this is the primary task of the Gendarmeria in any case. The character of the flat, treeless Pampa and the location of the major cities on or around it have created an emphasis on the importance of cavalry which has been taken for granted by the Argentines since the nineteenth century.³⁸ The cavalry has traditionally

³⁸ Hartley Dame, et al., " . . . The Utility of Horse Cavalry and Pack Animals in Counterinsurgency Operations in Latin America." Washington, D.C.: SORO/CINFAC--American University, 1965, p. 55 (open monograph).

been the seat of the army's leadership and has been "in the saddle" of almost every political maneuver performed by the army. Thus, the key to the morale and for that matter the political support of the army has almost always been the cavalry and its re-equipment with modern weaponry in modest quantity should therefore not be surprising.

The equipping of the army has an important national security-related aspect. This is the economic effect of the complete or partial manufacture and assembly of the equipment in Argentina. The last 30 AMX-13 tanks are to be largely manufactured by Argentine Corporations under license. It is planned that the French owned Argentine division of the Renault Auto Company-SAMYA-(formerly the Kaiser Corp., at Córdoba) will manufacture the engines, crankcases and transmissions. The cannon and precision optical instruments will be imported from European sources; the turret, chassis, and armor will be manufactured at the ASTARSA de San Fernando Naval Shipyard; and the vehicles will be assembled at the Campo de Mayo Arsenal, outside of Buenos Aires.³⁹ Steel for the tanks will be produced by the San Nicholas plant in Buenos Aires Province.⁴⁰ Argentines estimate that the production of

³⁹Comunidad, op. cit. La Prensa (B.A.), May 11, 1968, p. 3.

⁴⁰Marc Hutten, American French Press (Lima), February 28, 1968. (FBIS Reports, 2/29/68, p. B. 1--from Radio Broadcast in Spanish).

the final 30 AMX tanks will require 1.5 million man hours and the hiring of large numbers of workers and technicians working under the guidance of French technical assistance personnel.⁴¹

There is very little new or startling in the most recent cycle of weapons purchases by the army. The economic approach, with emphasis on domestic production is more ambitious than its limited past efforts, one of which resulted only in the production of ten 35 ton proto-type medium tanks called "Nahuel" under Perón in 1945;⁴² and even more so if the Argentines are serious about themselves exporting such armaments as the AMX-13.

The arms manufacturing policy adopted by the government dove-tails well with the economic development mission of the army by providing employment for a considerable labor force, saving foreign exchange and leading to the possible (but not probable) export of such equipment elsewhere on the continent by 1971-1972. In addition, the domestic manufacture and European relationships generated by Plan Europa have the national security related effect of enabling Argentina to free itself from what it considered to be binding restrictions placed on the hardware "loaned" by the United States. More

⁴¹American French Press (Paris), August 28, 1968, (FBIS Reports, August 29, 1968, p. B.1., Radio Broadcast in Spanish.)

⁴²Ysabel Rennie, The Argentina Republic, p. 382.

specifically, it permitted Argentina to acquire equipment from nations with which it has favorable balances of trade, whereas Argentina had a trade deficit in its dealings with the U.S. of over \$123 million dollars in 1968 alone. Thus, Argentina's Plan Europa conforms with an oft-quoted homily of Argentine Governments since the mid-19th century: "We buy from those who buy from us."

The Navy

The Argentina Navy has traditionally been the recipient of most of the "glamor hardware" purchased for the armed forces. Historically, this situation arose from the importance accorded a nation internationally in terms of its naval capability, and from the lack of effective overland modes of intra-continental transportation which placed a premium upon travel and communications by sea among the nations of South America in the 19th century.

The national security policy of Argentina, as it pertains to the navy, allows for a sizeable sea-borne force, for Argentina's history was marked on at least four occasions by set-backs due to naval involvements. These ranged from the abortive British invasions of 1808 and 1810, through the war with Brazil in 1928 in which the Argentines suffered a naval disaster, and particularly through the Anglo-French Blockades of the 1840s.

In more recent times, air power and the insatiable advances of technology in this field have resulted in considerable expenditures there. However, naval forces remain as the most status-oriented mode of weaponry available to the Argentine armed forces. This weaponry is internationally visible and therefore gratifies Argentine national pride and aspirations. It would also be the key to a successful Argentine national defense in the event of an interstate conflict with either of her two major continental neighbors or an extra-continental power, for almost all of the major cities of the continent are adjacent to the sea.

The high cost and maintenance involved in sustaining a navy has led to the development of a pattern of reaction and balance among the larger nations of South America. This has been particularly true of Argentina and Brazil. In addition, the high cost per unit of major pieces of naval shipping has led to opportunism as opposed to long range planning as a characteristic of naval weapons purchase. The national security needs of Argentina as they are presently seen to affect the navy are indeed secondary. In recent years, naval purchases have reflected a more economical and realistic focus of purpose as indicated in weapons purchases. The focus has been antisubmarine warfare, which is virtually the only field in which a "third world"

nation can maintain a credible navy at a realistic cost. This capability also serves to cover Argentina for conventional continental inter-state possibilities as well.

Set in the perspective of this country, Argentine naval power arose from the demonstrated success of Chile's professional navy in the War of the Pacific (1878), which was compounded by a concomitant border dispute between Chile and Argentina over Patagonia and Tierra del Fuego from 1891-1902. In this instance, national security interests, compounded by emotional nationalism led to sudden and seemingly disproportionate equipment acquisition. Chile and Argentina signed a naval arms agreement in 1902,⁴³ but in 1906, Brazil upset matters with an order for three battleships. The example set by Brazil in 1906 and 1910, particularly when viewed in the context of a spiraling world arms race, again made a natural case for naval expansion.

The cost factors were ignored in the early part of the century since a Chilean threat was perceived to Argentine territory, and naval acquisitions were made in spite of a severe depression at the time. Ten years later, high costs and a mutiny in the Brazilian Navy,

⁴³H. F. Peterson, Argentina and the U.S., p. 296. Costa Mendez, "Lecture . . .," op. cit.

led to cut-backs in expenditures. President Hipólito Yrigoyen (1916-1922, 1928-1930) refused to purchase weaponry as a matter of policy, and although his interim successor, President Marcelo de Alvear (1922-1928) did make some naval purchases, the Argentine Navy was not permitted to substantially modernize until after President Yrigoyen's overthrow by the armed forces in 1930.

From 1930 to 1940, the navy pursued a ten year equipment purchasing plan, which enabled it to obtain a series of new vessels in a timely and planner manner, commensurate with efficient operation. This situation reflected the economic well-being of the nation during this period. Emphasis was placed upon conventional inter-state prestige weapons during this era, with most naval expenditures going toward cruisers, destroyers. The functional mission of these forces was for national prestige and defense against attack from regional neighbors. The effect of submarine warfare during the First War was also very much borne in mind by Argentine naval planners during the thirties, when they ordered two modern submarines and a number of destroyers. However, on balance, the basic equipment of the navy still reflected a conventional inter-state defense mission with emphasis on national and institutional prestige.

Huge gold reserves accumulated during the Second World War, together with a variety of international

tensions and the arming of Brazil by the United States, and the growth of intense nationalism in the armed forces, created considerable pressure on the Argentines to increase their own level of armament. However, their neutrality in the war caused them to be denied access to the arms of the United States and its Allies, and the over-extension of the Axis powers after the invasion of Russia caused them to be disinclined to respond to Argentine requests. After the war, President Juan Perón spent huge sums to re-equip the armed forces in order to bring them up to a balance with Brazil and to reassert Argentine pretensions to leadership in the hemisphere. However, Perón's enmity towards the navy limited its acquisitions to two light cruisers and a number of surplus aircraft. The navy's equipment was already obsolescent and in poor condition as it entered the Perón period and it deteriorated steadily until his overthrow in 1955, which was notably assisted by the "Sea Fleet's" threat to bombard Buenos Aires. The Aramburu and Frondizi Governments considerably up-graded the navy, giving particular emphasis to its anti-submarine warfare role. This led to the purchase of the aircraft carrier Independencia, jet aircraft, and the ship loan from the U.S. of three destroyers and two submarines.

The navy has recently embarked on a long range program for planned equipment procurement, its first since the 1920s. Its mission as defined by equipment

purchases are today basically three-sided, and include: the protection of Argentine waters from submarines; the capability of meeting a conventional threat from either Chile from the south or Brazil from the north; and the capability of protecting Argentine waters and adjacent strategic passages from hostile submarine or raider activity in time of general war.⁴⁴

Institutional prestige is also a consideration of the present three year re-equipment cycle which is being financed by an authorization worth U.S. \$200 million. Ships are being outfitted with the British "Seacat" ship-to-air missile in order to give the navy a sense of relevance to modern military technology and the marines have likewise been equipped with several batteries of catapillar mounted "Tigercat" surface to air miysiles. In addition, an Italian "Argo" fire-control system was purchase for the light cruiser General Belgrano, at a combined cost of 5.1 million dollars. The system was installed and operational by late 1968. The Navy also purchased six-6 ton, reconstructed British mine-sweepers and two British mine hunters in the interests of "protecting Argentina's harbors and maritime trade in the South Atlantic."⁴⁵

⁴⁴Varela, op. cit.

⁴⁵Janes Fighting Ships (London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co., 1969). Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SPIRI), SIPRI Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament: 1968-1969 (New York: Humanities Press, 1969), pp. 237-238. Flying Review, January, 1968, p. 34.

The navy's air arm has been strengthened by the purchase of approximately 65 T-28D ("Fennec") light strike and training aircraft from France. These aircraft were purchased and delivered at a cost of \$10,000 each. A number were in poor condition but a significant number are repairable for operational use as trainers and use off of carriers. In addition, the navy ordered six armed Aeromacchi 325 G jet trainers which were adapted to carrier use. These planes in addition to 16 U.S. carriers adapted A-4 Ds are the real "power" of Argentine naval aviation.

At the present time the piece de resistance of the navy's ship reequipment program is the newly purchased and refitted light aircraft carrier 25 de Mayo, which has a steam catapult capable of handling jet aircraft. The carrier was formerly the Karel Dorman and was purchased from the Netherlands, repaired, and refitted in 1968, for 3.63 million dollars. It was commissioned into the Argentine Navy on the 28th of September, 1969.⁴⁶

In addition to the equipment cited above the navy intends to purchase and possibly build or at least assemble one of the two missile-equipped Leander Class frigates on order from Britain, and one of two submarines on order from West Germany.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ SIPRI, op. cit. See also: Janes . . ., op. cit.

⁴⁷ Varela, op. cit. ("Speech").

The contemporary equipment purchases by the Argentine Navy reflect a national security policy which supports credible sea-power in the field of anti-submarine warfare, and a conventional seapower capability sufficient to deal with any possible continental threat. The present re-equipment cycle of the navy is a planned one, and indicates a coherent approach to equipment planning which reflects naval professionalism, realistic national security oriented objectives and the lack of credible surplus equipment (excepting carriers and U.S. A-4B jets) given the growth in maritime and maritime aviation technology.


At the present time, the Argentine Navy includes the following items of major equipment, either as inventory on hand, or on order:⁴⁸

Naval vessels:

- 2 light aircraft carriers (the Independencia will be retired and scrapped)
- 3 light cruisers (one is not operational)
- 9 destroyers (of which only the three Fletcher Class ships on loan from the U.S. until 1972 are considered modern enough to be effective in ASW)
- 2 submarines (Balboa class, on loan from the U.S.)
- 6 minesweepers (recently reconditioned by Britain)
- 2 mine hunters (recently reconditioned by Britain)
- 4 patrol escorts
- 1 ice breaker
- 3 tankers
- 4 transports
- 24 other vessels, including: oilers, ocean tugs, landing craft, survey ships, tank landing ships and a submarine rescue vessel.

⁴⁸Various sources including: Janes Fighting Ships; SIPRI, op. cit.; Reuters, 2/24/69; Munson, et al., Area Handbook for Argentina, op. cit., p. 404; Janes All the Worlds Aircraft (London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co., 1969); David Wood, "Armed Forces in Central and South America." (London: ISS-Adelphi Paper #34, 1967), pp. 8, 10; Flying Review, Vol. 19, No. 10, p. 10.

Figure 2
 ARGENTINE NAVAL VESSELS
 FORCE LEVELS:
 1944-1968



(1961-1969)

- 2 Leander Class Frigates (are on order and will be equipped with "Seacat" missiles)
- 2 West German 450 ton submarines are on order.

Naval Aircraft:

- 45+ T-28D ("Fennec") trainers with 20 "spares" for cannibalization
- 12 operational (F-9F "Panther") jets configured for carrier operations (4 grounded for lack of spares)
- 2 operational "Cougar" jet trainers (F-9J)
- 6 Aeromacchi jet trainers configured for use off carriers
- 160+ other types of reciprocating engine aircraft, including: 5/P2E "Neptune" ASW patrol aircraft, 7 S-2A carrier based training aircraft, 10 helicopters for ASW patrolling and other miscellaneous aircraft for air transport (executive) and/or training purposes.

Naval Shore Based Armaments:

- 1 Battery of Tiger Cat missiles (surface to air) for the Argentine Naval Infantry

The Air Force

The Argentine Air Force is the most vulnerable of the Argentine Armed Forces to hardware obsolescence, for in the field of air power, modern technology has made broad and ever more complex break-throughs. The result has been necessarily spiralling costs and the advent of modern aircraft as a prestige weapon among the larger nations of South America, factors which have led these nations to maintain a general balance of power attitude toward their neighbors' air power, thereby creating constant pressures for new purchases to off-set the ravages of rapid obsolescence and neighborly acquisitions.

From the standpoint of Argentina's national

security policy, modern aircraft play several roles which are perceived to be important. First, they are to support ground forces and deny air superiority to a would be attacker. Second, the air force must have hardware capable of attacking the key targets in potentially hostile neighboring countries. Third, and probably more important, the air force must provide transportation for the armed forces and government in order to sustain growth in the more remote and sparsely settled territories, and to assure a continued national presence in these areas.

The national security policies pertaining to the air force and its equipment needs thus reveal Argentina's need for ground support and attack aircraft, and more importantly, transport aircraft with both long range and STOL capabilities. The present Government of Argentina's identification of industrial growth and development as being related to the national security has resulted in a relatively high priority being placed on the acquisition of suitable aircraft.

In addition to the national security roles cited above, the question of the availability of aircraft, particularly for transportation usage, has long plagued Argentina's Armed Forces planners who remember only too well their nation's virtual isolation from any external sources of supply during the last two world wars. This outlook has led them to attempt to create an aircraft

industry, an undertaking initiated, as we shall see below, in 1916. The problems associated with high technology and low volume production have made this undertaking considerably less than profitable. Nevertheless, Argentina's national security planners have continued to support the Fabrica Militar de Aviación (FMA) which presently produces small transport aircraft and a counter-insurgency support aircraft.

The history of the Argentine Air Force and of the evolution of its equipment needs together with its role and missions is worthy of note in the context of this paper. The growth and equipping of this armed service reflect the evolution of the nation's security-development-continental prestige related interests.

The Argentine Air Force came into existence as a branch of the Army in 1912, with the establishment of the Escuela de Aviación Militar (Military Aviation School) at El Palomar in Buenos Aires Province. The hardware nucleus of the small air force developed when the school obtained several Farman, Bleriot and Moran aircraft, which participated in army maneuvers in the Province of Entre Rios for the first time in 1914.⁴⁹

The development of aviation in Argentina was neglected during 1914-1918 due to the shortage of aircraft

⁴⁹ Air Forces of the World (Green), op. cit., pp. 11-12.

imports caused by the first World War. However, shortly after the close of the war an Italian aviation mission arrived with four Caproni Ca-33 tri-motor bombers, six Ansaldo SVA-Primo single seat fighters, two Fiat R-2s and several other training aircraft. This mission established itself at the El Palomar base in 1919, and initiated a formal training and assistance program.⁵⁰

During the period following the war, the Argentine government recognized the potential value of air transportation to the nation's vast and largely undeveloped interior territories. This led to the perception of a national security and development related need for domestic production of aircraft which had been lacking in the nation during the First World War. The result was the establishment of the FMA (Fabrica Militar de Aviación-- Military Aircraft Factory) in 1916 at Córdoba. This organization initially assembled various aircraft under foreign licenses for the use of the armed forces. However, in 1930 it began to develop original designs and experimental aircraft. Most notable in the latter category was the Ae. M.O.-1; a five passenger, one engine transport aircraft, which was first produced in 1933. This plane was used extensively for transportation in the interior of the country by both the Military Aviation Service and the military-administered civilian airline of the

⁵⁰Ibid., pp. 11-12.

Government, then called Aer-Argentina. During the war, when Argentina was again cut off from foreign sources of supply, the FMA produced approximately 100 Ae. D.L.-22 advanced trainers which sufficed to at least keep the Military Aviation Service's pilots in training.⁵¹ In December of 1944, the Military Aviation Service was upgraded and granted autonomy as the Argentine Air Force. By the end of the war, the air force was enabled once again to purchase foreign aircraft whose availability as surplus was augmented by Argentina's huge post-war reserves of foreign exchange. The Perón government purchased approximately 400 aircraft during the 1946-1947 period at an estimated cost of \$US40,000,000, and of this amount, the largest part was spent in Britain (with the exception of eight surplus Douglas C-54s obtained from the U.S.). Notable among the purchases from Britain were the following: 14 Avro "Lancaster" and 9 Avro "Lincoln II" bombers; 54 "Meteor" F-4 jet fighters; 39 "Dove" DH-104 Transports; and a number of Percival-Prentice trainers. In addition approximately 45 Fiat G-55 single seat fighters and a number of Fiat G-46 trainers were purchased from Italy.⁵²

By 1948, the Air Force of Argentina was the most modern on the continent and also probably the strongest, since it had received the largest share of the Perón Government's major equipment purchases. However, these

⁵¹Ibid., p. 12.

⁵²Ibid., p. 13.

purchases terminated with the near bankruptcy of the Peron Government after 1951. Between the years 1953 and 1960, the air force was unable to obtain new equipment due to a shortage of foreign exchange. During this period the FMA produced only several expensive, prototype "Pulqui" twin jet fighters and a few "El Boyero" two seat, reciprocating engine, observation aircraft.⁵³

The next notable acquisition of equipment by the air force took place in 1960, when the Frondizi government authorized the purchase of 26 (Canadian) F-86F "Sabre-Jets" from West Germany to supplement the aged (1948) "Meteors."⁵⁴ More significantly, the purchase of twelve C-47s confirmed the Frondizi Government's decision to award the primary military air transport mission to the air force instead of the army. The equipment was at least partly in response to the growing strength of the air forces of Brazil and Chile, which were then accumulating larger inventories of jet aircraft.⁵⁵ It was particularly intended to preserve the air force's morale at a time when the danger to pilots from its ancient aircraft had reached crisis proportions.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Royal Air Force Review (London), June 1957, p. 14.

⁵⁵ Aeroplane, Dec. 8, 1966, p. 11; Air Pictures, Feb., 1967, p. 43.

The next round of aircraft purchases took place in 1965-68, when continued obsolescence of equipment and the growth of neighboring air forces required the attention of the Illia Government. Recognizing that it could not receive supersonic (F-5) aircraft until after 1970 from the United States, the Government contracted to purchase 50 re-conditioned U.S. Douglas A-4D "Skyhawk" fighter-bombers,⁵⁶ as well as 4 UH-1D "Iroquois" helicopters for counter-insurgency use; 2 DC-6Bs; and three C-130 transport-cargo aircraft at a cost of over \$US12,000,000.⁵⁷ In 1968, the Ongania government purchased 8 Fokker Turbo-prop F27s as airliners and troop transports, 7 Bell Jet Ranger helicopters and 8 Hughes OH6A helicopters which were to serve as transport, reconnaissance, and patrol vehicles. In addition, the air force ordered 14 Aerocommander light twin aircraft with a seating capacity of eight for the transportation of executive personnel.⁵⁸

The A-4Ds were intended to up-grade the first-line equipment of the air force in the face of the growing obsolescence of the "Meteors" and F-86F "Sabre Jets." These aircraft offered a sensible stop-gap between an inadequate situation and the air force's desire to

⁵⁶Christian Science Monitor, Oct. 10, 1967, p. 3.
Air Pictures, Feb. 1967, p. 13.

⁵⁷Reuters (Buenos Aires), Feb. 24, 1969
(FBIS, 2/25/69, p. B2); SIPRI, op. cit., pp. 233-234;
Air Pictures, Feb., 1967, p. 43.

⁵⁸SIPRI, op. cit., p. 234.

possess modern equipment. The heavy duty placed upon the A-4D by the United States for tactical bombing and ground support in the Vietnam war increased its attractiveness to the Argentines, serving as evidence of the plane's modern character and utility.

The purchase of the various air force helicopters were intended to bolster the armed forces (and Gendarmaria's) capability to arrive at the scene of an emergency or insurgency rapidly. The "Iroquois" were intended for use as troop carriers and, secondarily, for use in air rescue operations, and the Bell Jet Rangers have been used for executive transportation and patrol. The value of the helicopter in unconventional warfare as demonstrated by the U.S. experience in Vietnam, and the events in Bolivia in 1966-7, had not been lost on the Argentine Air Force.

The DC-6Bs and C-130s were purchased in order to up-grade the air force's national security related ability to transport troops in sufficient numbers for strategic operations in all parts of the country. Some of these aircraft, particularly the DC-6Bs, were primarily for the use of the air force operated airline "LADE" (Lineas Aereas del Estado), which services the remote Southern territories of the nation.

The air force has been highly conscious of its military air transport responsibilities and has had

exclusive jurisdiction over this mission since 1962. Through the Military Transport Command, it has operational and administrative control of "LADE," and after 1966, the air force was also responsible for the administration of Aerolineas Argentinas,⁵⁹ the principal Argentine state-owned and operated domestic and international airline.

The purchase of the Fokker F-27s in 1968 further expanded the air force's Air Transport Command's capability by the addition to its inventory of a smaller, more modern and easily serviceable turbo-prop aircraft, capable of relatively short field take-offs and of carrying up to fifty passengers or troops.

The air force shares with the navy the mission for air rescue work. The present arrangement has the navy responsible for air-sea rescue and the air force responsible for all "inland" rescue operations (literally defined as those which are not on or off-shore of the beaches). For this purpose, nine 9HC Twin "Otter" type aircraft were purchased from Canada in 1968. The "Otters" have good STOL (short take-off and landing) capabilities and are well suited for use in the mountain and antarctic regions. Their cost to Argentina was \$US 5 million, and they are used to provide troop

⁵⁹ La Nacion, September 14, 1968, p. 1.

mobility to isolated regions as well as for conventional air transportation with the "LADE."⁶⁰

In recent years, the air force has been increasingly concerned with the need to be able to confront unconventional warfare situations. In response to this national security related perception, it has ordered the "FMA" to design and produce a twin engine aircraft particularly suited for the tactical support of such operations.⁶¹ In addition, the air force has been considering the purchase of 30 jet propelled "Alouette III" helicopters. These aircraft are suitable for unconventional warfare or air rescue requirements and would enhance the air force's capability to rapidly deliver air-mobile troops and/or Gendarmes to possible insurgent areas.⁶²

The Onganía Government placed an order for 12 refurbished B-57 ("Canberra") twin-engined jet bombers, with the British Government in February, 1969. This move gave the air force replacements for its retired World War II "Lincoln" and "Lancaster" bombers, and served to "tide the service over" prior to the delivery of more advanced, super-sonic, prestige aircraft in 1972.⁶³

⁶⁰SIPRI, op. cit., p. 233. ⁶¹Ibid.

⁶²Clarín (Buenos Aires), October 19, 1969, p. 21.

⁶³La Prensa, February 25, 1969, p. 2.

The three factors which seem to have determined Argentine policy in purchasing new aircraft recently include the following: the perception of need for modern aircraft in order to maintain air force officer morale and to make the service seem relevant to its perceived national security missions; the desire to maintain aircraft of sufficient formidability to impress regional competition or insurgents; the desire to have aircraft which would confer prestige upon the air force for the purposes of the parade ground "fly-by" and public respect; and the need for an effective air-mobile response capability for use against insurgents as well as an effective mode of air transportation and communication with the sparsely populated areas of the nation.

Argentine Aircraft Inventory:⁶⁴

- 23 Douglas A-4D "Sky Hawks" (two lost in crashes, planes reconditioned in the U.S. by Douglas, 1966-1968).
- 3 Lockheed C-130 "Hercules" transports (purchased from the U.S. via the MAP in 1966 and 1968, these can carry up to 90 troops or 72 fully equipped paratroopers).
- 8 Fokker F-27 mk/400M Turboprop transports or airliners (purchased new in July 1968 for \$US 14.4 million from the Netherlands, these can carry up to 50 passengers).

⁶⁴ SIPRI, op. cit., p. 234. Reuters, 2/24/69, op. cit. Munson, et al., op. cit., p. 406. Janes All the Worlds Aircraft, op. cit. D. Wood, "Armed Forces in Central and South America," Adelphi Paper, op. cit., pp. 8, 10; Air Pictures, Feb. 1967, p. 43.


- 15-25+ C-47s for air transport service
(many purchased from Brazil as surplus
in 1962).
- 14 Aero-Commander executive transports
(purchased new from the U.S. in 1968,
can carry up to 8 passengers).
- 27 F-86F "Sabre-Jets" (purchased from Germany
in 1960; of these, 19 may be operational.)
- 30 old Gloucester F-4 "Meteors" may still
be operational.
- 43 MS 763 armed jet trainers--assembled by
DIN FIA.
- 17 A Dove DH-104 transports may still be
operational.
- 4 DC-6Bs (were purchased from the U.S. in 1966).
- 9 DHC-3 Twin "Otter" transport aircraft were
bought from Canada in 1968 and 1969 for
\$US 5 million. (These are for transportation
in mountain areas and in the antarctic).
- 10 IA-50 Guarani-II turbo-prop transports have
been built by the FMA for LADE. (These
can carry up to 14 passengers).
- 4 Bell UH-14 "Iroquois" turbine powered
transport/COIN helicopters, purchased
from Bell in March 1968.
- 30 IA-35 "HUANQUERO" single engine trainer-
reconnaissance aircraft; built by DIN FIA.
- 7 Bell Jet Ranger helicopters, ordered in
March, 1968, delivery delayed.
- 8 Hughes OH-6A helicopters, delivered in
March, 1968.

On Order or Not Yet Delivered:

- 12 B-57 "Canberra" twin engined, sub-sonic
jet bombers (ordered from Britain in
February, 1969).

Figure 3

ARGENTINE AIR FORCE AND ARMY HARDWARE
1954 - 1968



- 2 Alouette III jet-powered helicopters
(for high altitude operations in the
mountains and antarctic, ordered from
France in October, 1969.)
- 25 A-4Bs, second part of the early order,
delayed due to U.S. Vietnam needs.

THE HISTORY AND DYNAMICS OF INTER-SERVICE
COOPERATION AND RIVALRY OVER MISSIONS
AND EQUIPMENT

Serious rivalry between the Argentine Armed Forces over missions and budgetary allocations can be traced to events which occurred in 1945. With the creation of the air force as an autonomous service in that year, a number of questions were raised with regard to the navy's air combat capability and its desire to purchase an aircraft carrier, for this weapon had become the principal conventional prestige weapon of World War II. Prior to 1945, the missions of the services had been essentially unambiguous, hence rivalry had been limited to issues of personality and had not assumed serious inter-institutional proportions.

The year 1945 was also memorable for the navy's near victory over Juan D. Perón, who was held for several days as its prisoner on Martín García Island. (Perón's political demise was only narrowly averted by huge popular protests against the then weak Farrell government.) The navy was forced to bring Perón back from exile and thereafter, Perón and his

followers bore a consistent enmity towards the navy, an issue which still has potent political residues in the present antipathy between elements in the command structure of the navy and the Peronists in contemporary Argentina.

Perón initially sympathized with the air force's desire for modern weaponry, and since the late forties was regarded as a fashionable era for air power, he proceeded to build for Argentina the most modern air force in Latin America, by purchasing a number of Meteor jet fighters and Lancaster bombers from Great Britain. At the same time, he refused all of the navy's requests for new ships and an aircraft carrier, and limited the navy to a few opportune purchases of reconnaissance and transport aircraft, plus several U.S. navy surplus light cruisers which were renamed: General Belgrano and Argentina.

The navy continued to oppose Perón and joined with dissident air force elements to attempt unsuccessful coups against him in 1951 and 1954. Perón countered by wholesale cashiering of naval officers, by building up rival army and air force units, and by denying many naval equipment requests. In 1955 the navy's forces had been substantially reduced on the land, due to lack of manpower in its "Marine units," and in the air, due to its lack of operational aircraft; but even so the navy was able to play a lead role in the successful

revolt which finally dislodged Perón in 1955. Admiral Isaac Rojas ordered its capital ships into Buenos Aires and threatened to bombard the city unless Juan Perón relinquished power. The navy's role in this undertaking was rewarded by the strengthening of its air arm. It expanded the Marine Corps which numbered over 8000 men in 1962,⁶⁵ and navy control was extended over the Maritime Prefecture, which Perón had placed under the National Gendarmeria. The navy also gained control over the ubiquitous Federal Police and by 1957-58, it was at the epogee of its institutional strength vis a vis the other services.

In the emotional atmosphere which followed Perón's decade, the matter of missions created rivalries among the armed forces which were further complicated by political issues. The navy, with limited army support, maintained an intransigent or "gorila" attitude towards the surviving Peronists, particularly with regard to their right to vote as "Peronists" in the national elections of 1958. The navy and its allies were called "rojos," "golpistas," "gorilas," or "nacionalistas," and they were opposed by many in the army and air force,

⁶⁵ James W. Rowe, "Argentina's Restless Military," from Latin American Politics, 24 Studies of the Current Scene. Robert D. Tomasek, ed. (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1966), p. 444.

who hoped to see the Peronists "reintegrated" or absorbed into the political party system. These more moderate groups were later known as the "liberales" or "azules."⁶⁶

The election of Arturo Frondizi to the Presidency of Argentina in 1958 brought the inter-service rivalries of the armed forces to a head. Frondizi came to power with strong Peronist support and was not at any time popular with the anti-Peronist hierarchy of the armed forces. Recognizing his vulnerability, he sustained himself in power by playing the armed forces off against each other, often using the purchase or authorization of equipment as a tool in this process. In 1958, Frondizi obligingly enabled the navy to purchase a British light aircraft carrier, together with 25 F9F ("Panther") jet aircraft. Although this purchase was partially motivated by an earlier Brazilian carrier order, it also served to maximize the ill-feeling held toward the navy by the army and air force. This gesture helped to temporarily appease the strong anti-Peronist influences in the navy and set the army and air force solidly against them, thereby reducing the likelihood of inter-service collusion against the presidency.

66

Marvin Goldwert, "Dichotomies of Militarism in Argentina," pp. 934-935.

Subsequent to this, in 1960 Frondizi showed marked preference to the air force by purchasing 26 F-86 jet fighters together with several T-28 trainers. His astuteness was rewarded in the same year, when the air force "shooed off" an impending coup by gorila elements of the army and navy with a dramatic show of strength. Following this, Frondizi encouraged the rivalry between the air force and navy by tantalizing both with the prospects of the anti-submarine warfare missions which both services badly wanted. Frondizi managed to avoid responsibility for the decision in the ensuing hassle by enabling both to purchase appropriate aircraft from the U.S. in 1961, a dilemma which he attempted to settle on the aircraft seller, the United States Government.

The U.S. avoided the embarrassment of denying one of the services by selling the appropriate aircraft to both--without the ASW electronics equipment. Air force-navy rivalry over this mission has persisted until 1966 when President Onganía awarded it to the navy. Frondizi also fanned a natural rivalry between the army and air force over the air transport mission, turning the army's major transport aircraft over to the air force in 1960, and allocating a purchase of 12 Brazilian surplus C-47 transport aircraft to the air force rather than to the army. This heightened the army's annoyance at dependence upon the air force for transport and

again rewarded the latter for services rendered in 1960. In August of 1961, Frondizi outraged the navy by giving the air force the search and rescue mission. He countered this by hinting (but not acting) at the idea that the navy might get the ASW mission. However, Frondizi never actually awarded this mission to the navy, a task which was left to the Government of Juan Onganía in 1966.⁶⁷

At the apogee of its institutional strength and prestige, in early 1962, the navy came to view with alarm the Peronist activities connected with the impending presidential elections and in concert with Golpista elements of the army attempted to block the same with a "golpe." This attempt was vigorously opposed by the "legalista" or azule elements in the army and air force and resulted in open inter-service combat for a period of several days, during April of 1963. The navy was at the time predominantly commanded by golpista officers who were violently anti-Peronist, and who favored an anti-Peronist dictatorship to the holding of elections in which the Peronists could participate. In this skirmish, naval air craft succeeded in destroying the army's Magdalena regimental tank headquarters a stronghold

⁶⁷ Interview with Ambassador Robert McClintock, October 10, 1968. Munson, et al., Area Handbook for Argentina, p. 404.

of azule sentiment, but the navy was itself severely trounced by the air force, which bombed and strafed its naval installations, and grounded naval aircraft as well as the "golpista," army and navy troop forces. It is suspected that the rivalry between the two services over the ASW missions and attack aircraft capability contributed in part to the thoroughness of the air force's counter-attack.⁶⁸

The result of the struggle of April, 1963 was the political and military reassertion of dominance by the azule or legalista elements in the army under Lt. Gen. Juan Onganía. The hard-line "golpista" officers of the navy and army conceded defeat to avert civil war and further bloodshed, and were retired; the size of the naval infantry was substantially reduce; and the Federal Police were removed from the navy's jurisdiction and transferred to the Ministry of the Interior. However, the importance of the rivalry which arose among the services and elements within the services during this period of Argentine history cannot be ignored, given the continued rivalry up to the present among the "nacionalistas" and "liberales" within the armed forces as a whole.⁶⁹

⁶⁸Goldwert, op. cit., p. 936; Mario Orsolini, La Crisis del Ejército (Buenos Aires: Arayu, 1964).

⁶⁹James W. Rowe, "Argentina's Restless Military," p. 449. Orsolini, op. cit.

The aborted golpe eliminated the navy's challenge to the then divided army as the most powerful of the armed services. The navy has since rebuilt its air arm and purchased a new carrier with a steam catapult suitable for launching attack jet aircraft. In addition, six Italian Macchi jet trainers have been purchased which are configured for use off of this carrier.⁷⁰ The Onganía administration has also officially given the navy the disputed mission for ASW and has divided between the navy and air force the air rescue mission, with the air force having responsibility for air rescue operations over Argentine territory (land), and the navy having the responsibility for such operations at sea, on the coast, and in Tierra del Fuego.

Jealousy remains between the air force and the other services vis a vis the air transport mission. The recent allocation of several of the new Fokker F-27's for the use of the navy in Tierra del Fuego encountered heavy air force opposition. Air force jealousy over the air transport mission and its consistent opposition to the acquisition of jet aircraft with attack capability on the part of the navy remain as a once and future source of inter-service rivalry over budgetary allocations and missions.

⁷⁰ SIPRI, op. cit., p. 237.

Politically and militarily the liberal elements in the army is the dominant factor within the armed forces institutional framework and it is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. The ~~Col~~ "Colpista's" (or Nacionalistas) most serious threat to this dominance was removed in 1963 when they lost in their attempt to block the election of Arturo Illia to the Presidency. Improved relations between the CINCs of the services to some extent have healed the wounds opened in 1962 and 1963. However, the issues remain over the air transportation mission, and particularly over the question of attack aircraft for the navy, which has recently placed an order for 16 A-4B jets, and which may still be distrusted by elements within the army and air force, azule or "liberal" groups.

Inter-service and intra-service rivalries, whether inspired by ideological and political reasons or disputed missions and roles, have been a serious problem for the Argentine Armed Forces since the Second World War. Given the dominant role which the armed forces have played in shaping the nation's course in recent decades, splits with the armed forces can only be viewed as destabilizing factors to any Argentine Government.

Should a dissident element within the armed forces choose to side with the Peronists or some other substantial part of the civilian political sector,

Argentina might well be confronted with possibilities for serious internal conflict, or even civil war. Such a war in the face of divided armed forces was averted narrowly in 1955, largely due to the sudden departure of Perón from the national scene.

FOREIGN MILITARY INFLUENCES ON THE ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES

The Argentine Armed Forces have been subject to foreign military influences from the time that they became professional institutions around the turn of the century up to the present. These influences have been exerted through: foreign military missions and advisors, foreign military assistance and sales programs, foreign military officers as instructors in officer training schools, and foreign technical training and sales programs. One overall result of these influences has been the patterning of the Argentine Armed Forces' military doctrines and practices along basically foreign concepts while few contributions from Argentina's own past have been retained. At the present time, this characteristic seems to be changing only in so far as the armed forces perceive increased need to become the spearhead of the nation's industrial and territorial development; a tendency which will be discussed below. (To a considerable extent, the Argentine proclivity to seek foreign guidance and

training has stemmed from a curiously ambivalent attitude toward their own national experience.)⁷¹

Argentina's Armed Forces have a rich, albeit relatively peaceful, history and heritage to draw upon, and distinctive regional problems to contend with, but this has not been enough. Beyond the reality of their actual needs, they have sought to bolster their image nationally and in the southern zone with European, and later, American, trappings, which were, and are, reflected in their organization, doctrines, armament procurement, and even in their physical appearance. This tendency is abetted by the professionalism and growth of the Brazilian and Chilean armed forces.

⁷¹Traditionally, Argentines have alternated between extreme manifestations of national pride in matters pertaining to international affairs and disdain for their own domestic heritage and produce. For example, imported merchandise has always been preferred by Argentines to domestic production on grounds of the symbolic prestige and desirability of imported material. Such has also been true to a considerable extent of Argentina's cultural characteristics and societal make-up. This attitude is particularly true of the capital city of Buenos Aires which dominates the nation, but it also applies in lesser degree to the nation as a whole. Argentina has always been a Latin American nation trying very much to be European and "not quite making it," and this proclivity is reflected in her foreign policy, her inflated definition of national security, her international strategic pretensions, and in the character of her armed forces. (See: Pendle, op.cit., pp. 176-178 for discussion of this characteristic.)

The Argentina's historical reliance on foreign sources for armaments has also been a general factor in determining the foreign influences exerted on the Argentine Armed Forces. With the flow of arms and equipment from a given country went technicians and advisors to demonstrate and instruct Argentines in their use. These men, German, American, British or French, brought with them their national outlooks, and they tended to create within the armed forces an atmosphere conducive to their point of view internationally. In varying degrees, these contacts also exerted certain residual influences upon the military outlook, though not necessarily the political behavior of key officers in the Argentine Armed Forces.

Extra-Hemispheric Military Influences

Argentina perceived that the success of Chile's Armed Forces, in the War of the Pacific (1879-1883) against Peru and Bolivia, was in large part due to the professionalism of that nation's armed forces which had been trained by foreign military advisors following a humiliating war with Spain from 1865 to 1868. Shortly after the Spanish War the Chilean Navy was reorganized, modernized, and trained by a British Navy Mission; and much the same thing had been done for the Chilean Army

by a German advisory team.⁷²

These events were not lost on the Argentines who had on-going border disputes like Chile over Patagonia and their Andean demarcation line. The Argentines were able to take advantage of Chile's economic exhaustion and preoccupation with its new northern territories following the War of the Pacific to take possession of areas claimed by them in Tierra del Fuego and Patagonia. They also initiated the modernization of their own armed forces, and particularly the navy.

During the period 1865-1900 there was established in Argentina a military education system, which included the Colegio Militar of the Army (1869) and the Escuela Naval Militar (1872). This program was completed by President Julio Roca (1880-1886, 1898-1904), who founded the War Academy (Escuela Superior de Guerra) in 1900.⁷³

Beginning with a series of contracts between the Argentine government and the German munitions firms of Krupp and Mauser in the early 1890s, the Argentine Army came to be almost wholly dependent upon German equipment and weapons. Later, and even more important to the development of the army officer corps, was the

⁷²Tommie Hillmen, Jr., "A History of the Armed Forces of Chile from Independence to 1920." Ph.D. dissertation, Syracuse University, 1963 (copy available at State/INR/RAR).

⁷³Munson, et al., Area Handbook for Argentina, pp. 399-400.

decision in 1899 to invite German officers to organize the Escuela Superior de Guerra (The War Academy). This institution, which was to be the focal point for grooming selected officers from all of the services for high command and staff positions, opened its doors in April, 1900, with a German Director, and four of the ten professors being German officers on contract to the Argentine Government. For the ensuing fourteen years, German majors and captains, wearing Argentine uniforms, rotated on the Academy's faculty while teaching most, if not all, of the institution's basic courses related to strategy and doctrine. Needless to say the War Academy was patterned after a Prussian model, as were both the Ballistics School (Escuela de Tiro) and Military Geographical Institute.⁷⁴

The exposure of the Argentine officer corps to German military influences was further strengthened by the practice of sending selected Argentine Army officers to Germany for additional training. Some of these visitors spent a year in German military schools, others served in German regiments, and some simply attended field exercises and annual maneuvers. From 1905, when this practice was initiated to 1914 when the War intervened, between 150 and 175 Argentine Army

⁷⁴ Robert A. Potash, The Army and Politics in Argentina 1928-1945 (Stanford University Press, Stanford, Cal., 1969), pp. 51-52.

officers had first hand training experiences in Germany. It is not insignificant that many of these officers subsequently rose to high troop commands and administrative positions, and dominated the instructorships of the nation's various military schools; for they were deemed to have been the beneficiaries of German "professionalization,"⁷⁵ and may well have had a heavy dose of German corporatism and nationalism in the process.

The influence of the Germans on the Argentine Army was felt in other ways beyond officer training. The army adopted a distinctly Prussian-style uniform with spiked patent leather helmet and knee boots, in 1911, and in 1910, a German Military Mission was brought in for the official purpose of training the army itself, in addition to its officer corps. As a result, the Argentine Army was reorganized along German lines, and its doctrines, appearance and procedures became distinctly German in character. In 1914, the army's field maneuvers were almost identical copies of those held in Europe by the German Imperial Army; its officers had become advocates of Prussian-style nationalism; and the army even had adopted the German "goose-step" for use in

75

Fritz T. Epstein, "European Influences in Latin America." Unpublished manuscript at Library of Congress, see also: Potash, op. cit., p. 5.

parade review, a practice which it still retains today.⁷⁶

The defeat of Germany in the First World War was only a temporary set back for the Argentine Army's German advisors. By 1921, at least six high ranking expatriate German officers were serving in unofficial advisory capacities with the Argentine Army and had effectively displaced a French attempt to develop ties with the War Academy. Of particular note were the activities of General Wilhelm Faupel, who served as the advisor to General José' Uriburu from 1921-1926. Faupel's resignation to serve with Peru's Army in 1926 created some nationalist resentment as "betrayal," and reduced the number of German advisors by three, but it did not prevent the army from retaining the services of the three remaining German advisors until 1935. In that year, a combination of aggressive German diplomacy coupled with the admiration of Argentine leadership for the idea of the corporate state and Nazi nationalism led to the expansion of ties between the Argentine Army and the Wehrmacht. By 1937, the War Academy and the army's General Staff had the benefit of an official six man mission, which came into contact with all of the able young Argentine Army officers destined for command

⁷⁶Munson, et al., op. cit., p. 395.
New York Times, Feb. 2, 1968, p. 3.

responsibilities. In addition, numbers of officers were sent to Germany, Spain and Italy for tours of up to two years, at the rate of around twenty officers per year.⁷⁷

The increased German influence over the army during this period could be followed by the movement of Germanophile officers to the leadership of the Circulo Militar and several other patriotic military oriented organizations from 1938-1941. During this period the influence of pro-German Army officers on the Governments of Argentina was obvious and often blatant. Motivated by anti-British economic nationalism and admiration for their German models, these officers exerted great pressures on the government to at least remain neutral in the face of Argentine popular support for the Allied cause during most of the Second World War.⁷⁸

The triumph of Germany over France in 1940 caused a stir among many elements within the Argentine Congress and led to a successful demand for the termination of the German Military Mission and the acquisition of armaments to protect Argentina in the event that the War should spread to the Americas. At this time, Germany's Ambassador, Baron Edmund von Thermann, was

⁷⁷Dispatch: U.S. Embassy/Buenos Aires to Dept., April 28, 1936, #835.20/21. (at Dept. of State historical files, the National Archives). Letter: U.S. Ambassador to Sec. State, Sept. 28, 1937, #811.22735/18.

⁷⁸José Luis Romero, A History of Argentine Political Thought. Intro. and tran. by Thomas McGann (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1963), p. 20.

actually able to boast of the support of 90% of the army's officer corps for the German cause.⁷⁹ Though this was undoubtedly an exaggeration, the clear majority obviously did take the side of the German cause, as is illustrated by the following survey of Argentine Army general officers under age 60, taken in 1939. At the outbreak of World War II, of thirty-four general officers active with the army, seventeen had been on detached service with the German Army or had served with German regiments for periods of up to two years. Several others had seen action on the Falangist side during the Spanish Civil War, and a lesser number had spent time in fascist Italy.⁸⁰ It should be noted that one of the more illustrious recipients of detached service in Italy was Colonel Juan Domingo Perón, who studied corporatism, skiing, and mountain warfare at the University of Perugia from 1939 through 1941.⁸¹

Germany's defeat in World War II brought the era of its influence over the Argentine Army and Government to a close. Many of the pro-Axis army officers, who had succeeded in maintaining Argentina on a relatively

⁷⁹German Embassy Cable: Von Termann to Berlin, #489, May 15, 1940, Roll 207/156,202 and -/ 156,204 (at National Archives).

⁸⁰José Luis Imaz, Los que mandan (Buenos Aires, 1964), p. 42.

⁸¹Interview with Arturo Ludueña, 11/8/68. (He was attache at the Argentine Embassy, Rome in 1940, and knew Perón at that time.)

pro-Axis stance until the very last part of the war, were removed from top policy posts, and British and American influences and equipment began to suffuse the armed forces. This process has continued, particularly particularly in the case of the United States, until recently, although the years of German presence still left marks which have survived, including the army's parade goose-step and some of its disciplinary practices.

The Argentine Military Aviation Service was initially influenced and trained by an Italian aviation mission which arrived in 1919, together with several sorely needed aircraft. In 1920, the Italians were supplanted by the French, who sent a Military Aviation Mission which reorganized the Military Air Service, but otherwise had little lasting influence on it.⁸² To a greater extent than either the essentially "germanic" Army or the "britainnic" Navy, the Argentine Air Force and its precursor, the Military Aviation Service, maintained a national rather than alien character, being essentially concerned with the development of national transport facilities and lines of communication with the national interior.

The Argentine Navy has been influenced by Britain from its inception, and has since closely

⁸² Air Forces of the World, op. cit., p. 12.

adhered to British naval tradition, for British naval officers guided its formation and development; and its training was in British hands until approximately 1935, when a United States Navy Mission came onto the scene.⁸³ Until the beginning of the Second World War, and in the past three years (1966-1969), most Argentine naval armament was purchased from the British, with certain notable exceptions which were discussed above. Britain was temporarily displaced by American influence with the Argentine Navy lasting from 1935 through 1966, when the Argentine Navy largely opted out of a reduced U.S. Military Assistance Plan and once again turned towards their traditional equipment sales relationship with the British.

The period 1945-1963 was one of economic nationalism for the Argentine Armed Forces. Leadership grew increasingly concerned with the character and mission of the armed forces and the result was considerable searching about and the establishment of an indigenous military role, which is today in part defined as the national development mission, and is being pursued vigorously through industrialization and the development of the frontier areas in the South. During this period, there was a brief glimpse of French influence when several French officers taught courses at the War Academy in 1956, and among other things, they imbued

⁸³Munson, et al., op. cit., p. 395.

their students with interest in the problem of unconventional warfare or counter-insurgency.⁸⁴ In the context of the armed forces' traditional horror of communism and their experiences with the Peronists, this exposition of French doctrine found fertile soil and flourished. The advent of Castro in Cuba further ingrained the idea of an unconventional warfare mission for the Argentine Armed Forces.⁸⁵

In recent years foreign military missions to Argentina (other than American) have included only a three man French Army Mission since 1961, and a small British Naval Mission.⁸⁶ It is expected that the present French Army Mission will be up-graded, given the considerably increased dependence of the Argentina Army on French armaments, and in view of the influx of French technicians into the country to assist in the production of French armaments in Argentina.

United States Military Assistance

Argentina first received "military assistance" from the United States when four Argentine instructors were trained as the nucleus of the Naval Air Service

⁸⁴ Kalma H. Silvert, "The Military, A Handbook for their Control." American Universities Field Staff Inc., East Coast S. American Series, Vol. V, No. 1, 1958, pp. 17-18, 26.

⁸⁵ Major Edgardo Bautista Matute, "Efica Repuesta al Castro-Communismo," Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra, Vol. XIV (May-Aug., 1957), pp. 109-112.

⁸⁶ Munson, et al., op. cit., p. 395.

by the United States Navy in 1921.⁸⁷ The next instance of United States military assistance to Argentina was the arrival in 1935 of a U.S. Naval Mission for the purpose of training naval officers and of establishing the Naval War College. The U.S. Naval Mission effectively replaced its British counterpart as the dominant foreign influence with the Argentine Navy. From 1935 through 1966, the U.S. Naval Mission has influenced the training techniques and the development of operational doctrines for the Argentine Navy.

The U.S. Naval Mission was followed by a U.S. Army Mission in 1938,⁸⁸ which at that time had little influence with the Argentine Army when compared with that of Nazi Germany. Thus, the early U.S. Military Missions were initially able to relate only to the Argentine Navy. However, after the war, the Argentine Army and the newly created air force became seriously interested in adopting the operational doctrines and organization of the post-war era's most powerful nation. During the period from 1945 through 1964, the U.S. Military Missions to all of the armed forces were consulted on operational, logistical and organizational practices and these practices were largely adopted by

⁸⁷The Air Forces of the World, op. cit., pp. 11-12.

⁸⁸Munson, et al., Area Handbook for Argentina, op. cit., p. 395.

Figure 4

ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL: PERSONNEL TRAINED BY THE UNITED STATES: 1959-1969

For all graphs:
- - - - - Argentina
..... Brazil







Figure 5

NAVAL TRAINING: PERSONNEL PROGRAMMED FOR
 TRAINING BY U.S. NAVY 1959-1969:
 ARGENTINA, CHILE, PERU



the Argentine Armed Forces.

A considerable amount of the military hardware purchased by the Argentine Armed Forces during this period came from the United States, principally through the direct sale of war surplus materials. Some credit sales were also arranged, in the case of the light cruiser and transport aircraft; and some surplus equipment and training in its use were provided as grant aid. Examples of equipment loans (with sales options) were three Fletcher class destroyers and two submarines loaned to Argentina from 1962-1972 as part of a large regional program. The major U.S. equipment sales to the army prior to 1964, consisted of World War II surplus Sherman M-4 tanks in 1948 and some armored personnel carriers which have been described above.⁸⁹

Until 1964, the basis for the credit sales or granting of equipment and the U.S. military training programs provided for Argentine officers and NCOs both by Mobile Training Teams and at Fort Guliak in Panama, was the adherence by Argentina to the Rio Treaty (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance) in 1947. This treaty provided a basis for hemispheric self-defense, in conformity with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, by which each of the signatories voluntarily

⁸⁹I. Varela, "Speech," op. cit. J. Rowe, "Argentina's Restless Military," op. cit., p. 444.

resolved to come to the defense of any other signatory in the event of extra-continental aggression against it. The Inter-American Defense College was an off-spring of this Treaty and several high ranking Argentine officers including ex-President Levingston have attended it for one year tours, as national delegates. In addition, a number of Argentina's principal officers have served as military attaches to the United States, and have thereby accumulated both experience in U.S. military techniques and admiration and respect for the United States in the process.

Argentina and the United States had no official military assistance arrangement (beyond \$2.8 million in equipment sales and loans)⁹⁰ until May 10, 1964. On that date, U.S. Ambassador Robert McClintock and Leopoldo Suarez, Minister of Defense for President Illia's Government, signed an agreement for a bilateral military assistance program (MAP) between the United States and Argentina. The MAP was to include: a cash sales program, a credit or loan sales program, a grant aid program, and a training program.⁹¹

The objectives of the MAP as presented to the Argentine Armed Forces were: the equipping and training of three model army brigades with standardized equipment

⁹⁰"Military Assistance Facts: March, 1968" (U.) DOD/ISA Pamphlet, p. 15.

⁹¹Interview with Amb. Robert McClintock, October, 1968.

capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations and maintaining internal security, performing civic action missions, particularly as they related to transportation and communications in the more remote sectors of the nation; the up-grading of Argentina's naval and air force capability for contributing substantive forces to OAS or UN peace-keeping operations; and developing a modern ASW capability for the navy, which had been burdened with obsolete equipment.⁹²

The objectives of the MAP program, from the point of view of the United States, were thus largely oriented toward providing the Argentines with an effective internal security capability. However, the Argentine Armed Forces viewed the U.S./M.A.P. as modernization and re-organization assistance in a much broader context. They envisaged for themselves a mission as a strategic force of importance within the free world and particularly the Latin American region. They strongly resisted attempts to place them in a simple police role. The United States, on the other hand, has sought to emphasize their internal security role while also giving them a modest capability as members of a potential regional peace force. In this role they would be lacking only the logistical capabilities for external operations; a requirement for which they presumably would depend upon the United States.

⁹²SIPRI, op. cit., p. 237.

The MAP, although initiated in 1964, was far from completed when the Golpe of June, 1966, ousted the Illia Government and brought in the Government of Juan Onganía. Following the coup, the sale of heavy weapons under the MAP was curtailed due to U.S. political distaste for the military character of the new government and Argentine reaction to the same. As a result, the pending credit sale of 60 M-41 "Walker Bulldog" tanks was suspended after only five had been delivered,⁹³ and was later cancelled at the behest of the Argentine Government, which had opted for its Plan Europa in 1968. This resulted in a conscious decision by the Onganía Government to purchase the army's military equipment in Europe, where it was free from what the Argentines considered to be the entangling political fetters of U.S. arms aid policies.

Although \$20.7 million was spent in Argentina,⁹⁴ the U.S. Military Assistance Program did not achieve its intended objectives before the political repercussions from the 1966 coup led to its suspension and later reduction. Basically the MAP did provide some needed equipment for army and air force transportation and repair facilities, which were badly needed to up-grade the logistical capabilities of the armed forces.

⁹³"Military Assistance Facts," op. cit., p. 15.

⁹⁴Munson, et al., op. cit., p. 402;
New York Times, Feb. 28, 1967, p. 3. New York Times,
October 8, 1968, p. 8.

The suspension of the MAP was lifted by the U.S. in October of 1967, but the program had been considerably reduced by the U.S. Congress and, in the meantime, the Argentine Armed Forces had opted for European sources of military hardware. As of 1969-1970, the MAP has been limited to a modest training program, which features Mobile Training Teams and Technical Assistance Groups, teaching maintenance and repair techniques and unconventional warfare techniques to selected units of the army and Gendarmeria and ASW training for selected naval units. In addition, 2000 officers and NCOs from the army and Gendarmeria received COIN training at Fort Guliak in the Canal Zone. There are many Argentine advocates of a close relationship between the Argentine Armed Forces and the United States some of whom have received training in the U.S. or the Canal Zone. However, even though the armed forces are organized along U.S. patterns, the movement toward European equipment procurement for the army and navy is likely to lead to an increase in the influence of the present French and British military missions and perhaps will lead to the arrival of other missions from interested European powers, including the Germans and possibly the Italians.

The character of future U.S. military influences on the Argentine Armed Forces is likely to be as follows. The United States has trained special units of the army in unconventional warfare techniques and has partially

equipped three of them as key air transportation brigades. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that U.S. doctrines in unconventional warfare will be of continuing interest to the army and air force.

Future requirements with which the U.S. may continue to assist the Argentine Armed Forces include: transportation, equipment, repair facilities, communications, logistics and anti-submarine warfare. These areas in particular will continue to be sources of input from the U.S. military missions and that they may be the most worthwhile objectives of our future MAP, given the American character of the armed forces present organization, doctrines and training.

The American MAP and the U.S. Military Missions have not been able to achieve any appreciable degree of political influence with their Argentine counterparts. The effect of the MAP has not been characterized in terms of political leverage, and this is hardly surprising given traditional Argentine suspicions of the United States which basically still exist. The parameter of Argentine-U.S. amicability is fundamentally the Argentine Armed Forces' pervasive fear of communism and its concomitant, subversion, in both its internal and external forms. Given their obsession with this fear, and coupled with the very real threat of Peronism, the Armed Forces of Argentina have discovered, and are likely to sustain

a definite community of interest with the United States. The present Argentine Government views the United States as the bastion of western military power against the "common enemy"--communism; and until the perception of the communist menace has subsided, its perception of need for the United States and its military assistance and training will not be likely to abate.

Chapter 4

BALANCE OF POWER AND ARMS LIMITATION

ARGENTINE PERCEPTIONS OF THE REGIONAL BALANCE OF POWER

Historical Factors

Since colonial times Argentina has regarded itself at least as the hispanic rival and counterweight to the ambitions of Brazil and on occasion as a potential "Colossus of the South." This attitude is dramatically illustrated by the following quote in a letter from the eminent Argentine jurist, Carlos Calvo to Argentine President, Bartolomé Mitre, in 1864:

The Argentine Republic is called upon to be within a half-century, if we have peace, as considerable a power in South America as are the United States in the North, and then will be the moment to settle accounts with that colossus with feet of paper, the Empire of Brazil.¹

The attitude cited above is perhaps archtypical; but historically, Argentina has consistently wished or sought to become the "Colossus of the South"; a goal which has perhaps not occurred so soon as its prophets have foretold.

¹Alejandro Magnet, Nuestros Vecinos Justicialistas (Santiago de Chile: Editorial del Pacifico, 1953), p. 30.

The fact remains that Brazil has outstripped Argentina in terms of every kind of growth since well before the Second World War. However, many Argentines still tend to remain convinced that Brazil, in spite of its greater mineral resources, more accessible hydro-electric power, and larger population, does not figure as a serious long term rival. They base their faith (as did the sociologist José Ingenieros fifty years ago) on the "Huntington-esque" (Ellsworth) notion that Argentines are a superior race to the "Negro-tainted" Brazilians, and that their temperate climate and rich soil, compounded with their European racial heritage, will in the end lead to their achievement of dominant status in the southern hemisphere of the America's.²

While some thinking Argentines still possess such an unbounded optimism in their country's future potential, most are also aware of its limitations due to isolation from its geographical remoteness. For Argentina has aspired to a partly European style of nationhood, and is related only to Brazil by geography, being cut off by the Andes Mountains from the other major nation of the region--Chile. This has resulted

²Ibid., pp. 22-23. George Pendle, Argentina (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 178. James, op. cit., p. 32. Ellsworth Huntington, Mainsprings of Civilization (New York: Mentor, 1958).

in a schizophrenic pattern of national goals and perceptions which makes it difficult to define Argentina's notion of power balance and regional relationships.³

Within the general parameter cited above, realistic Argentine notions of balance of power are almost solely related to the capabilities of her neighbor, and sometime rival, Brazil. Geography limits the martial possibilities between Argentina and its other major neighbor--Chile--to naval warfare in the southern extremes of the continent, since mountains considerably reduce serious possibilities of conventional ground warfare beyond the skirmish level between them. Their 3,300 miles of border is almost wholly defined by the watershed of the Andes Mountains and would discourage decisive army movements except possibly in Patagonia. The few existing mountain passes in the more populous north would be too easily defended against aggressive behavior to make this border a liability to either nation. However, Brazil does have an accessible, 700 mile long, border with Argentina, which is defined by rivers, and its naval port at Rio de Janeiro is within a manageable steaming distance of Buenos Aires, which is the key area of Argentina.

³Interview with Arturo Ludueña, op. cit.

The historic rivalry and perceptions of balance of power between Brazil and Argentina have existed since colonial times; for when the Rio de la Plata Vice Royalty was created in 1776, the reason given for its creation was recognition of the peculiar requirements of the River Plate region, which called for separate administrative policies. More important and significant, however, was the Spanish intention to neutralize the advance of the Portuguese into the Rio de la Plata region, notably in the area which is today Uruguay. The Spanish referred to this region as the "Banda Oriental," and the Portuguese called it the "Cisplatine Provinces," when they occupied the area from 1811-1828.⁴

An inconclusive war for the possession of this area broke out between Argentina's first government, the United Provinces of La Plata, and the Empire of Brazil, from 1826-1828. This war was ended by British mediation, which resulted in the establishment of Uruguay as an independent buffer state in 1828. Argentine irredentist sentiment towards "La Banda Oriental" continued to run high until 1852, when Argentina, under Juan Manuel de Rosas, attempted once too often to beseige Montevideo on the grounds that "it was assisting subversives."

⁴Munson, et al., op. cit., p. 32. Pendle, Argentina, op. cit., pp. 15-16. Ricardo Levene, A History of Argentina, 1937, op. cit., p. 287.

The Brazilians correctly saw this intervention as an irredentist effort and found common cause with Uruguay, Paraguay and Argentine opponents of the Rosas Government to overthrow it, thereby lifting the seige of Montevideo through the efforts of a combined army at the battle of Monte Caseros in 1852. Since then, there have been no military hostilities between Brazil and Argentina. However, their rivalry has continued and evolved in other ways.⁵

Since the late 19th century, Brazil has enjoyed closer relations with the United States than has Argentina, a matter which the Argentines have viewed with distrust. This trend became more pronounced in the 20th century and contributed to Argentine suspicions of possible political collusion between the U.S. and Brazil, to her disadvantage.

In 1906, Brazil created an arms race with Argentina when it abruptly began to purchase prestige naval armaments at a rate alarming to the Argentines. This trend upset the Argentine-Chilean Pact of 1902, and created a full scale naval arms race in the region until the "ABC Pact" of 1910. In 1915, Argentina, Brazil and Chile signed a second treaty, pledging

⁵Bela Maday, et al., U.S. Army Area Handbook for Brazil (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), pp. 657-658.

peaceful settlement of all disputes. However, in 1922, the United States leased several warships to the Brazilians and sent a Naval Mission to assist in the training and reorganization of the Brazilian Navy.⁶ This gesture elicited a protest from Argentina, and an assertion from the U.S. that the lease of these vessels was not indicative of collusion or political favoritism to Brazil on the part of the United States.⁷

In 1933, Argentina and Brazil signed and ratified a Pact of Conciliation and Non-Aggression, and when Brazil entered the Second World War on the Allied side in 1942, Argentina did not consider it to be a belligerent, in spite of its own "strict" neutral status. However, the Argentine Armed Forces, and particularly the pro-German army, viewed with alarm the large quantities of U.S. lend-lease military equipment which had been provided to Brazil, a development which eventually led Argentina to solicit such assistance from the U.S. (unsuccessfully) and finally from Germany via Spain (also unsuccessfully) in 1943-44.⁸ This perception of an imbalance in the respective armaments of the two countries was a matter

⁶Peterson, Argentina and the United States, op. cit., p. 370.

⁷J. W. Riddle, U.S. Ambassador to Argentina, to Sec. of State Hughes, Dec. 20, 1922; and Hughes to Riddle, Dec. 21, 1922; Foreign Relations: 1922, Volume I, pp. 19-22.

⁸Peterson, op. cit., p. 433. Paz and Ferrari, op. cit., pp. 99-101 and 110.

of considerable anxiety to the Argentine Armed Forces, whose ambitions in 1944 were also remarkably expansionist in character. A manifesto allegedly published by the Grupo de Oficiales Unidos (GOU) actually outlined a scheme for Argentine dominion over the entire southern continent in 1943.

The economic difficulties encountered by President Juan Peron after 1953 quickly laid these expansionist goals to rest after a series of major arms purchases, which brought Argentina up to "par" with Brazil. With the exception of Brazilian opposition to Peron's abortive economic and political pressures to coerce and intimidate Uruguay into a satellite position in 1952, the two largest nations of South America have enjoyed increasingly cordial relations in recent years, particularly in view of the current similarities in their circumstances of government and anti-communist ideology.⁹

However, like a fault in the earth in an earthquake zone, the historic rivalry and economic competition between these two nations can be obscured by passing trends but ought not to be put out of mind. Lingering Brazilian mistrust of Argentina's acquisitive attitude toward Uruguay was fueled by Peron's attitude in 1952 and

⁹ Pendle, op. cit., p. 160, Uruguay (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 7-14.

today still remains latent; as do Argentine fears of Brazilian dominance over the headwaters of the Plate River.¹⁰ This latter issue reappeared in 1968 when a series of Brazilian dams under construction at the Plate River's headwaters lowered water levels at Rosario and created navigation difficulties for the Argentines. This situation stirred grave concern among nationalist elements and received disproportionate public attention in spite of Brazilian assurances of innocent intent and the temporary nature of the diversion.¹¹

The Contemporary Balance

Brazil maintains an army numbering approximately 155,000 men of which 45,000 (or 40%) are based at Rio Grande Do Sul, in a combined anti-subversion and defensive posture. Argentina has 85,000 in its army, with approximately 15,000 men plus several detachments of gendarmeria stationed near the northeastern border areas.¹³ At


¹⁰ Robert N. Burr, "The Balance of Power in Nineteenth Century South America," Hispanic American Historical Review (February, 1955), pp. 37-60.

¹¹ La Prensa, March 19, 1968, p. 1.

¹² Maday, et al., op. cit., pp. 655-656.
D. Wood, Adelphi Paper #34, op. cit., p. 11.

¹³ Munson, et al., op. cit., pp. 391-392.
D. Wood, op. cit., p. 10.

Figure 6
 OPERATIONAL TANK AND WARSHIP INVENTORIES:
 ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL



For both graphs:

— — — — — Argentina
 - - - - - Brazil






Figure 7
 OPERATIONAL COMBAT AIRCRAFT INVENTORIES:
 ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL: 1954-1968



For both graphs:
 - - - - - Argentina
 Brazil

Figure 8
BRAZILIAN FORCE LEVELS







Figure 9
CHILEAN FORCE LEVELS



present, significant numbers of Brazilian troops are being shifted away from this border region due to Brazilian preception of the unlikelihood of military problems occurring there. The changing armed forces missions of both nations clearly indicate increased pre-occupation with internal security problems and lessened interest in regional or external possibilities.

The Brazilian Navy, much like its Argentine counterpart, operates with obsolescent equipment. However, it has a greater number of relatively functional destroyers and destroyer escorts than does Argentina. The crews of these units are trained by a U.S. Naval Mission and are considered by them to be singularly competent,¹⁴ perhaps more so than their Argentine counterparts. On the other hand, the Brazilian Navy is configured for anti-submarine warfare (ASW) possibilities and the Brazilian aircraft carrier Minas Gerais is only equipped with S-2A "Trackers," which are suited for little more than ASW contingencies and reconnaissance. Argentina's new carrier, the 25 de Mayo presently carries S-2Fs and a complement of 6 Aeromacchi jet aircraft, giving it a slight aerial edge over Brazil. Moreover, Argentina will have an attack capability when the Argentine Navy obtains the 16 carrier configured US A-4B jets which

¹⁴Maday, op. cit., p. 656.

have been ordered for delivery in 1971. The six Argentine Aeromacchi jet trainers, which are configured for carrier operations, constitute only a minimal potential threat to the Brazilians in the naval aviation area. On the whole, the Brazilians are considered to outnumber and to be slightly superior to their Argentine counterparts on the sea, although probably not sufficiently so as to be in any sense destabilizing in the event that the present friendly political climate between the two nations should deteriorate.

The present Argentine Air Force is superior to that of Brazil in terms of jet ground support capability, jet interceptor forces, and bomber forces, due to its A-4Bs, F-86s and "Canberras." Brazil, on the other hand, has superior air transport capability, in that it has 10 Lockheed C-130s (to Argentina's 3), 24 C-119s and C-82s, and two BAC-111s; giving it a substantial air-mobile advantage over Argentina. On the other hand, Brazilian interceptor and fighter capabilities are limited to a number of armed T-38 jet trainers and one "show piece" Meteor F-8. Although French "Mystere III" fighter bombers are on order, Brazil's bomber force presently consists of B-26s, and for off carrier use, she has only the S-2A "Tracker aircraft"¹⁵ which are

¹⁵SIPRI, op. cit., pp. 237-238; Wood, op. cit., p. 11.

used for ASW and patrolling.

The leadership of both Argentina and Brazil are more concerned with possibilities of collapse and communist takeover in the smaller neighboring states than with any form of direct threat from each other. Because of the congruence of the two nations' interests in this area, friction between them is most likely to occur in the event of unilateral behavior by either nation, such as militarily intervening in the affairs of Uruguay, Paraguay or Bolivia, which have borders with both of the two larger ones. Such a move would be likely to provoke a serious political and possible military crisis, domestic and international for either Argentina or Brazil. However, the character of the present regimes in both Argentina and Brazil makes such a development most unlikely. During the early 1970s, Argentine and Brazilian intervention in a third nation is more likely to take the form of a combined action carefully coordinated by these two anti-communist "giants" of the southern hemisphere.

Argentina today perceives little danger of a direct military threat from Brazil. Even in the event of hostilities arising from intervention in an adjacent state, the probabilities are slight that Brazil could successfully execute a sustained offensive against Argentina, mainly due to logistical considerations. On the other side, Argentina, with even weaker

logistical backup, could not hope to mount a serious offensive against Brazil, although she could probably stop a Brazilian ground attack short of Buenos Aires.

At the level of the armed forces, the concept of balance with Brazil is largely viewed as a matter of prestige and at this time receives little real consideration as a matter of threat. The armed forces would be unhappy to see their Brazilian counterparts armed with modern weaponry when their own might be World War II vintage; thus, the balance with Brazil is as much a matter of professional jealousy as it is of power considerations. Argentine planners view power considerations with Brazil only in the event of a radical regime seizing the government there, and would thus want to have the capability of meeting such a threat should it occur by not allowing too great a downside armament discrepancy to develop.

The election of Salvador Allende as President of Chile has raised for Argentine military planners a long dreaded spectre largely come true. Although, as we have seen, geography does not lend itself to military solutions between the two nations, encouragement of domestic unrest on the part of Chileans in Argentina could lead to drastic reactions and possible military contingencies. This situation will largely depend on Chilean behavior. Argentina will nevertheless become much more sensitive to the largely Chilean populations of Tierra del Fuego and parts of Patagonia, and it is

likely that military appropriations for the development and protection of this region will be increased drastically in the event of friction between the two countries.

Future Trends

The only significant balance of power threat which is recognized presently by Armed Forces Planners is Brazil. Although militarily the two nations are more or less at a standoff, Brazil has a slight logistical and numerical advantage over Argentina, but it is of little consequence, except for defensive purposes, where it would be decisive. The rivalry between these two nations today manifests itself in economic and political terms with hemisphere-wide implications, but the principal foci of their rivalry are the smaller states of the River Plate region: Uruguay and Paraguay, as well as Bolivia and Peru on the Pacific side. Brazil's notable feat of completing a highway and free port system linking Paraguay and Bolivia with Brazilian deep water ports on the Atlantic has recently improved that nation's relative position within the region, as has its completion of a railroad from Bolivia to these same ports. The access road, railroad, and the offer of a free port to Bolivia and Paraguay is perceived by knowledgeable Argentines as a most serious threat to Argentina's economic and political position in the region. What is particularly remarkable about this situation is the

fact that the completion and existence of the road has received little if any notice from either the Argentine press or government officials (in public).¹⁶ In addition, Brazil has in recent years conducted a more consistent, professional, and goal oriented foreign policy than has been the case with politically vacillating Argentina.

When viewed within the regional perspective presented above, the consistent foreign policy of Brazil's professional foreign ministry, "Itamarati," combined with Brazil's superior growth rate in all areas, has created a "Development Gap" which informed Argentines are reluctant to talk about in public but which is silently recognized at official levels. It is at this level that the true balance of power in South America is developing and the Argentines view it as little less than a "development crisis." It is therefore small wonder that the Argentine Armed Forces are pressing strongly ahead with a national program for industrialization and the creation of a logistical base. Both nations recognize that the future of the region they share will be determined by an economic rather than a military hegemony, and both are vying for leadership within the regional and economic entities; including the Latin American Free Trade Area and the Cuenca del Plata. At this point in time, Brazil is and has been a consistent front-runner. But the Argentines have

¹⁶ Interview with Arturo Ludueña, op. cit.

great natural resources and perhaps a more manageable geography and population pattern, advantages which may enable them to remain at least as formidable rivals and possible equals to the Brazilians.

In view of these conditions, the Government of Argentina has taken strong measures to stabilize and enhance the Argentine rate of development. Given the strong priorities of economic development, regional military considerations beyond the internal security mission are allotted only secondary priority because of the belief that the Brazilians have and will continue to pursue a peaceful, consistent, and challenging policy of economic development. But such development is what Argentine leaders fear, believing that it will lead to Brazilian economic and political hegemony over the southern cone of the continent, and perhaps over its northern tier as well.

A notable and additional stimulant to Argentina's perceptions of need for development arises from the rise of Marxist Salvador Allende in Chile. The existence of a large population of Chileans in the southern territories combined with the ever-present possibility of a dispute over the Beagle Channel will very likely lead to the increase of Argentine force levels in these territories. Should Chile become the recipient of Communist Bloc arms in the manner of Cuba, the reaction

of the Argentines will be entirely predicable. Barring Chilean arms increases or covert action against Argentina the very presence of the Chilean population on Argentine territory will serve as a stimulant for the armed forces in promoting and even rushing their program for the settlement and development of the territories by Argentines.

ARGENTINE ATTITUDES TOWARDS ARMS LIMITATION

1902-1938: Universalism and Regional Rivalry

The concern of Argentina with arms limitation in this century dates back to the "Pacto de Mayo" of 1902 whereby Argentina and Chile terminated a spiraling naval arms race with an agreement not to increase naval tonnage, during the ensuing five years. This agreement also precluded completion of those vessels then under construction and required each nation to give eighteen months notice of any intent to abrogate the Treaty. The two nations also agreed to establish an equal balance of strength as between their respective fleets.¹⁷

¹⁷ Maj. Gen. J. J. Marshall-Cornwall, Geographic Disarmament: Study of Regional Demilitarization (London: Oxford University Press, 1935), pp. 83-84. Armando Braun Menendez, "Roca y Los Pactos de Mayos," Estrategia, No. 3 (September-October, 1969), pp. 95-102.

This Treaty was cancelled by mutual consent within four years, when Brazil began an ambitious naval construction program in 1906. The regional arms race thus revived was finally halted in 1914 because of financial difficulties, a mutiny in the Brazilian Navy and the outbreak of war in Europe in 1914. The War eliminated the "ABC" nations' principal sources of arms.

In the years following World War I, the "ABC" nations found themselves with obsolete hardware and were faced with re-equipment cycles leading to an arms race in the area of naval equipment, which they met with varying degrees of eagerness. The Conference of American States of 1923 at Santiago met just as Argentina's Armed Forces, and particularly its navy, were expecting to acquire new equipment for the first time since 1914. Rarely, at least, on this account, the Argentine Government of Marcelo de Alvear showed little interest in arms limitation proposals raised by Brazil prior to the conference. In suggesting discussion of an initial arms control arrangement among the "ABC powers," the Brazilians had intended to pave the way to a full-scale disarmament discussion at the Santiago Conference. The Argentines declined this offer, however, because they had learned that the United States in late 1922 had sent a naval mission to train the Brazilian Navy and had also lent a number of capital ships to the Brazilians

in conjunction with the training arrangement. This U.S. training program in Brazil triggered the suspicions of the Argentine Government, which had historically rooted fears of U.S.-Brazilian collusion to Argentina's detriment. Brazil's training arrangement with the U.S. plus the obsolescence of the Argentine Navy was thus perceived as creating too wide an arms gap between the two countries to permit serious arms limitations discussions prior to or at the 1923 Santiago Conference.¹⁸

Ten years later, prior to the Seventh Inter-American Conference of 1933 at Montevideo, the Argentine Government of Agustin Justo advanced a proposal for an "Anti-War Pact," after evidencing little interest in a Chilean arms limitation proposal. The proposed treaty avoided specific arms limitations proposals attempting rather to develop a "universalist" or "non-aggression" pact as a substitute for hemispheric peace machinery. In the tradition of several previous and contemporary attempts to achieve regional and world disarmament (such as the Kellogg-Briand Pact to Outlaw War) Argentina's "Anti-War Pact" condemned wars of "aggression." It denied the validity of the forceful acquisition of territory, and prohibited the right of intervention

¹⁸ H. Peterson, The United States and Argentina, op. cit., pp. 370-371.

within the Americas, with particular reference to the interventionism of the United States.

The "Anti-War Pact" was the creation of then Foreign Minister Carlos Saavedra Lamas of Argentina; and it derived its inspiration from traditional precepts of Argentine foreign policy and from the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay (1928-1936). The Argentine desire to pose as the leader of the Latin American states in the international affairs field may also have been a factor.

The "Anti-War Pact" was a shell of a Treaty; having no direct provisions for arms limitations and only offering general prohibitions against aggressive war and intervention. As such, it received the signatures of Brazil and three other powers, specifically Peru, Chile and Uruguay in 1932. By the Montevideo Conference in 1933, the United States and a total of twenty American Nations had signed this "Pact," which may have been the high water mark of Argentine prestige and leadership in the Americas.¹⁹

¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 381-385. The New Republic, Vol. LXXXVI, April 1, 1936, pp. 219-220. Foreign Relations, 1932, Vol. V, pp. 261-268; P. C. Jessup, "The Saavedra Lamas Anti-War Draft Treaty," The American Journal of International Law, Vol. XXVII, Jan. 1933, pp. 109-114. C. Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, op. cit., pp. 318-324 and pp. 333-336.

In 1935, at Buenos Aires, the Argentine Government substantially defeated U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull's proposals for the creation of a continental peace mechanism within the Pan American Union by again substituting universalist "anti-war" proclamations for concrete hemispheric machinery for the preservation of peace. Using the bogeyman of United States intervention, Argentina's Saavedra Lamas defended the then League of Nations as an existing factor obviating the need for a regional peacekeeping entity. He also accused the United States of wishing to create a political role for Pan American Union, one which he claimed would circumvent the League of Nation's policy forbidding arms shipments to combatants. The Argentines thus used the Buenos Aires Conference to once again assert a universalist view of world affairs as a substitute for a regional pact with specific, political arms limitation provisions. The particular aim of the Argentines at this time was avoidance of any commitments which would benefit a regional American organization with a political character in place of the League of Nations. The Argentines also sought to prevent Pan American arms limitation and peace arrangements which would have in their view isolated the American states and specifically Argentina from the European milieu.²⁰

²⁰ Peterson, op. cit., pp. 392-393. Robert C. Hays, "Notes on the Conferences of Montevideo, Buenos

Although one outcome of the 1935 Buenos Aires Conference was an anti-war Treaty in the style and manner of the 1928 Kellogg Briand Pact, the American hemisphere's interests in collective arms-related arrangements were to be reasserted in a defensive ambiente at the Lima Conference of 1938, which paved the way for later and more definitive Pan American defense arrangements. Ironically, it was the earlier Argentine intransigence, based on egalitarian principles and a desire for continental leadership which prevented regional consolidation on issues relating to arms limitations of a meaningful kind. Instead, the majority of the nations of the hemisphere turned to measures pertaining to defense and war-time alliances, altogether bypassing the issues of arms limitations.

The appearance of the war clouds of 1938 in both Europe and the Pacific had changed the nature of Latin American interests in arms, from one oriented towards arms limitation and machinery for keeping the peace, to one of regional defense and military cooperation. This trend was to culminate finally in the Rio Pact or Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance which was signed on September 2nd, 1947 and soon ratified by all signatories.

Aires and Lima, with Special Reference to Argentine Policy." (A published manuscript, available at Dept. of State, Historical Division), pp. 50-51, 59-60.

Twelve years later, interest in arms control was finally to reappear after a twenty-six year interlude when the President of Chile, Jorge Alessandri attempted to reopen hemispheric discussions of arms limitations.

Recent Discussions of Arms
Limitation Possibilities

On November 20, 1959, President Jorge Alessandri of Chile issued a strong statement on the necessity for curbing the "disastrous arms race" in Latin America. Contemporary observers have commented that his motivation may have been enhanced by concern over impending naval purchases by Peru. Alessandri's initiative found immediate support from official civilian circles within the Peruvian Government, where the administration's austerity program was being threatened by new military outlays, and Peruvian President Manuel Prado proposed a special Latin American conference on arms limitation.²¹ The Prado Proposal received official civilian support indicated by newspapers in most South American countries with the exceptions of Paraguay and Brazil. However, it was opposed by the armed forces of almost every nation on the continent, including those of Argentina.

The original Alessandri proposal made three principal points: (1) that despite the existence of machinery for the peaceful settlement of disputes in

²¹New York Times, November 21, 1959, p. 1.

Latin America, the predominant atmosphere was one of "Mistrust and Fear"; (2) that as a result, Latin American countries were spending existing resources and borrowing from future generations to engage in an economically disastrous arms race; (3) that the industrial countries could assist Latin American development by preventing the continent from becoming a dumping ground for surplus armaments "exceeding what is reasonable for defense against aggression." In sum, Alessandri called for "the development of a balance in the defence capacities of the various Latin American countries."²²

President Prado moved to convene a conference on November 28, 1959, when he began contacting heads of states for a discussion of possibilities for arms limitation. Both Chile and Peru seemed inclined to develop an agreed level of armaments, or balance of power within the continent, to be established by regional agreement and maintained through international inspection. In response to President Prado's invitation, Chile specifically called for the conference to consider agreement on force allocations based on hemispheric defense responsibilities. The limitation of arms purchases to agreed percentages of budgets, and publicity on current armament levels and all subsequent purchases.²³

²²Ibid.

²³El Comercio (Lima), Nov. 29, 1959, pp. 1, 6.

President Arturo Frondizi of Argentina released a public statement on the proposals of Chile and Peru on December 9th, 1959, pledging "his most decided support" for the conference objectives proposed by President Prado. Frondizi went on to say that Argentina had traditionally followed an anti-armaments policy, and lauded the Alessandri and Prado proposals as important contributions to "common American objectives." He also referred to the "sanctity of treaties" as protection for the individual Latin American states and said that he took it for granted that the Prado Proposal would be implemented rapidly "through means which the American states regard as most fitting."²⁴

However, the Argentine Armed Forces did not hold a view consonant with that of their President. They had earlier demonstrated a veto power over Frondizi's initiatives, and in this case their opposition to arms limitations had the same effect. Army Commander-in-Chief, Carlos Toranzo Montero, who was also speaking for the armed forces, informed the Press that "the Army could not reduce its strength²⁵ and still comply

²⁴ La Prensa (Buenos Aires), Dec. 9, 1959, pp. 1, 8.

²⁵ The navy had just acquired an aircraft carrier and had begun negotiations with the United States for the loan or purchase of destroyers and submarines; it had also inquired about the purchase of 28 surplus "Sabre Jets" from Germany.

with its responsibilities."²⁶

In spite of the position taken by the armed forces against this issue, Frondizi received considerable civilian public support for his position. The influential paper La Prensa, the most prestigious independent Buenos Aires daily, stated on December 4th that a Latin American armaments race would be absurd in view of the economic condition of the continent; and the major opposition party in Congress urged that the President support the conference, prior to his own statement of December 9th.²⁷

The reluctance of the United States to become directly involved and the resistance of the armed forces in many of the nations resulted in the premature demise of the proposed conference. The non-involvement of Brazil in the proposed conference compounded with the Argentine Armed Forces concern with what they perceived as Brazilian superiority in equipment doomed this conference as decisively as any of the factors involved. In addition to this, the parameter of the conference was too broad to be received with anything but apprehension by the continent's military elements, which tended not to view arms limitations beyond the context of their own needs, institutional prestige and professionalism.

²⁶ La Prensa, Dec. 10, 1959, p. 1.

²⁷ La Prensa, Dec. 4, 1959 (editorial).

A second attempt at achieving a hemispheric arms limitation based on "non-receipt" agreements was initiated at the OAS by the United States in November of 1966, in anticipation of the Meeting of the Presidents of the American Nations to be held at Punta del Este in April, 1967. This initiative received limited official support from the Onganía Government of Argentina.²⁸ The Argentine position seemed to be that since the Argentine Government was heavily committed to social and economic development, it logically followed that Argentine national security must come about through economic development and growth rather than traditional military hardware. This position was in all probability designed to offset the label of "Military Regime" which the Onganía Government had from time to time sought to dispel.

Despite this seeming approval, the Argentine position, as revealed in official statements made prior to the Presidents meeting, was limited to general support of a policy of holding down arms purchases pending economic recovery. It did not endorse either "non-receipt" arrangements or limitations on specific types of combat equipment. Seen in a broader perspective, this reaction revealed that military equipment planning lay the context of the Onganía Government's ten year development plan. Arms limitation was thus lightly

²⁸New York Times, April 7, 1967, p. 2.

regarded within the realm of domestic policy and self sufficiency. The final Argentine attitude which reflected traditional nationalism was that agreement at the President's Conference had to be the result of national decisions taken in view of purely national interests. Thus, although the Argentine Government appeared to accept the U.S. President's statement favoring the elimination of unnecessary expenditures for armaments, it opposed the listing of specific categories of arms to be avoided thereby exhibiting a characteristically nationalistic response to a U.S. initiative in the hemisphere. In this context, the "Conference of Presidents" ineffectually "passed over" the arms issues, particularly with regard to possible "non-receipt" resolutions.²⁹ The neglect of potentially acceptable "non-receipt" resolutions and lack of Latin American initiative on this topic also reflected politically divergent interests, probable Latin American military opposition, and the consequent U.S. reluctance to press the issue.

On November 2nd, 1967, President Eduardo Frei of Chile followed up on the theme of arms limitation by proposing a conference specifically to discuss arms limitations and the use of non-receipt agreements as mechanisms toward this end.³⁰ The Frei proposal received

²⁹New York Times, November 3, 1967, p. 1.

³⁰Min. of Defense Emilio Van Peborgh. Remarks at Foreign Press Association Luncheon, Nov. 26, 1968.

mixed receptions in Latin America; it was specifically scorned by Peru, which had just agreed with France to purchase a number of Mirage V aircraft.

Internal Chilean politics would have made it impossible for President Frei to follow up on his initial proposals adequately, even if they had met with a warmer reception. His proposal rapidly succumbed to international political inertia.

The Argentine reaction to the Frei proposals was one of interest but not of enthusiasm. When the idea had receded from public attention in late 1968, the Argentine Government only indirectly alluded to it when (after having made a series of arms purchases in Europe-- tanks, APCs and transport aircraft), it announced pointedly that it would defer the then pending acquisition of French Mirage jets on the grounds that it was necessary to "avoid purchases that were symbolic of arms races."³¹ This rationale was produced in deference to the Government's established priority areas of economic and social development and probably in expectation of a U.S. sales agreement for F-5s in 1970.

Rivalry with Brazil, which has resulted in an Argentine tendency to react to Brazilian arms initiatives (or lack thereof); historic opposition to hemispheric multilateral ties; and the need for modern equipment

³¹Ibid.

in the face of aged equipment stocks and inventories; are all factors which have traditionally led Argentina to avoid or oppose hemispheric arms limitation arrangements. In addition to the above, the idea of arms limitation also had to contend with the Argentine Armed Forces' persistent vision of their strategic mission. This combined with the negative factors cited above resulted in Argentine disinterest toward arms limitation in the decade of 1959-1969.

Argentina's Armed Forces hold keenly nationalistic views of their nation's status and future potential in a continental sense. Hence they are loathe to accept a freeze in any field where Argentina may be perceived as inferior to her neighbors, including the area of armaments. In addition, Argentina's traditional antagonistic view of U.S. initiatives combined with the reluctance of other Latin American nations than Chile to advance arms control proposals makes the outlook for conventional arms control, in an institutionalized or pre-agreed sense, bleak indeed. Chile appears to be the only nation on the continent seriously interested in arms control. This attitude is based essentially on national interest, due to the difficult economic environment and the superior quantitative armament capabilities of Argentina as her larger neighbor to the east. In addition to Argentina on the east, Chileans do not ignore the irredentist

factor vis a vis Peru and Bolivia to the north. Thus Chile has excellent reasons for favoring arms control, whereas Argentina, from a nationalistic perspective, finds such reasons unconvincing.

ARGENTINE ATTITUDES TOWARD NUCLEAR
ARMS CONTROL

On matters pertaining to limitations on nuclear arms Argentina has consistently taken a nationalistic stance of opposition. This stance is in part due to Argentina's present position as the most advanced Latin American nation in the field of nuclear development and technology.

This estimate of Argentina's nuclear potential was recently presented at the Twelfth Annual Pugwash Conference at Sochi, in the U.S.S.R., where it was stated by several unidentified international specialists³² that Argentina will probably have the capacity to produce nuclear explosives within 10 to 12 years. This possibility is allegedly being encouraged by the Government of Argentina, which, according to the Pugwash source, is motivated by fear that a revolution in Brazil might some day endanger the national security of Argentina.

³²Anonymity is customary at these conferences to insure candor and to permit the presentation of unorthodox proposals by attendees without committing themselves or their governments to the same.

The key element in this program will be a 316 Megawatt nuclear reactor, capable of producing plutonium, which has been contracted with the West German firm of Siemens A. G. The reactor is scheduled to commence operation in June of 1972, at a cost of approximately \$70,000,000. It will utilize natural uranium fuel, which is produced in Argentina and which would avoid the necessity for Argentine reliance on the United States for artificially enriched uranium fuels. Under the present circumstances, since it is not a signatory of the NPT and Germany has not ratified it, Argentina's reactor may not be subject to safeguard inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency and consequently could produce weapons grade plutonium as a by-product.³³

The continental leadership of Argentina in the nuclear field is a matter of considerable national pride, as well as continental status. Under no foreseeable circumstances would an Argentine Government voluntarily forsake such a position, or even take a risk which could lead to such a loss. This is particularly true when the nuclear question is balanced with what is perceived by Argentines to be so frail a notion as arms limitation or control within the limited context of Latin America.

³³"Pugwash Parley in Sochi Told of Argentina's Nuclear Plans," New York Times, Oct. 27, 1969, p. 19.

The question of nuclear arms control for Argentina is centered on the contentious issue of peaceful uses of nuclear explosives and/or explosions. The fact that Brazil has adamantly refused to sign the NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) and has reserved the uses of nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes in the language of the LANFZ (Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty) compounds Argentine reluctance to place herself at a possible disadvantage to her continental rival and neighbor. Also an issue in the case of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is Argentina's traditional reluctance to become involved in multilateral treaties, particularly ones which could be construed as limiting Argentine development of nuclear science and techniques to the advantage of or in the interests of the United States and the U.S.S.R.

Argentina and the NPT

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as jointly tabled by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. in 1967 was initially received with mixed feelings, largely of opposition in Argentina. The "nationalists" stoutly opposed Argentine signature and only a few of the internationalist "liberals" offered lukewarm support for it. Moreover, the adamant opposition of Brazil to the Treaty, compounded with Brazilian negative persuasion, and Argentina's own perceptions of rivalry

with her northern neighbor, thoroughly chilled chances for the treaty's early acceptance by Argentina. German reluctance to sign was also cited as a bar, but more important was the fact that Argentines were loathe to risk their nuclear leadership on the continent to Brazil in return for commitment to a multilateral Treaty co-sponsored by the United States; and in addition, one which would in no way affect U.S. nuclear development or peaceful uses of nuclear explosions. Argentine abhorrence of U.S. leadership, and her traditional policy of favoring bilateral arrangements as opposed to general restrictive measures of a specific sort were also major factors contributing to its refusal to sign the Treaty.

Recent developments, which include the addition of Argentina to the CCD (Conference for the Committee on Disarmament) in the fall of 1969, possibly may lead to eventual Argentine acceptance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The signature of the Treaty by Germany and Japan also had some favorable effect. The present Argentine Government may be persuaded in the not too near future that non-development of nuclear explosives may not constitute a liability after all, particularly in view of the assurances provided by the United States of inexpensive peaceful nuclear explosions for specific applications (earth-moving, gas release, etc.), to be

provided by that nation if such were to be requested by Argentina in the interests of national development. On the other hand, the rationale behind the present negative Argentine position of opposition to the NPT has been defended officially as reluctance to convert a de facto great power monopoly into a de jure one. As in the case of Brazil, Argentina officially considers nuclear explosives to be a probable instrument of economic development in the future, and one which they are reluctant to forsake.³⁴

Argentine spokesmen hasten to point out that the nation's adherence to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963 in no way is not inconsistent with this policy toward the NPT, since the former was a matter of concern to the health and security of all humanity, both on the grounds of fallout radiation and of military weapons development. Similar logic to the above was used against the early version of the Draft Seabeds Treaty in late 1969, when Argentina initially opposed it on the grounds that it gave the superpowers license to extend a de facto monopoly over deep sea resources and weapons possibilities into a possible claim to special rights over these areas.³⁵ At present however, the Argentine

³⁴Buenos Aires Diplomatic Information Service (release), Oct. 27, 1969. FBIS Reports, Oct. 28, 1969, p. B1.

³⁵Ibid.

position on the Seabeds Treaty is softer than on the NPT. The present Treaty's total ban of weapons on the Seabed satisfies the universalist/egalitarian criterion which would be the likely grounds for Argentina's support.

Argentina and Latin American
Nuclear Free Zone (LANFZ)

Argentine problems with the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (LANFZ) were similar to those with the NPT. Yet Argentina signed the LANFZ, with reservations, on September 27th, 1967. Significantly, however, Argentina was among the last of the Latin American states to sign. Only Cuba, Guyana and Jamaica delayed longer or refused to sign. However, in signing and ratifying the Treaty, Argentina reserved the right to conduct nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Specifically, the Argentine interpretation of the Treaty's controversial Article 18 is stated as follows in the Government's communique following the signature:

. . . The Government of Argentina . . . recognizes the right of the contracting parties to carry out, through their own means or in association with third parties, explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes, including explosions which may presuppose devices similar to those employed in nuclear armaments.³⁶

Seen in the overall context of Argentina's foreign policy and perceptions of national security,

³⁶La Nacion (Buenos Aires), Sept. 28, 1969, p. 1. (U.S. Emb./B.A. trans.). SIPRI, op. cit., pp. 320, 333.

nuclear arms control is in conflict with certain aspects of development and industrial status. The language of the Argentine communique illustrates this concisely:

. . . the statement made upon signing this Treaty (LANFZ), confirms the principle of freedom in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, this being a decisive factor in the technological revolution through which mankind is passing and a fundamental instrument for the progress of the peoples of Latin America.³⁷

Thus, when confronted with proposals for the limitation or control of nuclear arms, Argentina has consistently adhered to her traditional foreign policy precept of "universalism," in accordance with which she has consistently opposed all specific proposals for weapons limitations of any kind since the Treaty of 1902 with Chile. Her national bias against multi-lateral treaties and particularly those which she perceives as favorable to the United States and the continuation of its technical and political dominion over the continent, if not the world, further enhances this position. Yet, in a positive sense, Argentina could support bilateral treaties for force limitations, such as the "Pacto de Mayo" of 1902, on armament matters or non-discriminatory general and complete disarmament proposals. Again, in the words of her Government after the signing of the LANFZ:

37
Ibid.

In keeping with its traditional peaceful conduct, the Argentine Republic has adhered on numerous occasions to measures supporting general and complete disarmament, which are intended to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this respect it is fitting to point out its character as signatory of the Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, and of the Treaty on Exploration and Utilization of Outer Space, and its vote favorable to the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on the subject.³⁸

UNIVERSALISM, REGIONALISM, NATIONALISM
AND ARMS CONTROL

This Universalist appeal for general and complete disarmament would benefit all nations equally, and, in the Argentine view, would not disproportionately enhance the power of the United States in the Americas. In the spirit of "America for Humanity," it would remove the issue from the issue of national interest. On the other hand, enthusiastic reception of general and complete disarmament can also rightly be regarded as a cynical cover for national interests that do not coincide with any kind of specific arms control within the realm of probability. Even the most optimistic advocate of arms control must admit that the current international scene is such as to make general and complete disarmament a "strawman" or cover-up for opposition which would be

³⁸ Ibid.

inconvenient to publicly admit. In order to work, GCD requires the development of an international rule of law that is not likely to occur in this writer's lifetime.

In the context discussed above, Argentina's armament policies toward both nuclear and conventional arms control or limitation may be summarized as follows:

1. Argentina will have difficulty with world-wide treaties requiring control or limitations on specific weapons at this time. This applies to conventional and nuclear weapons. ("CBW" weapons may be an exception.)
2. Argentina might be persuaded to enter into a general agreement for the establishment of force ratios as among Brazil, Chile and herself. She may also be amenable to the principle of "Non-receipt" as the arms control basis for such an agreement.
3. Argentina would prefer to deal with the United States on a bilateral basis in order to protect herself from what she perceives as the overwhelming power of the U.S. in a regional arrangement.
4. Any Argentine agreement to limit arms will necessarily depend upon Brazilian adherence or participation. Argentina will not prejudice her armament or developmental position vis a vis Brazil, consequently Brazilian non-participation in arms control arrangements would prevent Argentine acceptance of the same.
5. The Argentine Armed Forces will, for the foreseeable future, require effective and reasonably modern armaments, commensurate with their perceptions of internal security needs, a national strategic role, and with any possible Brazilian threat.

6. Argentina will oppose arms control or arms limitation arrangements which arise from or are to be monitored by the OAS, an organization which she considers to be a tool of United States interests.
7. Argentina will insist upon the right to use or manufacture peaceful nuclear devices at least as long as Brazil does. This is due to her present leadership position in South American nuclear technology and her national pride which considers nuclear capability to be a characteristic of first-rate nation states.
8. Argentina would support general treaties with an egalitarian or universalist application, such as universal test bans, general and complete disarmament, treaties to ban war, treaties against aggression, or a seabeds treaty. However, she would oppose any such treaty which applied or implied unequal status among the contracting nations.

Chapter 5

THE NATIONAL CONTEXT

INSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

The armed forces of Argentina have been a heavily politicized institution since the overthrow of Ipólito Irigoyen in 1930. They have since become the self-proclaimed guardians of the constitution and of effective government. The leaders of the armed forces have increasingly become impatient with the failures or "ineffectiveness" of civilian politicians, due as much to their own ambitions, nationalism, and sense of purpose, as to frustration with the inability of the civilian governments to come to grips with Peronism and a lagging economy.

It is therefore not surprising that since 1930 10 of the last 13 Presidents of Argentina have come into office from active or recently retired commissions in the Armed Forces. The Armed Forces in a sense exist more as an alternate source of power in the nation than as servants of the people or as protectors of constitutional legitimacy per se. Institutionally, the armed forces draw support from the traditional landed elites

whose interests they have tended to serve. With the blessing of the traditional elements of the Catholic Church, the Armed Forces and their conservative supporters have formed a bulwark against the institutional challenge to their political role and institutional status and dominance which has arisen from the growth of industrialism and of its concomitant Peronism.

Since the fall of Illia in 1966, the armed forces have had to face the prospect of having "their" governments hostage to the power of the Peronists. They have undone two of "their" governments for recognizing this as was the case with Onganía who attempted to come to terms with the Peronists and on the other hand they dumped Levingston, who was altogether too inflexible. The dilemma of the armed forces is thus a politically acute one. They now recognize that they must gracefully devise a "salida" or way out of government without conceding the field to the Peronists. This will entail elections in the next one or (at most) two years and a formula which would bar direct Peronist participation.

Hope for stability in such an arrangement can only come with the death of Perón and the passage from power of the present armed forces CINCs, particularly General Lanusse. This progression of events could precede ideological compromise between the two institutional powers of Argentina. Such a compromise would most likely be clothed in the cloak of a resurgence

of nationalism and a more traditional and outward-looking foreign policy.

The armed forces in opting out of an awkward and demeaning political role will fall back on their traditional deliberative position vis a vis civilian governments, and are likely to become increasingly active in the field of economic development. In this field they have pursued a role of notable importance, probably managing a larger portion of the industrial base of the nation than is true of any of the five or six larger nations of South and Central America.

In their past role as the dominant institutional power behind the government the armed forces have supported a national economic policy (or better a series of them) which stressed industrial growth and self-sufficiency. This outlook has led the armed forces to welcome foreign investment. They have held a belief that economic strength will be the key to national greatness. Recently, they have placed some restriction on foreign investment where importation of products has been involved, or where the development of the nations natural resources are concerned. But foreign investment which contributes to the national industrial base has been welcomed.

On the whole, Argentina has promoted foreign investment vigorously. Perhaps more so than any other

nation in Latin America. The economic role of the armed forces is the outgrowth of that institution's peculiar nationalism. This role readily provides the armed forces with a rationale which combines their institutional defense missions with industrial development and the settlement of the national territories. It also provides them with a broader basis for claims against the government's resources, claims which reenforce their perceptions of the desirability of economic independence from the industrial powers of the northern temperate zone.

The existence of a Marxist regime in Chile has added to the compulsion of the Argentines to shore up their economy and insure so far as possible stable growth and employment. The growing threat of disruption by Peronists and the problems of the economy over the last 15 years have sensitized the armed forces to the need for improved performance in the economic area as well as a "salida" from the politically debilitating experience of sustaining unpopular governments. The expansive scope of the armed forces economic activities and the extent to which they perceive national security over the long term in economic terms makes a study of this function appropriate for this paper.

NATIONAL SECURITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The direct role played by the armed forces in the economy of Argentina today reflects their perception of national security in the context of the nation's state of development and economic self-reliance. This sentiment has been articulated by armed forces spokesmen since the 1930s. Perón effectively defined it in 1944 as follows:

The words "national defense" may make some of you think this is a problem whose presentation and solution are of interest only to the armed forces. The truth is very different: into its solution go all the inhabitants, all their energies, all their wealth, all their industries and production, all their means of transport and communication; the armed forces being merely . . . the fighting instrument of that great whole which is "the nation in arms!"

Quoted in Rennie, op. cit., p. 375.

This concept of the national security and defense as emanating from the vitality and strength of the nation as a whole exists in much the same manner for the Argentine Armed Forces today. The words spoken above are reflective of a nation during a time of war, but they also express a basic view which has remained relatively constant in recent times.

This view of national security tends to be reenforced by the tremendous economic strides which have been taken by Brazil since the Second World War.

The Argentines fear being outstripped on the economic and political front by their northern neighbor, and Argentine nationalists, particularly those found among the armed forces, have tended to feel obliged to at least keep up with Brazil. How this is to be accomplished is an issue of great importance among both civilian and military sectors of the population. Brazil has grown and continues to grow through the introduction of massive infusions of foreign capital and international loans; capital creating vehicles which Argentina had distained save on a bilateral basis up to 1956.

The present government has taken a relatively favorable view towards foreign capital investment, particularly when it conforms to the guidelines of the National Development Council and is in concert with domestic capital resources, public or private. However, within this context, the armed forces are determined to achieve the status of national independence for the production of armaments and logistical backup equipment, while at the same time advocating a rapid development of the nation's industrial potential and resources. At the present time the leadership and institutional nucleus of the national development role lie with the National Development Council (CONADE).

The CONADE exists at the highest level of the Onganía and Levingston Governments, and serves as the

economic planning equivalent to the National Security Council (CONASE). These two councils respectively determine and coordinate the national development and security policy for the nation.

The National Development Council (CONADE)¹

The CONADE constitutes the basic planning agency for the Onganía Government's National System of Planning and Action for Development. Its tasks include: determining policy and strategy relating to the development of the nation; coordinating its activities with the CONASE in order to combine the national goals of security and development, and formulating the long term and medium term plans for the national development. The CONADE is also authorized to coordinate the overall plans with regional and sectional plans; and to direct short term programming, the preparation of budgets, and the evaluation of projects. The CONADE issues regulations for the development activities of all municipal, regional and national public sector organizations and is charged with guiding the private sector's activities towards national development patterns and objectives. The decisions of the CONADE are mandatory

¹Clarín (Buenos Aires Daily), October 1, 1966, p. 1. See also: Munson, et al., Area Handbook for Argentina, op. cit., pp. 262-263.

for all public agencies and the Council is responsible solely to the President of the Republic.

The CONADE is composed of the five Ministers of the Cabinet as its permanent members and fifteen Secretaries of State as its non-permanent membership. The Council is chaired by the President of the Republic and its secretariat is headed by a Secretary, who holds cabinet rank. As of June 27, 1969, this job had been held by Gen. Juan Enrique Guglielmelli, a developmentist General (retired) with past associations with former President Frondizi.

Directly responsible to the CONADE are eight regional planning bureaus, each with a Board of Governors who are jointly responsible for the formulation of the development plans and strategies for the region and who singly hold responsibility for the execution of development plans and programs in their respective jurisdictions. They are answerable through the CONADE to the President. The regional boards also have representation from the Ministry of the Interior and from the Secretary of State for Government to assure continuity and coordination of policies at the working level. The CONADE was created by Decree-Law 16,964 of 1966.

The creation of the National System of Development Planning for Action and the CONADE as its

institutional implementation reflects the great importance placed upon the development of the nation by the present Government. The CONADE, together with the CONASE, coordinates the policies of the General Directorate of Military Factories.

THE ARMED FORCES AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

Background

The economic role of the Argentine Armed Forces dates from the last quarter of the 19th century when the army expanded the nation's frontiers and liquidated two ineffective challenges from the Indian peoples of the southern regions. In this process, much as was the case in the United States, the army had built forts, established telegraphic communications, and constructed roads.²

In the period following the First World War, economic nationalism attracted many adherents among the officers of the army, leading them to advocate state directed industrial development through increased national planning and capital investment. The influence

²Dr. Gustavo Cirigliano, "En busca de una coincidencia de hipótesis interpretivas de la realidad Argentina," Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra, XLIV (May-June, 1966), pp. 23-29.

and example of Germany encouraged this attitude, particularly in the late thirties. Such German trained officers as Generals Manuel Savio and Enrique Mosconi, advocated the rapid development of heavy industries and oil production respectively. These moves, they believed, were vital to the growth of national power and independence. In contrast, the conservative oligarchy or "liberal-internationalists" among the army officers and their conservative supporters favored laissez faire capitalism and foreign trade and investment.³

The Argentine Armed Forces have since then assumed for themselves an important role in the development of national industry. This process began officially with the establishment of the Superior Technical School (EST) in 1930. The EST was to train officers to be technically competent and capable of directing the operations of the various small arms producing factories and plants which had been built after the First World War at the insistence of the army. At the same time, however, the rationale for the EST was also supported by the need for a center to study the technical problems related to planning. This approach would include planning for the development of basic industries that would

³ Robert A. Potash, The Army and Politics in Argentina, pp. 23-24, 54.

enhance national defense capabilities and would also produce officers with national planning skills. The graduates of the EST have become managers of the Military Factory System of the General Directorate of Military Factories (DGFM).⁴

The forerunner of the "DGFM System" (General Directorate of Military Factories) was the military aircraft factory established at Córdoba in 1927. In 1952 this aircraft factory became the National Directorate of Aeronautical Manufacture and Research, and in 1941, the army officially created the DGFM, presumably as a result of Argentina's enforced isolation from all outside sources of armaments during World War II. This organization was given broad responsibilities for the manufacture of armaments and ammunition. It was later charged with the exploration and exploitation of the nation's industrial ores and with the development of heavy industry.⁵

⁴Ibid., p. 77. See also: La Nacion (Buenos Aires), November 8, 1930, p. 1 which reports the decree creating the school. Revista Universitaria, Vol. IV, No. 61, 1935 contains a discussion of the school's organization, aims and courses.

⁵Potash, op. cit., pp. 123, 187. Col. Lino D. Montial Forzano, "El afianzamiento de las fronteras y la cooperacion," Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra, XLIV (July-August, 1966), pp. 80-82.

By the late forties--the early years of the Perón Government--the DGFm had come to include a myriad of industrial enterprises providing civilian as well as military users with such industrial materials as pig iron, steel, and chemicals. Under Perón, the navy's Rio Santiago Shipyards near La Plata were notably expanded in 1953; they have since been utilized sporadically for the production of small tankers, cargo vessels, and similar craft up to 10,000 tons.⁶ The air force's Córdoba Factory which was known as the State Aeronautics and Mechanical Industries until 1957, also grew substantially. Between 1927 and 1967 it produced 929 military and civilian aircraft of original design and assembled over 360 aircraft engines. In 1957, it became the DINFIA and one of its surviving components, the Aeronautical and Space Investigation Institute of the air force, have developed various sounding rockets and instruments for Argentina's space research program, which is the most advanced in Latin America.⁷ As a sideline, DINFIA had in the past produced farm implements and some motor vehicles. Much of the DINFIA was sold

⁶ Inter-American Defense Board Staff, "Work of the Armed Forces in the Economic and Social Development of the Countries (Military Civic Action), "Staff Paper # T-255, Washington, D.C., June 8, 1965, pp. 24-25.

⁷ Janes All the Worlds Aircraft, op. cit. Missiles and Rockets, November 15, 1965, p. 9.

to the private sector in 1962, and in 1968 the remainder of the DINFIA was replaced by the Research and Development Command of the air force.

The Industrial Role of the Armed Forces in Recent Years

The Army Factories under the General Directorate for Military Manufacture (GDMM), produce various types of light weapons and ammunition for both light and heavy weapons. These include: pistols, rifles, sub-machine guns and explosives. In the past these factories have produced: machine guns, bazookas, mortars, recoilless rifles, and light artillery through licensing agreements. The GDMM also has production capability for such general communications equipment as wire-line telephones; and civilian industry has produced some suitable field radio equipment. The relatively high cost of low volume domestic production of the more sophisticated military equipment items such as armored vehicles, naval vessels, and aircraft, has retarded the development of Argentine industry in these areas, although both the Onganía and Levingston Governments placed specific emphasis on the importance of gradually up-grading these capabilities within a proper economic context.⁸

⁸ IADB Staff Paper, op. cit., p. 25.
Interview with Miss Priscilla Clapp, correspondent to the Institute for Strategic Studies, October, 1968. Confirmado, January 19, 1967, p. 5.

In 1947, the DGFm began planning its most ambitious achievement to date, which was the development of the integrated steel mill at San Nicolás, between Rosario and Buenos Aires. The DGFm had constructed a smaller mill in 1943 at Zapla in Jujuy Province, utilizing limited iron deposits located there. This mill was expanded and remodeled in 1962. The San Nicolás plant was inaugurated as a joint DGFm-private sector corporation, called Sociedad Mixta Siderurgia Argentina--(SOMISA) in 1960; it was then envisioned as being among the largest on the continent. SOMISA's production in 1968 amounted to over 2,000,000 tons. The SOMISA is owned jointly by the DGFm and private stock holders. Retired generals serve as its president and vice president respectively, and the armed forces have a predominant voice in its management. The Argentine Government presently controls approximately 75% of the company's stock although it is authorized to sell off up to 90% of the same to the private sector.⁹

⁹IADB Staff Paper, op. cit., p. 24.
Anonymous, "La Obra del Ejercito en la Educacion, la Investigacion Cientifica, la Industria, y la Accion Civica," Revista del Circulo Militar (Buenos Aires), No. 670, Oct.-Nov.-Dec. 1963, pp. 31-34.
H. A. Zoehrer, "The Armed Forces of Argentina: A Comparative Analysis of Civil Military Relationships." (unpublished seminar paper, SIS/American U.) December 22, 1963, 24 pp. Munson, et al., op. cit., pp. 302-303.

The relationship between the military factories, the mixed military and private sector factories, and those of the purely private sector has been essentially complementary. The pattern has been that the military have often served as the initiators in areas which were initially unprofitable. They eventually step aside and sell off their factories as the private sector becomes extensively and competitively involved. This process has been exemplified in the experience of the State Aeronautics and Mechanical Industries (SAMI), which initially produced automobiles, motor cycles and farm machinery. Eventually SAMI sold off most of its factories to the Kaiser Automotive Works and Fiat in 1962. The SAMI retained only the aircraft factory at Córdoba in which it is building a few twin engined transport ("Guarani II") with turbo-prop engines and the Cessna 182 under a licensing arrangement.¹⁰

Since 1968 the armed forces' new armaments program has imposed some major requirements on the DGFM. It has been directed to produce over 20 AMX-13 tanks at the San Lorenzo shipyard, and a number of military and civilian factories will participate in various aspects of this endeavor. The first of the domestically assembled AMX-13s was unveiled in

¹⁰IADB Staff Paper, op. cit., p. 24. Oscar Altimir y Jean Sourrouille, "Los Instrumentos de Promocion Industrial en la Post-Guerra," Desarrollo Economico, IV (July-December, 1966), pp. 469-487.

December, 1969. Since then, spokesmen for the army have even suggested that Argentina eventually may export these tanks to other nations.¹¹

The naval shipyards at Rio Santiago were upgraded in 1943 under the State Shipyards and Naval Factories (SSNF) and are scheduled at least to partly assemble several anti-submarine frigates under license from the British Government. They are also expected to assemble two prefabricated submarines that are on order from West Germany. At the present time, the shipyard can construct up to 40,000 tons of shipping annually; however, it has recently been operating at only 10% of this capacity. The Rio Santiago yards employ 47 engineers who supervise 2,400 workers, office personnel and machinists.¹²

The Argentine Army is closer to its goal of logistical self-sufficiency than are either the air force or navy. Its well-developed munitions and small arms industry, the factories for civilian vehicle production (Argentina produced 46,000 trucks in 1966 alone),¹³ and a well developed communications industry,

¹¹La Prensa, May 11, 1968, p. 3.
La Nacion, February 8, 1969, p. 2.

¹²IADB Staff Paper, op. cit., p. 25.

¹³Munson, et al., op. cit., p. 303.

are all favorable to the logistical support of this service. The air force and navy are further from self-sufficiency because of the high costs which limit the production of the highly sophisticated weapons they require. Aircraft cannot be economically produced at Córdoba for the present limited requirements of the air force. The high level of technology involved in aircraft manufacture and the lack of Argentine capability for manufacturing aircraft engines to military specifications has made this industry a losing proposition save on an assembly rather than a complete fabrication basis. The Córdoba facility is now almost exclusively concerned with the partial assembly and fabrication of the Cessna 182, a single engine aircraft which is being built primarily for the civilian market.

The same production problems exist to a lesser degree for the navy, which lacks the facilities to manufacture efficient marine propulsion plants, a disadvantage which is compounded by a lack of the volume orders required to justify the maintenance of a realistic size shipyard on an economic basis. The sporadic character of Argentine commercial and naval requirements, combined with excessive costs and inefficient labor have made this industry a problem area for Argentina's military industrialists. It is one which even the present military orders will not improve.

THE FUTURE FOR THE ARMED FORCES IN THE
ECONOMIC CONTEXT: CIVIC ACTION

The Argentina Armed Forces suffer from no lack of plans for the development of the nation. They are particularly determined to speed up and promote the development of the sparsely settled national territories of Patagonia and Tierra del Fuego. The region has barely been explored much less surveyed for natural resources. The CONADE authorized intensive land use surveys for these regions in 1967, with particular emphasis placed upon the identification of natural resources. The armed forces will participate extensively in these surveys, and has assumed a leadership role in the establishment of industry and communications in the region.¹⁴

In addition to surveying the regions of the south, the Onganía and Levingston Governments greatly expanded the road building program; it is expected that the armed forces will step up their activities in this field in the less settled regions of the country, particularly in the south and northwest. This priority is of interest when we note that in 1966 there were

¹⁴Confirmado, III (July 31, 1967), p. 67.
Enrique Nera Villa Lobos, "Planes de Promocion de la Patagonia," Estrategia, No. 3 (Sept.-Oct., 1969), pp. 39-54.

only 86 centimeters of paved highway and several meters of railways per square kilometer of territory in Patagonia.¹⁵ The prospects of deteriorating relations with Chile have also tended to upgrade the importance of the population and consolidation of this region, which lacks the mountainous border of the more northerly areas. It can thus be foreseen that an area of intense interest to the armed forces in the 1970s economy of the nation will increasingly be in the form of civic action. It is a firmly rooted tradition that has a number of noteworthy precedents.

Civic Action

The Argentine Armed Forces have conducted a number of limited but effective civic action programs. Not the least important of these being universal male conscription which requires that all conscripts under the system who are illiterate be given the equivalent of a fourth grade education in reading, writing and arithmetic. This requirement is presently applied to approximately 10% of all conscripts inducted; but in certain provinces up to 70% illiteracy is encountered.

¹⁵Lt. Col. José Pedro Martín, "La Patagonia Argentina-Incidencia de Su Desarrollo en el Orden Nacional," Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra, XLIV (Sept.-Dec., 1966), pp. 155-163.

There the military education program is and has been an even more significant factor in encouraging development. Military vocational training for conscripts has been another aspect of army civic action. It has long provided the national economy with a flow of skilled and semi-skilled workers in the electronic and mechanical fields.¹⁶

In addition to its education program, the armed forces civic action programs also furnish maps, charts and meteorological information for national use. They also provide emergency housing, food and medical facilities to victims of natural disasters. The army and gendarmeria provide road, levee, bridge and airfield construction services in the less populated provinces; and the program provides telegraphic and telephone services in remote areas such as Patagonia or along the Andes mountains in the northwest. The army and gendarmeria also provide limited medical and educational facilities for non-conscript civilians in such areas.¹⁷ In addition, the army's civic action program

¹⁶ IADB Staff Paper, op. cit., pp. 29-30.
Major Luis Alberto Leoni, "Encuadre de la Institucion Ejercito en el Estado Moderno," Revista Militar, CLXLII-CLXLIV (October-December, 1960), pp. 29-43.

¹⁷ IADB Staff Paper, op. cit., pp. 45, 63, 81.

constructed almost 5000 units of emergency housing for the city of Buenos Aires in 1968.¹⁸

The navy and maritime prefecture provide nautical charts and maintain search and rescue services along the sea coast. They also provide passenger and cargo service to remote southern towns and ports, particularly in Tierra del Fuego, which is under naval jurisdiction. In some areas including Tierra del Fuego, the navy and air force personnel stationed there assist in conducting rural schools and operate apprentice schools in their repair facilities for the vocational training of 14 and 15 year old boys.¹⁹

Argentina's military civic action programs are tied to national development activities and are under the joint direction of CONASE and CONADE. These programs are carried out in remote areas where they do not compete with the private sector and indeed tend to enhance the latter's growth. Their cost to the government is relatively slight save for construction materials and wear and tear on equipment. The defense budget has no separate entries for civic action and there exists no publicly available tabulation of such expenditures. Some of the programs accomplishments are, however,

¹⁸Interview with Arturo Ludueña, May 4, 1970.

¹⁹IADB Staff Paper, op. cit., p. 29.

matters of record. Since 1962, the army claims to have: constructed over 2000 miles of roads in remote areas, constructed 45 bridges, provided medical treatment to about 8,600 civilians, given literacy training to approximately 407,000 persons, and built over 1,260 schools. In addition, it operated several hospitals, laid telephone cables and improved numerous public service structures and services. In 1966, four bridges were constructed for the town of Rio Gallegos (pop. 25,000), which were considered to have catalyzed the development of improved roads and of the region's economy.²⁰ Another field where army civic action has taken place is in the area of conservation and the augmentation of natural resources.

A single example of this type of civic action mission, together with its rationalization, was the planting by the army of 1, 7 million eucalyptus trees per year in an area of 15 thousand hectares at the annual rate of 700 hectares per year. This operation took place in the depressed Province of Jujuy, at the

²⁰ Ibid. "La Obra del Ejército en la Educación . . .," op. cit. H. A. Zoehrer, "The Armed Forces of Argentina: . . ." op. cit. Confirmado, III (July 13, 1967), p. 42. Lic. Mario Ameghino Zamudio, "Las relaciones publicas en las Fuerzas Armadas," Revista del Circulo Militar, LXV (Jan.-April, 1965), pp. 73-87.

town of Zaplá. These and other plantings were expected to improve watersheds and even more important, to provide over 180 thousand tons of charcoal for steelmaking. The army also provided the area with a coke oven to serve the region's several steel mills which had also been constructed by the armed force's GDMM. The project described above was performed in connection with the expansion and modernization of the Zaplá Steel Mills. This project also resulted in the construction of 425 houses for workers, three dormitories for single workers, five primary schools, four play grounds with swimming pools, and four large cinemas. Zaplá also has an army originated public transportation system.²¹

The United States Military Assistance Program has provided approximately \$2.5 million (U.S.) from 1964-1968 for military civic action related projects.²² In FY 1972, the MAP is scheduled to provide \$1 million (U.S.) to an army construction engineer battalion through the military sales program. This battalion is the only Argentine unit being directly supported by the U.S. in which civic action is its specific purpose

²¹"La Obra del Ejército en la Educación . . .," op. cit., pp. 30-34.

²²Edwin Lieuwin, "The Latin American Military and U.S. Policy." (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1967), pp. 23-25. "Military Assistance Facts," Washington, D.C.: DOD/ISA, March, 1968, pp. 15-24.

and activity.

Civic action along with the large field of economic development has been heartily endorsed by many of the armed forces leaders. Most outspoken of these proponents was the Secretary of the CONADE, (1969-1970) Major General Juan D. Guglialmelli, who defined the role of the armed forces to include "all the activities of the community and in each of them seeking to forge the concept and consolidating sentiment of sovereignty." The battles of today, Guglialmelli asserted, are being fought by the armed forces on an economic front on behalf of national sovereignty and development.²³

The economic activities of the armed forces are not without critics, anonymous and otherwise, who accuse the armed forces factories and other economic efforts of being inefficient, over-staffed, and non-competitive with the private sector. These critics also view civic action as a small side-line in the normal activities of the armed forces which they hold must be preparation for the defense of the nation from external and internal

²³General Juan D. Guglialmelli, "Discurso del Director del Centro del Altos Estudios y Escuela Superior de Guerra, General de Brigada Juan Enrique Guglialmelli, el 15 de Diciembre de 1965 con Motivo del Cierre del año lectivo," Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra, XLIV (Jan.-Feb. 1966), pp. 8, 11.

dangers. Its advocates, on the other hand view civic action and the development of the economy by the armed forces as inoculations against subversion and as boosters of the economic strength and therefor of the military might of the nation.

The prevailing opinion in Argentina on this issue, at least in Government circles, seems to favor economic and social roles for the armed forces so long as these do not interfere with their combat capability or directly compete with the private sector of the economy.

The armed forces have tended in the past and are likely to continue in the future to build heavy industry for the nation where it does not exist and where private sources either cannot afford the risks or lack the incentive to pursue the projects. The armed forces thereby hope to bring the projects up to a stage where they can be sold off to the private sector or where mixed corporations along the lines of the SOMISA can be established.

Civic action is likely to be viewed as a vital component of the development process as in the case of Zaplá, or it will be performed in the interests of opening up Argentina's vast and relatively unsettled regions to settlement and development. By creating infra-structure, the armed forces see themselves in the role of pioneers aiding in the realization of the

national potential and in the traditional goal of populating the national territory. Argentines and more recently Brazilians have been long captivated by the idea expressed by Juan Bautista Alberdi, drafter of the Argentine National Constitution of 1852. Alberdi's motto and the motto of Argentina in his times and up to the present was: "gobernar es poblar," or translated, "to foment settlement is the essence of government." In the context of Argentina's fear of Chilean immigration in Tierra del Fuego and Patagonia, this will mean the settlement or even re-population of these vast areas by Argentines. The mystique of development and population historically are interwoven, and the accession to power of an avowedly Marxist government in Chile lends this matter a new sense of urgency in the view of Argentina's advocates of development.

THE COST OF THE ARMED FORCES: TRENDS IN FORCES AND BUDGETS

The cost of sustaining the Armed Forces of Argentina poses a question and a problem to her own planners and would be developers, for the growth of the Armed Forces manpower has notably outstripped the nation's relatively modest (2.2%/year) population growth. However, their cost remains relatively in line with the other comparable institutions of the continent. The question then is whether the services

performed by the armed forces in their developmental, security and deliberative roles justifies the cost of their upkeep which lies in the vicinity of 16% of the national budget.²⁴ The problem, which may well lack an answer, is by whose standard may the question be answered. The following section will present the reader with an essentially factual view of the cost factors borne by Argentines in order that they might have armed forces.

Over the past fifty years, the growth of Argentina's military strength has more than kept pace in terms of manpower with the growth of the national population which has increased from 10,000,000 in 1920 to 23,000,000 in 1969. During this period Argentine military manpower increased from a total of 38,000 men in 1920 to 138,000 in 1969 or 73% of the total population, a considerable increase. Thus the population's growth over the period came to 150% as contrasted with military growth of 350%, in terms of manpower.²⁵

Argentina's military expenditures rose very gradually during the 1920s and 1930s, reaching a high point of 300 million pesos by the outbreak of the Second World War. Between 1940 and 1945, however,

²⁴Potash, op. cit., pp. 74-75.

²⁵Ibid., p. 168.

military expenditures more than tripled in terms of constant values and prices. This increase was due to a rearmament plan which averaged 272 million pesos per year over a five year period. The all-time high for annual expenditures was reached in 1945, when military expenditures accounted for 43% of all national government expenditures. Expenditures for the armed forces levelled off in the immediate post-war years to approximately 20-25% of the budget and sharply declined after 1951. Since then the expenditures of the armed forces have fluctuated in the vicinity of 16% and have not exceeded the 1945 level in terms of constant prices.²⁶ A sharp increase in funding allocated to the budget of the Ministry of Defense in 1969, included substantial costs attributed to industrial facilities, the federal police, and maritime prefecture (factors absent from previous budgets), and yet even this total, in terms of constant values, is still considerably below the mark set in 1945.

Many of the increases reflected in the military budgets of 1943-1945 reflected personnel costs for a larger military establishment. They also included the funds for armaments and domestically produced military items. Since that time, personnel costs have gradually

²⁶ Munson, et al., Area Handbook for Argentina, op. cit., p. 370.

absorbed a proportionately higher share of the military budget, and military expenditures on equipment have tended to decline in relative amounts. In a revealing speech on Navy Day, 1968, Admiral Ignacio Varela, described this trend when he asserted that:

. . . in 1945, available funds amounted to 162 million pesos, at constant values on that date; in 1965 only 97 million pesos were available. On the other hand the composition of these expenditures has changed significantly, for since the decade of the 1940s, personnel costs amounted to 50% of the budget; whereas at present, they have been driven by cost of living to the extent of requiring 75% of the budget.

He went on to point out that:

. . . the balance of the military budget--25%-- had to suffice to maintain existing equipment, operate and renovate it at a relative level which was reduced by 50% from 1945.

Varela pointed out that during the decade of the 1960s naval tonnage averaged 85,000 tons, whereas in 1945 it amounted to 157,000 tons, a significant decline.²⁷

All factors considered, Argentina's military costs have remained more or less constant in dollar terms since the Second World War. The military budget declined from a swollen two-fifths of the national budget in 1945 to about 16% in 1965,²⁸ a decline which

²⁷ Varela, op. cit. Munson, et al., op. cit., p. 370.

²⁸ Ibid., pp. 270-271.

reflected the growth of the national budget and GNP as well as a levelling off of military expenditures. During this period, there were higher allotments to social and economic services performed by the armed forces (in many cases for the armed forces as well); and in 1965, for the first time ever, budgeted national education expenditures exceeded that for national defense.

Of a total allotment of \$US 300 million in 1967, (21% of the National Budget) the army was assigned 43%, the navy 32% and the air force 25%. The army's budget has actually declined in dollar amount from the war years when this service alone claimed two-thirds of a \$US 280 million budget. The navy and air force have gained funding in recent years at the expense of the army, each having increased its budget by about approximately 50% since 1945.²⁹

In keeping with their level of institutional development, the Argentine Armed Forces have a pension and retirement system which absorbs a significant part of the total military budget. These items amounted to 15% of the military budget in 1965. It is estimated that there are almost as many officers on the retired

²⁹Magio Salano, "Our Military Men: What We Don't Know About Them," Atlantida (February, 1967). (U.S. Embassy/B.A. Translation).

list as on active duty; in the case of general officers, the retired list exceeded the active one.

As of the beginning of March, 1966, the Armed Forces Social Security Institute had 46,576 members. These included those retired under normal procedures, those retired for political reasons,³⁰ and those who retired to go into business. Statistically broken down by service the retired list appears as follows.³¹

ARMY

Officers	3,308	
NCOs	16,336	
Widows and Children	<u>7,091</u>	
	26,735	(56.66%)

NAVY

Officers	1,484	
NCOs	12,337	
Widows and Children	<u>3,171</u>	
	16,892	(36.55%)

AIR FORCE

Officers	620	
NCOs	1,810	
Widows and CHildren	<u>516</u>	
	2,946	(6.76%)

³⁰ After the unsuccessful coup attempts of 1962 and 1963, 1,265 Army officers, 345 Navy officers, and 219 Air Force officers and other personnel were retired.

³¹ Varela, "Speech," op. cit.

At the present time the heaviest pressure for more funds and the most difficult to obtain are for increased pay to active personnel. Cutbacks have been made to support this need since 1963 through the reduction of the number of conscripts, but this has had marginal effect on the overall budget due at least in part to the pitifully small pay earned by the Argentine conscript during his one year of obligatory service.

Actual armament expenditures rose sharply under the Onganía and Levingston Governments, reflecting the results of "Plan Europa" after a period of savings and restraint during the limited life of the US-MAP. It is estimated that "Plan Europa" and other recent armament purchases and future commitments will total approximately \$US 200,000,000. However, the dramatic increase in the cost of armaments and their maintenance has been a factor in retarding such large scale purchases. Naval equipment offers examples of this problem. In the words of Navy CINC Admiral Varela in 1968:

. . . the battleships Moreno and Rivadavia, of 28,000 tons displacement . . . cost in 1914, \$11,000,000. (US). The cruisers 25 de Mayo and Almirante Brown of 14,000 tons (total) cost \$US 4,000,000 in 1930. In the year 1938, the cruiser La Argentina of 7500 tons cost \$US 4,500,000. Submarines of the Salta class of 1931, which in their trials broke world records for deep dives, cost \$US 850,000. At the present time, a single modern anti-submarine frigate of 3,500 tons costs \$35,000,000 (US), and a modern, non-nuclear, submarine costs over \$US 10,000,000.³²

³²Ibid.

The inflation in maintenance costs is reflected by the fact that repair costs per ton of naval vessels have risen from 1800 pesos in 1960 to a 1960 equivalent of 5,347 pesos in 1966.³³

Security and defense related expenditures represented 21.5% of the budget for 1967; 16% for 1968 and approximately 20% for 1969. Much of the four percent increase was allocated to salary increases. In 1968, non-police costs for defense amounted to the equivalent of \$US 325 million, and the budget for 1969 was approximately \$US 435 million. Of the 1968 figure, \$US 51 million were for armament purchases, barracks construction, base maintenance and landing fields. In 1969, capital investments were for \$US 77 million.³⁴ The following charts will place these values in a twenty year perspective and also illustrate the relative positions of Brazil and Argentina.³⁵

The economic patterns and cycles which have influenced Argentine arms procurement may be summarized

³³Reuters (B.A.), Feb. 24, 1969, op. cit.

³⁴SIPRI, op. cit., pp. 55-60.

³⁵The statistics contained in these graphs are compiled on different data and bases than those in the body of this paper. They are to be used for their value as relative comparative indicators rather than as necessarily similar calculations. This is due to the fact that such calculations seldom if ever utilize identical bases.

Table 1

LATIN AMERICA: LONG AND SHORT TERM TRENDS
IN THE VOLUME OF MILITARY EXPENDITURE^a

Based on constant price figures


	Average per cent change per year					Budgeted change in 1969	Size of military expenditure in 1968 US \$ mn, current prices and exchange-rates
	Long- term trend 1949-68	Short- term trend 1965-68	Year-to-year changes ^b				
			1965-66	1966-67	1967-68		
South America							
Brazil	+ 3.2 ^b	+ 11.9 ^c	- 16.3	+ 13.8	1008.5 ^d
Argentina	- 0.8	+ 5.6	- 27.8	+ 23.8	+ 31.7	..	428.6
Venezuela	+ 9.4	+ 6.3	+ 8.6	+ 11.7	- 1.0	..	195.6
Peru	+ 7.1	+ 12.3	+ 3.4	+ 14.4	+ 19.8	- 11.3	153.0
Colombia	+ 8.0	+ 1.7	—	+ 3.3	+ 1.7	..	135.5
Chile	+ 3.4	+ 5.1	+ 4.1	+ 10.1	+ 1.2	+ 2.2	109.0
Central America							
Mexico	+ 5.2	+ 8.0	+ 20.4	+ 0.6	+ 4.0	..	182.9

Source: *SEPRI, Op. Cit.*, page 214.

^a Figures are given only for countries whose military expenditure in 1968 exceeded \$100 million (at current prices and exchange-rates). Because reliable figures are not available, Cuba is omitted.

^b 1949-1967. ^c 1964-1967. ^d 1967.

Figure 10
 MILITARY EXPENDITURE IN LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES
 1950 - 1968



Source: SIPRI, *op. cit.*, page 214.

Chart 1.15. Military expenditure in Latin American countries: relative importance in 1968




Table 2

SOUTH AMERICA: CONSTANT PRICE FIGURES

	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958
Argentina	506.3	379.4	268.3	281.5	247.8	270.1	291.7	231.4	292.6	244.0	281
Bolivia	4.2	2.4	2.5	2.1
Brazil	172.3	220.2	219.4	246.2	238.8	241.7	235.3	268.4	323.8	357.1	367.6
Chile	65.3	68.2	78.1	73.7	...	132.3	84.7	126.3	120.9	129.8	121.6
Colombia	21.2	24.6	23.2	29.3	40.8	54.4	64.1	63.4	61.7	64.7	50.8
Ecuador	7.5	12.1	...	18.2	20.1	19.3	13.4
Paraguay	4.8	4.8	15.8
Peru	21.5	28.5	31.3	36.2	35.0	34.2	32.2	34.3	56.5	50.9	57.7
Uruguay
Venezuela	42.8	47.6	63.5	63.5	70.5	71.1	69.6	111.4	139.2	117.6	136.2
Total	850.0	790.0	710.0	760.0	760.0	830.0	810.0	870.0	1 030.0	990.0	1 100.0

	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1968X
	253.7	284.9	280.4	269.8	262.6	288.6	276.0	199.3	246.7	246.7	...	428.6
	2.8	4.0	4.6	4.7	6.0	5.9	11.8	14.3	16.1 ^b
	288.8	267.3	245.1	264.6	259.8	272.8	406.9	340.5	387.5	1 008.5
	96.4	103.5	105.2	111.6	95.9	94.2	111.5	116.1	127.8	129.3	(132.2)	109.0
	42.2	47.3	56.2	88.8	97.1	94.6	101.6	101.6	104.9	106.7	...	135.5
	16.5	22.2	21.1	20.1	17.4	19.8	22.2	24.8	19.5	19.8	(19.8)	23.5 ^a
	[5.1]	[4.9]	4.2	4.8	5.3	5.5	5.9	7.2	8.8	[10.0]	...	19.6 ^a
	50.8	50.1	[60.0]	[70.0]	80.7	78.7	74.6	77.1	88.2	105.7	(93.7)	153.0
	[9.4]	[10.8]	14.9	14.9	20.3	19.8	18.9	14.4	[15.0]	[16.0]	...	13.1 ^b
	195.1	174.6	151.9	157.8	188.3	197.6	219.1	237.9	265.8	263.1	...	195.6
	960.0	970.0	940.0	1 010.0	1 030.0	1 080.0	1 250.0	1 130.0	1 280.0	1 390.0	...	2 120.0

US \$ mn, at 1960 prices and 1960 exchange-rates (Final column, X, at current prices and exchange-rates)

SIPRI, *op. cit.*, p. 254

Table 3

SOUTH AMERICA: CURRENT PRICE FIGURES:
LOCAL CURRENCY

Currency		1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957		
Argentina	mn. pesos	2 135	2 071	1 952	2 747	3 320	3 775	4 246	3 809	5 420	7 115		
Bolivia	mn. pesos	1.7	...	4.7	9.7	23.9		
Brazil	bn. cruzeros	4.8	5.9	6.3	7.6	9.3	11.3	13.0	17.8	26.2	34.6		
Chile	mn. escudos	2.2	2.8	3.7	4.5	6.0	11.7	13.2	34.3	61.7	73.1		
Colombia	mn. pesos	57	71	81	110	150	214	275	222	283	289		
Ecuador	mn. sucres	88	113	181	250	295	278	239		
Paraguay	mn. guaranis		
Peru	mn. soles	212	319	398	508	522	562	551	613	1 066	1 039		
Uruguay	mn. pesos		
Venezuela	mn. bolivares	120	153	182	201	212	210	270	333	382	496		
		1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
		9 831	17 686	24 027	27 367	33 608	40 188	45 158	64 703	61 656	98 933	150 000	...
		35.0	41.0	39.0	57.9	61.0	66.0	71.0	146.0	191.0
		40.8	43.9	54.8	69.6	114.5	194.5	338.5	924	1 157	1 430
		82.2	91.1	109.0	119.3	144.1	178.5	256.0	369.0	472.0	614.0	774.0	(964.0)
		306	272	317	410	664	965	1 072	1 218	1 467	1 628	1 761	...
		282	247	336	336	329	307	370	428	498	406	428	...
		1 348	1 436	1 613	2 016	2 471
		1 265	1 259	1 340	2 614	2 864	3 122	3 528	4 441	5 921	(5 766)
		187	221	365	509	760	1 000
		601	607	540	533	509	613	650	734	796	881	880	...

SIPRI, *op cit*, p. 254.

Table 4

ARGENTINA'S MILITARY EXPENDITURES:¹ IN CURRENT
AND CONSTANT PESOS AND IN U.S. DOLLARS,
FOR THE YEARS 1940-1969

Year	current pesos (millions)	constant pesos (1967:100)	US Dollars ² (Millions)
1940	306	45,734	131
1941	330	48,429	139
1942	416	57,750	165
1943	na	na	na
1944	891	121,596	347
1945	1,193	138,113	395
1946	1,268	124,110	355
1947	1,446	125,369	358
1948	na	na	na
1949	1,938	112,955	323
1950	2,054	95,026	272
1951	na	na	na
1952	3,505	95,509	273
1953	3,187	80,905	231
1954	na	na	na
1955	4,279	90,952	260
1956	7,529	128,622	367
1957	8,728	125,465	358
1958	12,137	127,156	363
1959	21,147	110,252	315
1960	28,615	124,440	356
1961	38,776	155,877	445
1962	45,438	143,655	410
1963	45,569	113,209	323
1964	56,867	110,500	316
1965	59,847	93,705	268
1966	72,287	91,172	260
1967	108,480	108,480	310
1968 ^{3/}	168,880	145,061	414
1969 ^{3/}	152,110	122,788	351

1. Expenditures of the Ministry of Defense Except for 1969(see f.n.#3)
2. Values in constant pesos on a 1967 basis converted into US dollars at the 350/1 rate in effect in 1967 (December).
3. Budgetary expenditures on a functional basis.

SOURCES:

Expenditure data through 1964 taken from the Annual Reports of the Secretaria de Estado de Hacienda de la Nacion; 1965-1969 were taken from official budget reports -- These ran on a calendar year basis through 1966, and beginning again in 1965. The official amounts for Jan.-Oct. 1957 and Nov.1963 through Dec.1964 were converted to a 12 month basis.

as follows. The rising cost of modern "heavy" weaponry will discourage massive purchases of new weapons, and the existing trend will probably continue leading to increased personnel costs and decreasing equipment expenditures as components of the defense budget. At the same time, the armed forces will insist upon limited quantities of modern "heavy" weaponry for purposes of institutional pride, public display and professional morale. However, economic considerations will limit the quantity of these weapons which will include naval vessels of frigate or DE status, tactical ("SAM" or Air to Air) missiles, and super-sonic aircraft. Instead, emphasis will be placed upon modern light armaments, coupled with an indigenous logistical and production capability.

Given the rising cost of "heavy" weaponry, the armed forces will have to be opportunistic vis a vis purchases of sophisticated and modern surplus items (I.e., the A-4Bs). In particular the armed forces will want to most effectively use their armament funds for the development of effective equipment for anti-subversive or counter-insurgency units; and such a policy places continuing emphasis on mobility and maneuverable firepower rather than on strength and specialized firepower per se.

Emphasis on anti-subversive capability, budgetary restraints imposed by national austerity and priority on industry, coupled with a measure of opportunism, will be the principal determinants from an economic point of view, in influencing the future armament procurement policies of the Argentine Armed Forces.

The lack of a civilian political consensus in Argentina tends to make the question raised at the outset of this section essentially academic. The justification for the expenses of armed forces can be raised by no power group other than the Peronists with any hope of significant new answers emerging. The political consciousness of Argentina rests in the dichotomy between the Peronists on one hand and the traditional landed elements and armed forces on the other. The tragedy of modern Argentina is that there is no effective middle ground--a basis for the limited consensus invaluable to representative government. As a result, the conscious point of governing authority in Argentina remains with the armed forces and thereby justifies their sense of direction for the nation as well as the costs that have been and will be incurred.

Beyond this rationale there remains the rather limp and obvious fact that the other nations of the continent maintain similar institutions of generally proportionate power which is to say that armed forces

in Latin America and elsewhere are still regarded as essential symbols of national sovereignty.

Chapter 6

CONCLUSIONS

This paper has demonstrated that the national security interests and policies of Argentina's present armed forces dominated government(s) are warped from their normal course by the peculiar political position of the armed forces in that country. This condition arises from the armed forces' rivalry with the most powerful civilian institution in the nation, Peronism, and is re-enforced by the preponderance of armed forces personnel, active or retired, who now occupy government jobs related to the planning and development of the country.

Under armed forces management, the national planners of Argentina have tended to equate national security with industrialization and national economic self-sufficiency. They have also been preoccupied with their perception of need to develop and actively control the more remote territories and provinces of the country, through the use of civic action projects, settlement schemes and in a few cases the introduction of industries.

The influence of the armed forces on the national security planning and policies of Argentina has been influential in the promotion of the gradual but massive growth of the Armed Forces Factories System. This growth has resulted in an augmentation of the economic influence of the armed forces and reflects their preoccupation with the necessity for national development (industrialization and settlement) as a panacea for political unrest and social disorder.

The desire of the armed forces and of many civilian elements to achieve industrialization in Argentina also arises from their enforced awareness of the nation's isolation from the rest of the world during the two world wars of this century. These wars denied Argentina access to military equipment and industrial elements which the nation's planners considered to be vital. Since, in the case of the Second World War, the nation's isolation was caused by political considerations which Argentines viewed as arbitrary, self-sufficiency as a national goal has assumed a position of primary importance to the armed forces and nationalistic elements in the civilian sectors of the population, which include the Peronists. The development necessary for the achievement of these objectives has necessitated considerable amounts of capital expenditure, often provided jointly by the Armed

Forces and the nation's private sector. A third and economically and politically more controversial element in this field has been that of foreign financial participation and often control of enterprises considered to be vital to the nation's development. The armed forces and civilian political elements have not yet found a national position or a national consensus on this question. At the time at which this paper was typed, the balance hung in favor of foreign capital investment and ownership, with a shifting emphasis toward joint ownership with either the Argentine private sector or the armed forces.

In the international political field, Argentina has traditionally taken nationalistic positions on issues pertaining to national military capability, arms control and disarmament. This tendency arises from Argentina's awareness of the strength of her own armed forces as compared with those of Brazil and now Chile. The Argentine Armed Forces fear of communism as an external factor and more importantly, Peronism as an internal threat, have brought the Government, which they presently control, closer to the interests of the United States on matters related to the hemisphere than the nation's historical interests would normally permit. This trend has been diminished by restrictions imposed on the sale of armaments by the United States to Argentina following the coup of 1966. The result of

U.S. policies in this field, which have been confused since 1966, was a conscious decision by the Argentine Army and, to a lesser extent the Navy, to buy its military hardware in Europe. Called Plan Europa, it resulted in a major equipment modernization by the two services, largely achieved through arrangements with the French and British. Notable exceptions to this policy were to be found in the Air Force's purchase of 50 A-4Bs, and the Navy's purchase of 16 carrier configured A-4Bs in 1970.

Argentina's national security oriented planners have traditionally tended to measure Argentina economically and militarily with Brazil. However, this traditional perspective ought not to be viewed as an arms race in any sense--at least not at the present time--but rather as a time-honored balance of power in a region which is singularly devoid of direct extra-hemispheric influences. Indeed, nationalistic rivalry with Brazil is probably the single most important factor in determining Argentine need for traditional armaments such as naval vessels and cavalry armor. Recent developments in Chile have added the dimension of a neighboring Marxist state to this situation, but will probably not have a profound effect upon Argentina's armament, though it will indeed effect the deployment of what it has. Geographically, the result will be enhanced Argentine interest in the territories of the south, where the barrier of the Andes Mountain Range diminishes, and where Argentina

and Chile have conflicting claims which remain unresolved, in the Beagle Channel and Laguna del Desierto areas.

If the relative strength of Brazil and Chile are deemed to be measurements of need for Argentina's national security planners concerned with armaments, the overwhelmingly crucial political and social problem confronting them is internal--the Peronists. Juan Perón recognized the potential cohesiveness of Argentina's long neglected labor sector, and created a politica-labor union power base without precedent in Latin American history for its political and economic power. Perón came to power in 1946 and remained until overthrown by a faction of the Armed Forces in 1955. During this period he sustained himself in power at least in part by playing his civilian labor supporters off against the armed forces, a tactic which eventually led to the disaffection of the latter institution. With the exit of Perón, the Armed Forces suppressed Peronism without providing the followers of the ex-dictator with a viable form of political expression. The result has been a festering political crisis at an institutional level which has pitted the Armed Forces as self-perceived and ordained guardians of the constitution and political stability against the Peronist labor sector which constitutes over 36% of the civilian electorate.

The enmity between these two national institutions led in part to the overthrow of two elected

civilian Presidents--Frondizi and Illia--and has poisoned the political processes of the nation in that the Armed Forces have to date adamantly refused to permit direct Peronist participation in national elections. The threat of violence arising from the growing frustration of this sector has been a principal preoccupation of Argentina's national security planners and the Commanders of the Armed Forces. It has led to preoccupation with internal security precautions and resultant emphasis within the context of the armed forces and para-military forces upon mobility, and internal security type training for NCOs and officers of the services; much of which is provided by the United States in Panama or through mobile training teams sent directly to Argentina.

A secondary outgrowth of the Government's perception of threat from Peronist or internal communists has been renewed emphasis upon industrialization and the creation of jobs in developed areas, as prevention against active opposition to the Government. In the less developed regions, this attitude has taken the form of better armed forces community relations through services and construction provided by civic action teams. These are intended to forestall disaffection with the Government and the Armed Forces in the nation's more isolated areas.

In sum, the national security and armaments problems and perceptions of Argentina are intimately

intertwined with that nation's political dilemma--the stand-off between the armed forces which control the Government and seek to safeguard their institutional interests and privileges and the Peronists, who represent the most numerous and cohesive political force in the civilian sector of the nation. ~~Unless~~ a salida or "way out" is found by the Lanusse Government, which can satisfy its immediate constituency in the Armed Forces, and enable the Peronists to participate in the politics of the nation, the political dilemma created by the dichotomy between the armed forces and Peronists will at least remain and will probably grow more intense. Symptomatic of this will be labor intransigence to Governmental policies, and occasional outright violence in certain instances, when strikes and ensuing public unrest could weaken the position of the Government and require further direct intervention by the Armed Forces. The situation could become particularly serious from the point of view of the Armed Forces in the event that the Peronists should continue to find common cause with the Marxist Government of Chile.

It should be evident to the reader that the Armed Forces-Peronist standoff is and has created a pathological political and economic situation in Argentina today. This paper should remind the reader of Argentina's more traditional and basic national security oriented

interests, policies and precepts, which I believe will once again become apparent following a political salida. Until then, the national security-defined obsession of the armed forces with Peronism and communism, and their refusal to come to terms with the former has meant that the Governments of Generals Onganía, Levingston, and Lanusse have been almost hopelessly constrained politically. As a result, the national interests of Argentina have been distorted, internal security will be a dominant pre-occupation of the Government's planners, and the national interest overall will be inadequately served. Most serious, however, is the extent to which the political dilemma of the nation has enervated it--economically, socially and politically. Until salida is achieved, Argentina will continue to drift on a pathologically motivated course, and will fail to sustain rational evolution and growth, either politically or economically. Time is also a factor in this rather grim setting, for the stalemate of the Governments of the Armed Forces will continue to weaken them and commensurately contribute to the potential for violence in a nation already polarized in a serious confrontation. The probability factor for the breakdown of the Armed Forces Governments with ensuing violence is directly related to the speed with which salida can be achieved, or at the very least initiated, by the Lanusse Government.

Chapter 7

BIBLIOGRAPHY

It would be appropriate to conclude this study of Argentina's national security policy by placing it within the context of the literature on Argentina. As a study of Argentina's national security interests and policies, this paper is unique in both the Spanish and English language literatures. However, it borders on a number of disciplines and draws from the work of several eminent scholars in related fields.

I particularly wish to cite the excellent and scholarly work of Dr. Robert Potash, who has been studying the role and development of the Argentina Armed Forces. His study of their development from 1928-1945, which was published in 1969 by the Stanford University Press, is definitive. He is presently writing a companion volume which will study the Armed Forces from 1945 through the present era. Dr. Potash's work yielded particularly useful information on the development of the political role of the armed forces. His focus is upon the development of the armed forces as professional institutions and their effect upon the politics of Argentina.

A notably useful and well researched volume by Dr. Harold F. Peterson entitled: Argentina and the U.S.: 1810-1960 provided a wealth of information on the development of Argentine foreign policy and U.S.-Argentine relations. This volume was most useful for its research which led to good primary sources.

The fields of Argentine economic development and foreign policies were covered in a superior manner by the work of Drs. Alberto Conil Paz and Gustavo E. Ferrari, in their volume entitled: Argentina's Foreign Policy, 1930-1960. This work was particularly helpful to me in my analysis of Frondizi's policies and the period following the advent of Perón.

I drew some interesting and valuable insights on Argentina's early foreign policies from Dr. Thomas F. McGann's volume entitled: Argentina: the Divided Land. Dr. McGann suggested the concept of the "Viceregal Tradition" which I developed as a foreign policy leitmotif in Chapter II. This short volume made excellent reading and provided a number of stimulating leads and insights which I found valuable.

The history of Argentina which I used for my background research and which served as my principal historical reference for events prior to 1935 was Ricardo Levene's: A History of Argentina. More recent "historical" sources included the Paz and Ferrari book,

Samuel Bailey's: Labor, Nationalism and Politics in Argentina (for the Peron era), and the volume by José Luis Romero, entitled: A History of Argentine Political Thought.

On the subject of the development missions of the Argentine Armed Forces, I found the work of Juan Enrique Gugliamelli to be superior, valuable, and contemporary supplement to Dr. Potash's more historical study. Gugliamelli's work is also outstanding on matters relating to Argentine strategic thinking, and articles written by himself and his colleagues which have been published in the new magazine Estrategia are almost unique in Latin American literature for lucidity of thought, valid strategic thinking and absence of polemic. I acknowledge considerable debt to the thoughts and work of General Gugliamelli particularly on Argentine views of border disputes, development missions of the armed forces and the international military role open to the Argentine Armed Forces.

Many of the important contributions to this paper came from short Spanish language magazine and newspaper articles. This was very much the case with the work of General Gugliamelli. I particularly used articles by the following Argentine authorities: Oscar Camillon, for his article on Argentine-Chilean relations during the Government of Frondizi; Julio

Morandi on Student Organizations in Argentina (Prensa Latina, Habana); Maj. Edgardo B. Matute, whose article in the Rev. de la Esc. Sup. de Guerra in 1957 traces the origins and growth of anti-communism as a doctrine of the armed forces; and Gen. Orsisis Villegas' article on "Guerra revolucionaria comunista" which reveals the growth of the doctrine of anti-communism during the Frondizi years.

Other written sources of notable value include Admiral Ignacio Varela's Navy Day Speech of May 17, 1968, which is definitive in its presentation of the problems and aspirations of that branch of the armed forces. I found particularly useful a transcript of a lecture given by former Argentine Foreign Minister Nicanor Costa Mendez entitled: "Politica internacional de Argentina: 1880-1930." This piece yields insights into the professionalization of the armed forces and the nation's armament policies at the turn of the century. Another valuable source of data on the contemporary armed forces was a transcript of a talk and question answer session given by Minister for Defense Emilio van Peborgh on November 26, 1968. He addressed the defense needs of Argentina for the present decade and provided a number of valuable statistics to defend his position (a trait shared by his U.S. counterparts).

In sum, to the best of my knowledge, this

paper presents a unique perspective of Argentina. Its focus upon that country's national security policies and interests is also unique to the Latin American field generally. The study drew heavily on existing literature for historical references, political background and economic and strategic considerations. The greater part of the footnotes cite primary research.

PRIMARY SOURCES

Aidar, Miguel. "La Patagonia: Cesafio para una empresa nacional," Estrategia (Sept.-Oct., 1969), pp. 34-39.

A developmentist view of the need to settle and incorporate Patagonia. The value here is that this is representative of the thinking of civilians, and some officers in the armed forces toward the danger and challenge of the south.

Altimir, Oscar y Sourrouille, Jean. "Los Instrumentos de Promoción Industrial en la Post-Guerra," Desarrollo Economico, IV (July-Dec., 1966), pp. 469-487.

This is a general discussion of the history of Argentine efforts to encourage industrial growth since World War II. Too general to be really useful.

Bianchi, A. & von Kirch. "El canal Beagle: fabula y especulacion," Estrategia (Sept.-Oct., 1969), No. 3, pp. 55-65.

An Argentine strategic view of the Beagle Channel dispute, includes a history of the controversy from the Argentine point of view. This is a superior article, complete with maps and charts. Needless to say it is hardly unbiased.

Camilion, Oscar. "Los Protocolos de 1960 y las relaciones Argentino-Chilenas," Estrategia, No. 3 (Sept.-Oct., 1969), pp. 111-123.

This article reflects the views of a former Frondicista official on relations with Chile during the Frondizi Period, but particularly in regard to the settlement of the Andean Enclaves dispute. This is a first-hand account of the period.

Costa Mendez, Nicanor. "Politica internacional de Argentina: 1880-1930." Lecture delivered at the Centro de Altos Estudios, May 5, 1965. (Unpublished mimeograph in Spanish).

This document is of value because it gives considerable attention to events leading up to the professionalization of the armed forces through the founding of their educational system, the arms purchases of the late 19th century and particularly the Pacto de Mayo between Chile and Argentina in 1902. The writer was foreign minister of Argentina under Onganía.

"Communique of the Argentine Government Upon its Signature of the Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America," La Nacion (Buenos Aires), 9/28/67, pp. 1, 4.

This article contains a specific presentation of official Argentine views and interpretations of the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty. The questions of peaceful uses of nuclear explosives and Argentine policy vis a vis the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty are treated in some detail.

"Declaracion conjunta de los presidentes de Argentina y Chile del 21 de Febrero de 1952," in Estrategia, No. 3 (Sept.-Oct., 1969).

This item is of value as an account of this crucial meeting which played a vital role in Perón's unsuccessful attempt to woo Chilean support for his Latin American Economic Union.

Einauti, Luigi, and Stepan, Al. "Latin American Military Force Levels, Armament Expenditures and Related Policies." Informal Talk given at the Dept. of State, INR/XR, 7/17/67. Report drafted by C. Winsor.

This talk constituted Einauti's debriefing following extensive research on Latin American armaments by the two in Peru, Brazil, Chile and Argentina. Of particular value were their perceptions of underlying policies and a number of valuable specific data.

Escobar, Rafael Santibanez (Admiral: Navy of Chile) "La posición Chilena en la Beagle," Estrategia, No. 3 (Sept.-Oct., 1969), pp. 73-78.

A forthright and well written presentation of Chile's position on the Beagle Channel. It was written by the former CINC of the Navy of Chile and contains maps and charts.

Florit, Carlos A. Las Fuerzas Armadas y la Guerra Psicológica. Buenos Aires: Ediciones Arayu, 1963.

A most valuable, albeit biased book by Frondizi's former foreign minister. This book is an almost unique source of data on the Argentine Armed Forces intelligence arms during Frondizi's tenure. The tone is anti-military, but information on organization and dynamics is useful.

Florit, Carlos A. Politica Exterior Nacional.
Buenos Aires: Publicaciones Arayu, 1960.

A somewhat polemical work by Frondizi's foreign minister which may be useful as an indicator of thinking in the Government in the early years of Frondizi's short tenure.

Frigerio, Rogello. Nacionalismo, Potencias Industriales, y Subdesarrollo. Buenos Aires: Editorial Concordia, 1961.

This book is reputed to have strongly influenced Frondizi's later foreign policies. The author advocates the necessity for the LDCs to band together and deal collectively with the industrial powers.

Frondizi, Arturo. La Politica Exterior de Argentina.
Buenos Aires: Publicaciones Arayu, 1962.

A polemical piece of axe-grinding by Frondizi.

Guglialmelli, Gen. Juan E. "Discurso del Director del Centro del Altos Estudios y Escuela Superior de Guerra, General de Brigada Juan Enrique Guglialmelli, el 15 de Diciembre de 1965 con Motivo del Cierre del ano lectivo," Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra, XLIV (Jan.-Feb., 1966), pp. 8-11.

A good albeit brief credo of Armed Forces developmentism. The author is the secretary of the CONADE as of 11/70. He is the leading advocate of armed forces development of the nation's untapped resources.

Guglialmelli, Gen. (Ret.) Juan E. "Los intereses vinculados al 'statu quo' postergan la integracion patagonia," Estrategia (Sept.-Oct., 1969), No. 3, pp. 8-23.

This is an analysis of the problems confronting those who would develop Patagonia. Heavy on facts and useful data.

"Military Assistance Facts." Dept. of Defense, Office for International Security Affairs, pamphlet, March, 1968, 1969.

Gives broad costs of U.S. military assistance programs.

Morandi, Julio. "The Student Organizations in Argentina," Prensa Latina (Havana), July 24, 1969.

A decidedly left-wing/Castroist analysis of Argentina's student movements. This study is useful and rather unique.

"Obra del Ejército en la Educación, la Investigación Científica, la Industria, y la Acción Cívica," Revista del Circulo Militar, No. 670 (Oct.-Dec., 1963), pp. 31-34.

This article is unsigned and suggests a position paper by advocates of increased armed forces civic action. General and somewhat short; dated.

Onganía, Lt. General Juan Carlos. "The Government, the Armed Forces and the National Community." Speech given at West Point, June, 1964.

This speech represents a useful recapitulation of the liberal attitudes and homilies of the Armed Forces. Featured was Onganía's forceful rejection of Armed Forces intervention in Government. His acceptance of the Presidency two years later is illustrative of the futility in attempting to peg the factions of this institution to ideological convictions.

Paz, Hipólito, "La política Argentino-Chilean durante la presidencia de Perón," Estrategia, No. 3 (Sept.-Oct., 1969), pp. 103-110.

This is an unusual article by a former Peronist official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is a first hand account of Perón's dealings with Chile, with particular emphasis on the Pact of Santiago and its aftermath. A short but factual and well written piece.

Perlanger, Col. Luis Cesar. "Laguna del Desierto: un entredicho fronterizo aun no concluido," Estrategia, No. 3 (Sept.-Oct., 1969), pp. 85-94.

A rather nationalistic presentation of the Argentine side of the Laguna de Desierto dispute. It is heavy on law and history.

Hull, Cordell. The Memoirs of Cordell Hull. New York: MacMillan Co., 1948.

The Memoirs are useful because they contain first-hand references to hemispheric diplomacy in the late 30s and war years. The former secretary of state was never very well disposed to Argentina after 1935.

Imaz, José Luis. Los que mandan. Buenos Aires: EUDBA, 1964.

A definitive book on the social origins and attitudes of Argentine Armed Forces officers. The study indicates that the make-up of the officers is shifting toward the children of middle class immigrant parents, with associated changes in points of view and political interests.

Inter-American Defense Board Staff Paper. "Work of the Armed Forces in the Economic and Social Development of the Countries." Washington, D.C.: Inter American Defense Board staff monograph, #T-255, 6/8/65.

This paper contains a somewhat dated but valuable compilation of military civic action programs in the Latin American nations. It is a unique source, divided into categories of programs and national sub-sections, and contains many references to specific projects and responsibilities.

Jessup, P. C. "The Saavedra Lamas Anti-War Draft Treaty," American Journal of International Law, XXVII, Jan. 1933.

An observer's account of the historic Buenos Aires Conference of 1936. Does not flatter the late Argentine foreign Minister.

Matute, Major Edgardo Bautista. "Eficaz repuesta al Castro-Communismo," Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra, Vol. XIV (May-Aug., 1957), pp. 109-112.

This article is one of the first indications of the growth of Anti-Communism in the Argentine Armed Forces. It was essentially a call to Argentina to answer Castro's ideological challenge.

Quadros, Janios. "Brazil's New Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 40 (October, 1961), pp. 19-28.

A somewhat confusing defense of Cuba and an assertion of Brazilian foreign policy for the benefit of a United States readership. This is useful as a perspective of a fleeting anomaly on the Brazilian foreign policy scene. Its value here was as an indicator of Frondizi's own thinking which followed it closely on the Cuban issue.

Salano, Mario. "Our Military Men: What We Don't Know About Them," Atlantida (Buenos Aires), February, 1967, U.S. Embassy translation.

This article was written under a pen-name, probably by General Lanusse. Referred to as the "Virgin Sword" article, it created considerable controversy within the armed forces. It is useful for its analysis of military attitudes and data on retirement.

Silvert, Kalman H. "The Military, A Handbook for Their Control," American Universities Field Staff, Inc., East Coast South America Series, Vol. V, No. 1, 1958. (Contains a verbatim speech by Gen. Roberto Gonzales on the professionalist development of the Argentine Armed Forces, with a wealth of detail).

Van Peborgh, Minister of Defense Emilio. "Remarks at the Foreign Press Association Luncheon," November 26, 1968 (prepared text translated by the U.S. Embassy, Buenos Aires).

This speech contains a useful presentation of the objectives of the Onganía Government, with particular reference to the defense needs of Argentina. He answers criticism of his Department's budget with statistics which are both accurate and unobtainable from other sources, (a characteristic of his counterparts in the USA).

Varela, Admiral Ignacio (Commander in Chief of the Navy), "Navy Day Speech," May 17, 1968, at Comodoro Rivadavia. (From prepared text in Spanish, translated by C. Winsor).

A most detailed and invaluable presentation of the objectives, history, needs, and fiscal problems of the Argentine Navy. This speech is a mine of unique data and reveals the strategic perspectives of the navy in the 1960s. It is a very valuable document for any scholar with interests in the Argentine Navy from any perspective.

Villegas, Gen. Osiris G. Guerra Revolucionaria Comunista. Buenos Aires: 1963.

An interesting article by the present chief of the CONASE, indicating the Argentine Armed Forces perception of threat from Communism. This is basically a polemical tract but still reveals the nature of the Armed Forces anxieties during the post-Frondizi period.

Zavala, Miguel. El gobierno constitucional y la unidad de America--antecedentes recopilados. Buenos Aires, 1967 (an unpublished monograph in Spanish).

This is a valuable source of key policy speeches during the Illia years. The positions taken during the Santo Domingo episode (1965) and the positions of the Illia Government on all foreign policy issues are treated here through the selective use of Zavala's speeches and writings. This document was probably published clandestinely as it has no attribution. It is a most useful source of primary data on the Illia interlude.

SECONDARY SOURCES

Books

- Astiz, Carlos Alberto (ed.). Latin American International Politics: Ambitions, Capabilities and National Interest of Mexico, Brazil and Argentina. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969.
- Bailey, Samuel L. Labor, Nationalism and Politics in Argentina. New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1967.
A good source of information on Peron and his uses of labor and foreign policy.
- Bienen, Henry (ed.). Institutionalized Intervention. New York: The Russell Sage Press, 1969.
- Dame, Hartley F., et al. "The Political Influence of University Students in Latin America." Washington, D. C.: Special Operations Research Office/CIMFAC, American University, 1965. (DOD Monograph available at Defense Documentation Center).
- Ferns, H. S. Britain and Argentina in the Nineteenth Century. London: Clarendon Press, 1960.
- Ferrer, Aldo. La Economia Argentina. Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1968.
- Green, William. Air Forces of the World. London: MacDonald & Company, 1958.
Contains a good history of the Argentine Air Force.
- Huntington, Ellsworth. The Mainsprings of Civilization. New York: Mentor, 1958.
- James, Preston E. Latin America. 3rd ed. New York: Odessey Press, 1959.
- Janes Fighting Ships. London: Sampson Low, Marston and Co., 1969.
- Janes All the World Aircraft. London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co., 1969.
Unfortunately this only deals with aircraft produced in each nation.

- Levene, Ricardo. A History of Argentina. (Translated and edited by W. S. Robertson). Chapel Hill, N. C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1937.
An excellent history of Argentina for general use.
- Maday, Bela, et al. U.S. Army Area Handbook for Brazil. Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., Dept. of the Army Pamphlet #550-20, 1964.
- Magnet, Alejandro. Nuestros Vecinos Justicialisticas. Santiago de Chile: Editorial de Pacifico, 1953.
A Chilean perspective of Perón's economic and diplomatic overtures to Chile in the early 1950s.
- Marshall-Cornwall, Maj. Gen. J. J. Geographic Disarmament: A Study of Regional Demilitarization. London: Oxford University Press, 1935.
A useful source for data on the pre-World War I Latin American armaments agreements, particularly the so-called "ABC Pact", the Pacto de Mayo and the Pact of 1910.
- McGann, Thomas F. Argentina: The Divided Land. Princeton: Princeton, N. J.: Van Nostrand Co., 1966.
A general and short but good "perspective" book on Argentina. The Vice-Regal Tradition was suggested here.
- McGann, Thomas F. Argentina, The United States, and the Inter-American System, 1880-1914. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957.
A good source for the wrangling between the U.S. and Argentina during the formative years of the Inter-American System.
- Munson, Fredrick P., et al. Area Handbook for Argentina. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, Dept. of the Army Pamphlet #550-73, 1969.
- Orsolini, Mario. La Crisis del Ejercito. Buenos Aires: Ediciones Arayu, 1964.
An interesting commentary on the inter-service conflicts of 1962-1963, polemical.
- Orsolini, Mario. El Ejercita Argentino y Crecimiento Nacional. Buenos Aires: Ediciones Arayu, 1965.
A developmentist view of the role of the Armed Forces.

Paz, Alberto A. Conil, and Ferrari, Gustavo E.
Argentina's Foreign Policy: 1930-1960.

Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966.

A thorough and well documented, if opinionated study of Argentina's foreign policy. The author is anti-Frondizi, but this is a most valuable source of data and perspective.

Pendle, George. Argentina. London: Oxford University Press, 1963.

A good, short "perspective book" on Argentina with some useful insights and analysis. It is a good source of deeper reference material.

Peterson, Harold F. Argentina and the United States: 1810-1960. Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York, 1964.

A very thoroughly researched work, and a mine of data. This book is a fine source of information on the subject. The author's use of analysis and his conclusions are decidedly inferior to his research.

Potash, Robert. The Army and Politics in Argentina: 1928-1945. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1969.

An exhaustively researched and authoritative book on the role and development of the Argentine Army. Potash is an excellent source of data and insight. His book is uniformly accurate and good.

Ramos, Jorge Abelardo. Historia Politica del Ejército Argentino. Buenos Aires: Editorial A. Pena Lillo, 1959.

An anti-Peronist polemic.

Rennie, Ysabel F. The Argentine Republic. New York: MacMillan Co., 1945.

A spotty history of Argentina, written in a readable style and a good source of further research materials and references.

Romero, José Luis. A History of Argentine Political Thought. Into. and trans. by Thomas McGann. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1963.

Rowe, James W. "Argentina's Restless Military," from Latin American Politics, 24 Studies of the Current Scene. Robert D. Tomasek, editor. New York: Doubleday and Company, 1966.

Scobie, James R. Argentina, A City and A Nation.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1964.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI), SIPRI Yearbook of Armaments and
Disarmament: 1968-1969. New York: Humanities
Press, 1969.

A good source of statistics on arms expenditures
and purchases.

Stuart, Graham H. Latin America and the United States.
New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1956.

Sueldo, Horacio. "Las Fuerzas Armadas," from Argentina:
1930-1960. Buenos Aires: Editorial del Sur, 1961.

Contains useful data on the size and deployment
of the armed forces and para-military forces.

Whitaker, Arthur P. The United States and Argentine.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954.

Welles, Sumner. Seven Decisions That Shaped History.
New York: Harper & Co., 1950.

OTHER PRIMARY SOURCES

Periodicals and Newspapers Consulted or Cited Without Titles

Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, D.C.)

The New York Times (NYC)

The Christian Science Monitor (Boston)

La Prensa (Buenos Aires)

La Nacion (Buenos Aires)

Clarín (Buenos Aires)

Confirmado (Buenos Aires)

El Cronista Comercial (Buenos Aires)

Boletín Oficial (Buenos Aires)

El Siglo (Santiago)

The "FBIS Reports" for Latin America (Washington)

Primera Plana (Buenos Aires, closed down, fall, 1969).

La Razon (Buenos Aires)

Comunidad (Buenos Aires)

Flying Review (New York)

Air Pictures (New York)

Royal Air Force Review (London)

Aeroplana (Paris)

Vision (Mexico City)

El Comercio (Lima)

Missiles and Rockets (Los Angeles)

Unclassified Official Documents
and Reports

United States Department of State, Political Reports on Argentine Internal Affairs. Decimal File 835 ("Argentine Affairs") The National Archives of the United States, Washington, D. C. (Microfilmed).

German Foreign Office Files, Rolls 4006, 25, 26, 762, 766, and 347; microfilm copy T 120 ("Argentine Affairs"), available at the National Archives of the U.S.

Anales de Legislación Argentina.

Interviews with Persons Having First
Hand Knowledge of the Subject

Ambassador Robert McClintock (U.S. Ambassador to Argentina, 1964-1965) - reviewed the first two chapters of the paper and provided a number of extremely useful insights. His knowledge of Frondizi's playing the services off against each other and attempting to involve the U.S. in their disputes was most valuable to this paper.

Ambassador Arturo Ludueña (Ret.) of the Argentine Foreign Service from 1936-1956 has also reviewed this paper in its entirety for accuracy. His most useful contributions were in his assessments of Perón's foreign policies and his analysis of traditional Argentine views of Europe and related trades policy.

Robert A. Potash, author of The Army and Politics in Argentina: 1928-1945 provided me with some useful insights into the armed forces perceptions of threat and internal divisions. He is currently writing a book on Argentina's Army from 1945 through the present, with emphasis on their political role.

Geoffrey Kemp, writer and correspondent for the Institute for Strategic Studies in London was most generous in making available his data on arms purchase by the armed forces.

Priscilla Clapp of the Browne and Shaw Division of Bolt, Bernak and Newman in Boston was able to make available to me an invaluable file of recorded arms transfers and sales to the Argentine Armed Forces.

Elizabeth Hyman, Alexander Sleight and Tom Riggs of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State and who have lived or done research in Argentina were most helpful in assisting me on specifics.

Roberto Campora of the Embassy of Argentina in Washington provided some interesting perspectives of Argentina's relationship with Brazil.

NEWSPAPER EDITORIALS AND UNSIGNED ARTICLES

"Comando en Jefe del Ejército." Boletín Oficial, March 27, 1968, p. 1, col. 1.

The official version of the new laws pertaining to the national defense and command structures.

"Díese a conocer el Texto de la Ley de Defensa." La Prensa, October 8, 1966, pp. 1 and 8.

Contains the new law decrees establishing the CONASE and CONADE and setting forth their powers.

"Las Fuerzas Armadas en Argentina." (unsigned) Confirmado (Buenos Aires), April 27, 1967, pp. 24-26.

A brief pro-military exhortation of the Armed Forces role in creating a greater Argentina which smacks of an official Government position.

"La controversia sobre el Canal Beagle," (editorial) El Mercurio (Santiago daily), Oct. 27, 1966.

"Nuevamente el Beagle," (editorial) El Diario Ilustrado, June 19, 1968.

Two key Chilean editorials on the Beagle Channel dispute which are useful for perspective.

"Una decision de soberania." Comunidad (Buenos Aires), May 1968, p. 8.

An emotional and highly nationalistic defense of the Army's Plan Europa and of the decisions to purchase new ships for the navy. This is a good presentation of the nationalistic justifications for well-equipped armed forces.

SECONDARY SOURCES: MAGAZINE ARTICLES AND OTHER DOCUMENTS

Alexander, Robert J. "Peronism and Argentina's Quest for Leadership in Latin America." Journal of Inter-American Affairs, Volume 9, No. 1, 1955, p. 54.

A useful, albeit somewhat contemporary analysis of Perón's foreign policies by an excellent scholar.

Burr, Robert N. "The Balance of Power in Nineteenth Century South America." Hispanic American Historical Review, February, 1955, pp. 40-42.

A valuable work which is particularly useful for insights into the Argentine-Brazilian rivalry and war in the early 19th century.

Ciriliano, Dr. Gustavo F. J. "En busca de una coincidencia de hipotesis interpretivas de la realidad Argentina." Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra, XLIV, May-June, 1966, pp. 23-29.

A brief and polemical political analysis of the problems as perceived by the Armed Forces prior to the ouster of Illia.

Epstein, Fritz T. "European Influences in Latin America." Unpublished manuscript at Lib. of Congress, microfilm 7104-F, estimated date - 1941.

A rather unique and useful document with some useful data on the German Army's influence in Argentina.

Forzano, Col. Lino D. Montial. "El afianzamiento de las fronteras y la cooperación." Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra, XLIV, July-August, 1966, pp. 80-82.

An armed forces/developmentist's view of the possibilities for private sector-armed forces cooperation in the development of the south. Too short, and polemical.

Galarza, Ernesto. "Argentine Labor Under Perón." Inter-American Reports, No. 2, March, 1948, pp. 13-14.

Goldwert, Marvin. "Dichotomies of Militarism in Argentina." Orbis, Fall, 1966, Vol. IX, No. 3, pp. 930-939.

A useful account of the divisions within the armed forces following the fall of Perón. This article is not comprehensive but is useful as background to an extremely complex period.

Hillmen, Tommie, Junior. "A History of the Armed Forces of Chile from Independence to 1920." Ph.D. Dissertation, Syracuse University, 1963. (Copy: Dept. of State--unpublished).

Contains some interesting research on the growth of professionalism in the Chilean Army. Attention is also given to European influences.

Holmes, Olive. "Perón's Greater Argentina and the United States." Foreign Policy Reports, XXIV, December 1, 1948, pp. 164-165.

A decidedly optimistic view of Argentine capabilities in the heyday of Perón. The article is only useful as an indicator of the scope of Perón's ambitions.

Kemp, Geoffrey and Sutton, John L. "Arms to Developing Countries: 1945-1965." London: ISS Adelphi Papers #28, October, 1966.

An accurate and well written analysis of the arms flow into the developing areas since World War II. Notable is the author's conclusions that the Latin Americans are the least armed nations of all the LDCs.

Leoni, Major Luis Alberto. "Encuadre de la Institución Ejército en el Estado Moderno," Revista Militar, CLXLII, Oct.-Dec., 1960, pp. 29-43.

Martin, Lt. Col. José Pedro. "La Patagonia Argentina--Incidencia de Su Desarrollo en el Orden Nacional," Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra, XXIV, Sept.-Dec., 1966, pp. 155-163.

Menendez, Armando Braun. "Roca y Los Pactos de Mayo," Estrategia, No. 3, Sept.-Oct., 1969, pp. 95-102.

An authoritative and useful study of the 1902 Pact which is well written and factual.

Wood, David. "Armed Forces in Central and South America." London: ISS, Adelphi Paper #34, April, 1967, pp. 8-11.

An accurate and factual analysis of the Armed Forces of Latin America. Kemp reaches the conclusion that there is no "arms race" in the area, which is relatively "under armed."

Zamudio, Lic. Mario Ameghino. "Las relaciones publicas en las Fuerzas Armadas," Revista del Circulo Militar, LXV, Jan.-April, 1965, pp. 73-87.

An exhortation for the Armed Forces to better their image nationally through good works and civic action . . . polemical.

Zoehrerer, H. A. "The Armed Forces of Argentina: A Comparative Analysis of Civil Military Relationships." (unpublished seminar paper, SIS/American University), December 22, 1963, 24 pp.

A brief but useful perspective piece.